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ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses three different sources of matched employer-employee (MEE) data
to study how firm-level heterogeneity influences workers’ labor market outcomes. Chapters I
and II deal with implicit contracts or long-term unenforceable agreements between firms and
workers that govern outcomes such as the split between wage and non-wage compensation,
the duration of employment relationships, worker productivity, and risk sharing. Chapter
III considers the statistical challenge of creating a MEE dataset by linking a household-level
survey with establishment-level administrative data in the absence of unique identifiers.
In chapter I, I study the determinants of retirement behavior by exploiting the recent and
widespread elimination of traditional pensions and subsequent adoption of 401(k) plans by
U.S. employers. Using thousands of firm-level natural experiments, I show that unexpected
losses in future compensation engendered by pension plan transitions induce a 1 percentage
point increase in retirement on impact. Affected workers who do not retire immediately
lengthen their careers and exhibit a 2 percentage point reduction in retirement 10 years after
the pension plan transition. Observed heterogeneity in retirement behavior is indicative of
differences in wealth and in preferences for leisure. Using these treatment effects as estimation
targets, I fit a structural model of retirement and saving in which workers with different levels
of wealth and different preferences for leisure exhibit heterogenous behavior when faced with
a pension plan transition. I use simulations from the model to show that a counterfactual
policy that eliminates Social Security payroll taxes for workers over age 60 increases the
average retirement age by one year and provides substantial welfare gains to older workers.
In chapter II, which is co-authored with Parag Mahajan, we use MEE data from Germany
to show that cohorts entering the labor market during a recession experience a 4.9 percent
reduction in wages cumulated over the first decade of labor market experience. While 40
percent of the recession-induced wage loss is explained by workers matching with lower
paying firms, we use a revealed preference-based algorithm to show that fully three-fourths
of the losses in employer-specific pay are compensated for by non-pay amenities. The higher
non-pay amenities that we associate with recessionary labor market entrants are consistent
with the view that employers that hire during business cycle downturns exhibit less cyclically
sensitive labor demand and provide greater long-term job security. Our findings indicate
x
that the welfare cost of labor market entry during recessions is less severe than pecuniary
estimates would imply.
In chapter III, which is co-authored with John Abowd, Joelle Abramowitz, Margaret
Levenstein, Kristin McCue, Trivellore Raghunathan, Ann Rodgers, Matthew Shapiro, and
Nada Wasi, we illustrate an application of record linkage between a household-level survey
and an establishment-level administrative dataset in the absence of unique identifiers. Record
linkage in this setting is challenging because the distribution of employment across firms is
highly asymmetric. To address these difficulties, we use a supervised machine learning model
to probabilistically link survey respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) with
employers and establishments in the Census Business Register (BR) to create a new data
source which we call the CenHRS. We use multiple imputation to propagate uncertainty
from the linkage step into subsequent analyses of the linked data. The linked data reveal new
evidence that survey respondents’ misreporting and selective nonresponse about employer
characteristics are systematically correlated with wages.
xi
CHAPTER I
Breaking the Implicit Contract: Using Pension Freezes
to Study Lifetime Labor Supply
1.1 Introduction
The aging of the baby boom generation poses stark challenges that affects not only the
financial future of retirees but also the overall performance of the economy. As a large share
of the population permanently withdraws from the labor force, economic growth will slow,
more individuals will claim Social Security and Medicare benefits, and fewer workers will pay
into these social insurance programs. To mitigate some of these adverse effects, researchers
have proposed policies that incentivize delayed retirement by altering the tax code or by
changing the structure of public and private pension benefits.
Predicting retirement responses to policy-induced changes in compensation structure
is subject to two empirical challenges. The first challenge relates to defining the horizon
that workers consider when making retirement decisions. Several studies including Krueger
and Pischke (1992), Rogerson and Wallenius (2013), Brown (2013), and Manoli and Weber
(2016) model retirement in the context of contemporaneous changes in compensation. In
contrast, Stock and Wise (1990) emphasize that the retirement decision is determined not
only by contemporaneous compensation but also by the entire path of expected future
compensation.1 The role of long horizons in determining retirement is important and has
been validated empirically using both reduced-form and structural methods (see, e.g., Coile
and Gruber (2007) and references therein). Nevertheless, a limitation of studies that do
adopt a forward-looking view on retirement behavior is that they have been identified either
using cross sectional variation or using panel fixed effect designs. These empirical approaches
1Implicit contracts that solve agency problems are a powerful force connecting current labor supply
decisions to future compensation. See Lazear (1979), Lazear (1981) and Akerlof and Katz (1989) for
important theoretical contributions.
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can be problematic because within- and between-person differences in future compensation
are likely correlated with unobserved determinants of lifetime labor supply. Closely related
to this concern, the second challenge stems from the fact that unanticipated changes in
compensation generate both wealth and substitution effects, and the identification of the
structural parameters governing these effects is difficult when relying on panel data alone
(see, e.g., MaCurdy (1981)).
In this paper, I address both challenges. I use a novel source of variation to identify
a model of retirement behavior in which workers’ retirement decisions depend on both
current and expected future compensation. My identification strategy relies on the large-scale
restructuring of U.S. private sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans which began in the
early 2000’s. Since then, many employers have reneged on long-standing promises to their
workers by eliminating generous DB pension accruals and replacing them with less lucrative
defined contribution (DC) and cash balance (CB) pension plans.2 These actions, known as
pension freezes, allow workers to keep previously earned pension benefits but unexpectedly
change the present value of future compensation that workers have been promised but
are yet to be paid.3 From a research perspective, pension freezes are useful because they
generate unanticipated shifts in workers’ age-compensation profiles which induce both wealth
and substitution effects.4 As I describe below, this source of variation credibly identifies
preference parameters governing retirement behavior thereby providing a better way to
predict how older workers will react to unexpected policy-induced changes in compensation
structure.
To study why employers have increasingly restructured their DB plans and to examine
how employees respond to these changes, I create a new dataset that matches information
from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative records on the universe of private sector
pension plans with longitudinal employer-employee linked data from the Census Bureau. My
research design pools together thousands of firm-level natural experiments and compares the
labor supply behavior of workers whose employers freeze their DB plans with workers whose
2401(k) plans are the most common type of DC plan. Unlike traditional DB pensions which guarantee
workers an income stream in retirement, DC plans allow workers to accumulate retirement savings in
tax-preferred accounts. Employers typically provide incentives for participation in these plans by matching
worker contributions. CB plans are functionally similar to DC plans. More details are provided in Section
1.2.
3The abrupt nature of these changes are reflected in the sentiment of one disgruntled Verizon employee
who, after hearing of the company’s decision to freeze his DB pension, said “Oh, it’s outrageous that they ...
change the rules in the middle of the game.” See “Verizon Unveils Major Changes to Retirement Benefits,”
National Public Radio, All Things Considered, December 6, 2005.
4Krueger and Pischke (1992), Brown (2013), and Gelber et al. (2016) also rely on unanticipated changes
in pension compensation to study retirement behavior. These studies do not use variation in future
compensation to identify a structural model or estimate the effect of counterfactual policies.
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employers keep their DB plans intact.
On the firm side, I provide evidence that pension freezes are driven primarily by plan
funding deficiencies and are unrelated to mass layoffs or employee age structure. On the
worker side, I show that the retirement response to these shocks varies in two important
dimensions. First, workers initially affected at different ages exhibit differing retirement
responses because they experience compensation losses of varying magnitude. Second,
holding age fixed, some workers respond to freezes by retiring early while others respond by
retiring later. Early retirements reflect the dominance of substitution effects while delayed
retirements reflect the dominance of wealth effects. Workers’ dynamic response to pension
freezes is therefore indicative of heterogeneity in wealth and/or preferences for leisure.
The administrative data that I use describe employment responses to pension freezes.
These data do not include information on the dollar value of compensation changes induced
by pension freezes. To estimate the pecuniary effects of pension freezes and to conduct
counterfactual simulations, I develop and estimate a structural model of retirement timing
and saving that relies on rich survey data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
The model incorporates heterogeneity in wealth and in preferences for leisure and allows
work decisions to depend not only on current compensation but also on the option of higher
earnings and increased pension benefits in the future as in Stock and Wise (1990). Unlike
Stock and Wise (1990), however, the model allows for saving in multiple asset types, includes
Social Security benefits, and features non-linear taxes.5 I fit the model using the method
of simulated moments (MSM) by matching quasi-experimental employment responses to
pension freezes as observed in administrative data.
The model that I estimate highlights the importance of forward-looking behavior in
governing the retirement decision and lends itself to evaluating the impact of counterfactual
policies aimed at incentivizing delayed retirement through a permanent shift in future
compensation trajectories. I examine one such proposal through the lens of the model.
In particular, I consider eliminating the Social Security or Old Age and Survivors Insurance
(OASI) component of the payroll tax for workers over the age of 60. This reform has been
proposed as a way of lengthening lifetime labor supply by removing contribution requirements
for workers who are fully vested in Social Security benefits (see, e.g., Burtless and Quinn
(2002) and Goda et al. (2009)). Simulations from the estimated model predict that an
unexpected elimination of the OASI payroll tax at age 60 causes employment rates to rise by
an average of approximately 5 percentage points over a 20 year horizon which equates to a
5The model I use is a stochastic dynamic programming model of retirement and not an option value
model as pioneered by Stock and Wise (1990). Lumsdaine et al. (1992) provide a comparison of the two
approaches.
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1.1 year delay in the average retirement age. Equivalent variation from the reform averages
$75,000 per worker.6
In this paper, I make three contributions to the literature. First, I provide the
only available evidence of how older Americans have re-timed their retirement decisions
in response to widespread DB pension freezes. These analyses, based on high-quality
administrative data, shed new light on the ongoing transition from DB to DC pension
provision. While prior studies examining the incentive effects of DB and DC pension plans
have emphasized that DC plans encourage longer careers (see, e.g., Friedberg and Webb
(2005)), the findings I present in this paper show that unexpected transitions from DB to
DC plans generate a mixed response: some workers choose to shorten their careers whereas
others choose to lengthen them. Second, I estimate a model of retirement and saving which
is identified by plausibly exogenous variation in future compensation arising from pension
freezes. This natural experiment-based identification strategy represents a departure from
prior structural models of retirement that rely on cross sectional or panel data to isolate
variation in compensation (see, e.g., Stock and Wise (1990), Berkovic and Stern (1991), Rust
and Phelan (1997), French (2005), and French and Jones (2011)). Finally, I provide evidence
about the effectiveness of a counterfactual reform to payroll taxes designed to lengthen
careers. In contrast to prior efforts evaluating the effect of payroll tax sunsets (Laitner
and Silverman (2012) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2015)), the model and identification
strategy employed in this paper explicitly account for the long-term option value channel of
continued employment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides institutional
details on the DB pension landscape in the United States and explains important recent
changes influencing firms’ decisions to freeze their plans. Section 1.3 outlines a model of
retirement timing and saving and uses the model to evaluate how workers respond to pension
freezes. Section 1.4 discusses three different sources of administrative data used in the
analyses. Section 1.5 outlines the empirical framework and presents summary statistics.
Section 1.6 provides empirical evidence on workers’ labor supply responses to pension freezes.
Section 1.7 explains the identification and estimation of the structural model and presents
parameter estimates. Section 1.8 evaluates the counterfactual OASI payroll tax sunset.
Section 1.9 concludes.
6Estimated in 2010 dollars with present values calculated at age 60.
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1.2 Why are employers freezing DB plans?
In 1980 DB plans covered 61 percent of pension eligible private sector workers. By 2015
the same statistic had fallen to 16 percent.7 This overall decline occurred not only because
of a surge in new 401(k) DC plans but also because of stagnation in the creation of new
DB plans. For most of this period, DB plans continued to operate normally with only rare
instances of distressed plan terminations triggered by firm bankruptcy.8 Starting in the late
1990’s, however, several prominent firms began converting their DB plans to CB plans. CB
conversions switched pension accruals away from formulas that were based on years of service
and earnings, to account based plans that provided participants employer contributions that
were proportional to earnings and a market linked rate of return on previous contributions.9
In the early 2000’s this shift was amplified as many employers altogether ended traditional
DB pension accruals in actions known as hard freezes.10 The incidence of CB conversions
and hard freezes between 1999 and 2015 is shown in Figure 1.1. By 2015, about half of
all private sector single employer DB plans had either been converted to CB plans or hard
frozen, affecting about 40 percent of active participants or 4.1 million workers.11
1.2.1 Costs of DB plan provision have become increasingly volatile
Firm’s decisions to renege on DB promises through CB conversions and hard freezes
occurred in a deteriorating financial environment that increased the volatility of DB pension
costs. As shown in Figure 1.2, the wake of the dot-com bubble and ensuing recession lowered
the asset value of pension funds substantially. In 2000, the private sector DB system had
$1.44 in assets for each dollar of future liabilities. By 2004, the funding ratio had slipped
7See Table E7, Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs, U.S. Department of Labor,
2018.
8The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 reduced the ability of DB sponsoring employers to take
tax deductions for pension contributions. This change led to a spike in non-distress terminations between
1987 and 1990 (see, e.g., Table A-9 in Pension Insurance Data Book 1996, PBGC Single Employer Program
https://www.pbgc.gov/documents/1996databook.pdf).
9CB plans are functionally very similar to DC plans: they provide participants with individual accounts
whose value is tied to earnings levels. There are, however, two differences. First, CB plans allow for larger
maximum pre-tax deferrals than DC plans. Second, it is common in CB plans for employers to bear some
interest rate risk by promising a minimum rate of return on the value of the account. For these reasons, CB
plans are subject to the same funding obligations required of DB plans and are legally treated as DB plans.
10Over the same period, employers also began closing their DB plans to new entrants in actions known
as soft-freezes. I do not consider soft-freezes in this paper.
11Hard freezes are exceedingly rare in the public sector affecting less than 0.5 percent of eligible state
and local government workers. The main reason for this difference owes to differing legal protections in the
private and public sectors. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which governs
private pensions, explicitly allows sponsors to modify future pension rules provided that earned pension
benefits are not reduced. In the public sector, which is not subject to the provisions of ERISA, several state
governments protect both earned and unearned future pension benefits. See, e.g., Monahan (2012).
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to 0.85. As the funding position of DB plans worsened, statutory provisions required firms
to increase annual contributions; consequently, aggregate payments into DB pension funds
rose five-fold from $26 billion in 2000 to $124 billion in 2003. Low interest rates and
stock market losses during the Great Recession weakened firms’ funding positions drawing
further increases in required pension contributions. These shocks disproportionately affected
plans with marginal funding status as they were not buffered against large contributions
requirements in the same way that overfunded plans were. The role of worsening plan
finances as a key predictor of subsequent pension freezes is demonstrated greater detail in
Appendix A.3, which relies on firm-level microdata.12
In the midst of major changes to the finances of DB pension funds, the Pension Protection
Act (PPA) was signed into law in 2006. The PPA established more conservative standards on
the interest rates that sponsors could use to discount future liabilities, reduced the period over
which sponsors needed to amortize funding deficits from 15 years to 7 years, and required that
plans with funding ratios of 80 percent or below make additional minimum contributions and
pay higher insurance premiums to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).13
These key provisions of the PPA, which were phased-in as of 2008, raised statutory minimum
pension contributions and imposed greater cost pressure on DB sponsors with marginal
funding status.
1.2.2 Legal constraints to freezing plans have been alleviated
Between 1998 and 2000, a handful of prominent employers had converted traditional DB
plans to CB plans. Older employees, who stood to lose substantial future pension accruals
as a result these transitions, brought class action lawsuits against their employers claiming
that CB conversions violated the age discrimination provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (see, e.g., Zelinksy (2000)). As these cases played out in
the court system, the legality of CB conversions remained uncertain. The threat of litigation
along with large potential settlement costs for class action lawsuits likely constrained other
employers from converting traditional DB plans. In 2006, however, a Federal appeals court
ruled that IBM’s CB conversion was age-neutral, thereby ending uncertainty surrounding
12Munnell and Soto (2007), Bovbjerg et al. (2008), and Rauh et al. (2020) also find that cost savings
and funding volatility are important determinants of firms’ decisions to freeze their DB plans. A compliance
check on frozen DB plans conducted by the IRS in 2012 and obtained through a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for this research project further corroborates this conclusion finding that sponsors typically
froze their plans due to funding deficiencies.
13Some of the PPA’s requirements were relaxed during the Great Recession as pension sponsors sought
relief from strict funding targets. For instance, The Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
and Pension Relief Act of 2010 allowed firms to elect extended amortization periods for any two plan years
between 2008 and 2011. The extensions were for 9 or 15 years rather than the 7 year requirement of the
PPA.
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the legality of what was seen by many as an important test for restructuring traditional DB
plans.14 In the same year the new PPA law provided guidelines that CB conversions needed
to meet in order to be considered age-neutral. Together, the appeals court ruling and the
PPA’s new provisions gave willing employers the legal cover they needed to restructure their
DB plans.
1.3 Model of retirement and saving
This section develops a model of retirement timing and saving. Using the model, I
show that pension freezes generate both substitution and wealth effects and therefore have
an ambiguous impact on retirement behavior. I explain how heterogeneity in wealth and
in preferences for leisure implies differential retirement responses for workers faced with
freeze-induced losses in future compensation. I summarize these comparative statics into
three empirically testable implications.
1.3.1 Defined benefit pension incentives
Before characterizing the model, I illustrate key features of DB plans and their effect
on total compensation using data from the HRS. The left panel of Figure 1.3 shows the
age-compensation profile for the average, DB eligible, HRS respondent between the age of
50 and 70. The dashed line shows wage and salary compensation. The solid line adds
DB and DC pension accruals to wage and salary compensation. Notably, about half of
the respondents in the DB eligible sample have non-zero DC balances.15 Two types of
non-linearities typical to DB pensions are evident in the figure. First, DB accruals generate
prominent spikes in compensation. At age 55, which is a common early retirement age (ERA)
in many DB plans, workers can begin claiming benefits thereby generating a substantial jump
in pension wealth. After the ERA, accruals grow at a slower rate as workers approach the
normal retirement age (NRA) which is typically 65. After the NRA, it is common for DB
accruals to no longer grow in a manner that is actuarially fair and, in fact, become negative
in real terms. This downturn occurs because workers who postpone retirement do not obtain
sufficiently large increases in pension benefits even though they will obtain those benefits
for fewer (mortality adjusted) years.16 In the figure, pension compensation is positive for
14See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, “Issues Left Unresolved on Pensions,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2007.
15Earnings and pension benefits are computed for each individual at each age, so the age-based variation
in compensation reflects plan-specific formulas for accruals and not changes in sample composition due to
retirement.
16This implicit tax on continued work is a common feature of DB pensions specifically designed to
encourage retirement (see, e.g., Chapter 12 in Gustman et al. (2000)).
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workers over 65 only because DC accruals offset negative DB accruals.
The profiles shown in the left panel of Figure 1.3 illustrate how DB plans generate strong
incentives for workers to remain employed through the ERA in order to collect generous
retirement benefits. In contrast, after age 65, DB plans generate strong incentives for
workers to retire. Underpinning these carefully designed incentives is an implicit contract
between firms and workers: firms make long-term unenforceable commitments to workers in
which continued employment through retirement age will be rewarded with lucrative pension
benefits. Workers on the other hand exert effort over the course of their careers and avoid
early termination that would result in the loss of promised pension benefits (see, e.g., Lazear
(1981), Kotlikoff and Wise (1985), and Lazear and Moore (1988) for theory and evidence).
By freezing DB pensions, firms are unilaterally reneging on this implicit contract.
The following section outlines a model of retirement in the presence of DB pension
promises and uses the model to understand how worker behavior changes in response to
pension freezes.
1.3.2 Setup
Individuals are heterogenous in age (a ∈ {50, 51, . . . , 80}), non-pension wealth Aa ∈
[0,∞), DC pension wealth WDCa ∈ [0,∞), and the extent to which they dislike working, g.
For individual ι currently aged a, the disutility of working is modeled as
gιa = γ + φa︸ ︷︷ ︸
deterministic component
+ fιa︸︷︷︸
random component
(1.3.1)
fιa = ρfι,a−1 + vιa, (1.3.2)
where vιa ∼ N (0, σ2v) is an iid disturbance term. The deterministic component of g
captures changes in preferences for leisure that are common to workers of the same age,
whereas the random component captures individual specific differences in health, disability
status, and non-pay aspects of employer-employee match quality. I assume that utility from
consumption exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and that consumption and
leisure are separable. Under these assumptions, flow utility for an individual ι aged a is
given by
c
1− 1
σ
ιa
1− 1
σ
− gιa × 1 {ι is working at age a} . (1.3.3)
Earnings at age a are given by ea which is taxable in the period that it is earned.
Conditional on remaining employed, all workers share the same deterministic age-earnings
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profile with earnings at age a given by ea. DC wealth evolves according to
WDCιa = W
DC
ι,a−1(1 + r) + ea(m
w
ιa +m
e(mwιa)) (1.3.4)
C¯ ≥ ea(mwιa +me(mwιa)), (1.3.5)
where r is the interest rate and mwιa is the fraction of earnings that a worker defers towards
her DC account on a pre-tax basis. me(mwιa) is the fraction of earnings that the worker’s
employer contributes to her DC account. me is expressed as a function of mwιa reflecting
commonly used employer incentives for participation in DC plans. IRS rules limit total
contributions to be less than a threshold value C¯.17
Workers earn DB pension wealth on the basis of a deterministic formula which is set by
firms. The formula takes earnings history, tenure, and age as its arguments and returns the
value of DB pension wealth:
WDBa = B(earnings,tenure,age). (1.3.6)
If a worker chooses to retire at age a, she obtains the annuity value of her DB wealth,
which is bDBa . Workers also accrue Social Security benefits based on their earnings history
in the form of an annuity whose value at age a is given by bSSa . Like the DB annuity, Social
Security can only be claimed in retirement. ba = b
DB
a + b
SS
a is the total annuity income for
an individual who chooses to retire at age a.18 I assume that individuals cannot hold debt
or borrow against DC pension assets, so Aιa ≥ 0 and WDCιa ≥ 0.
Total compensation for worker ι currently aged a is
χιa = ea(1−mwιa)(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-deferred compensation
+ ∆WDCιa︸ ︷︷ ︸
DC accrual
+ ∆WDBa︸ ︷︷ ︸
DB accrual
, (1.3.7)
where τ is tax rate applied to income after pre-tax deferrals have been made.19 Equation
(1.3.7) reflects the assumption that workers have passed the age where real earnings growth
contributes to higher Social Security benefits. Consequently, there are no increments to
Social Security wealth from additional years of employment.
17In 2010 the total contribution limit was $49,000 with workers over age 50 being allowed to make an
extra $5,500 in catch-up contributions. These values are updated annually by the IRS based on cost of living
adjustments. See https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cola_table.pdf
1862 is the earliest age at which workers can claim Social Security benefits. When estimating the model,
I assume that workers who choose to retire before age 62 start claiming Social Security benefits at age 62.
19Income tax can be reduced by elective deferrals to DC accounts but payroll taxes apply to all earned
income up to the relevant earnings caps.
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1.3.3 Value of retirement
To conserve notation, denote age a variables by v and age a + 1 variables by v′. The
value of retirement at age a is V Ra which is written recursively as
V Ra (b, A,W
DC) = max
A′,WDC′
{
u(c) + β(1− pa)V Ra+1(b, A′,WDC
′
)
}
(1.3.8)
s.t. c ≤
(
b+WDC − W
DC′
1 + r
)
(1− τ) + A− A
′
1 + r
. (1.3.9)
In equation (1.3.8), u(c) is utility from consumption, β is the annual discount factor, and
pa is the subjective probability of death within one year for an individual currently aged a.
Annuitized pension income (b) is fixed at the age of retirement which is why b rather than
b′ appears in the continuation value. Given the state variables and the budget constraint,
the retirees consumption choice is recast as the choice of how to decumulate pension and
non-pension wealth at each age. Pension income, which is the sum of annuitized income and
liquidated DC pension wealth, is taxable while liquidated non-pension wealth is not taxable.
Notably, the value function treats retirement as a self absorbing state which excludes the
possibility of short-term bridge employment. The assumption of self-absorbing retirement is
important in the context of this paper because it makes future compensation contingent on
current labor supply in a very stark way: if a worker enters the retirement state, her future
labor market options are entirely foreclosed. I provide empirical evidence in Section 1.6.1
that workers affected by pension freezes tend to follow a once-and-for-all retirement pattern
which is consistent with the modeling assumption I make here.
1.3.4 Value of working
Denote the age a vector of state variables for a working individual by X =
(e, g, b,WDC , A). The value of working at age a is V Wa which is written recursively as
V Wa (X) = max
A′,mw
{
u(c)− g + β(1− pa)Eg′
[
max
{
V Ra+1(b
′, A′,WDC
′
), V Wa+1(X
′)
}]}
(1.3.10)
s.t. c ≤ e(1−mw)(1− τ) + A− A
′
1 + r
. (1.3.11)
In equation (1.3.10), flow utility from consumption is offset by the disutility of working g. The
expectation operator for the continuation value term integrates over the random variable g′.
By remaining employed at age a, workers preserve the possibility of obtaining higher earnings
and higher pension accruals in the future which is reflected in the continuation value. Given
the state variables, the budget constraint (1.3.11), and the DC accumulation constraints
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(1.3.4) and (1.3.5), workers choose how much non-pension wealth to accumulate and what
fraction of their earnings to defer towards DC pensions. I assume that DC pension wealth
is illiquid until retirement.20
1.3.5 Optimal retirement decision
A worker retires when V Ra ≥ V Wa . This condition defines a cutoff value g¯a so that any
draw of ga ≥ g¯a will lead to retirement. Solving for g¯a yields
g¯a = u(c
W
a )− u(cRa ) + β(1− pa)× (1.3.12)
1: Continuation value of working︷ ︸︸ ︷
Eg′
[
max
{
V Ra+1(a+ 1, b
′, A′,WDC
′
), V Wa+1(X
′)
}]
−
2: Continuation value of retiring︷ ︸︸ ︷
V Ra+1(a+ 1, b, A
′,WDC
′
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Option value of working one more period

where cWa and c
R
a are the optimal consumption choices in the work and retirement states at
age a. Consider terms 1 and 2 on the right side of equation (1.3.12). Higher future earnings
and the potential for higher pension accruals raise term 1 and increase the incentive for
continued work. On the other hand, higher levels of retirement wealth raise term 2, thereby
generating an incentive to retire. These two offsetting incentives are key determinants of the
optimal retirement decision, which is summarized by the cutoff value g¯a.
In this framework, the decision about whether to continue working or to retire is
determined by the option value channel which embodies the implicit contract of continued
employment with the firm: By remaining employed in the current period, the worker obtains
earnings growth and increased pension benefits in the future. Furthermore, because DB
pension wealth is backloaded and cannot be ported between employers, the option value of
working has a particularly strong firm-specific component. Following Stock and Wise (1990),
work decisions in this model vary not only due to period-by-period changes in compensation,
but also due to changes in the option value of continued employment which is embedded in
term 1.
1.3.6 The effect of a pension freeze is theoretically ambiguous
When employers renege on long-term promises by freezing DB pensions, workers
experience changes to the total value of compensation that they had previously expected
to earn by retirement. The effect of these shocks is illustrated in the right-hand panel of
20IRS rules allow penalty free distributions from DC accounts after age 59 12 . Distributions taken prior
to 59 12 are subject to a 10 percent tax. Distributions must start at age 70
1
2 . I do not incorporate these
institutional features into the model.
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Figure 1.3. The solid blue line shows the path of total compensation in a world where DB
plans are kept intact (i.e. no pension freezes occur). When a DB plan is frozen, workers keep
all previously earned benefits but no longer earn any new DB accruals. Instead, workers who
do not already participate in DC plans are offered the chance to do so after the freeze.21
These changes are shown using dashed red lines which simulate the effect of a DB pension
freeze for workers aged 52 and 65. The post-freeze simulations shown in the figure assume
that respondents without DC wealth begin actively participating in a hypothetical new DC
plan after the freeze.
The figure highlights that pension freezes shift the age-compensation profile in different
ways based on the age at which workers experience them. The average 52 year-old experiences
large initial losses in compensation followed by gains after age 63. In contrast, the average 65
year-old experiences much smaller losses, followed by immediate gains. In fact, workers over
age 65 experience unambiguous gains. The main reason that pension freezes have positive
effects on compensation over the long-term is because workers with DC plans can continue to
accumulate pension wealth even at ages where traditional DB plans would penalize continued
work.22
Now consider terms 1 and 2 on the right side of equation (1.3.12) for a worker who
is under age 65 when her plan is frozen. Holding all else fixed, the loss in DB accruals
generates two opposing effects. First, reductions to bDB lower the return to working (term
1) thereby decreasing the option value of working and generating a substitution effect on
labor supply. Second, reductions to bDB make workers poorer in retirement (term 2) thereby
increasing the option value of working and generating a wealth effect on labor supply. The
same mechanisms work with opposite signs on a worker who is over age 65 when her plan
is frozen: freezes reduce the penalty for continued work thereby increasing labor supply
through the substitution effect. At the same time, greater pension wealth accumulation
raises the continuation value of retirement thereby lowering labor supply through the wealth
effect. Since substitution and wealth effects work against each other, the impact of freezes
on retirement behavior cannot be signed.
Despite the overall theoretical ambiguity, two sources of heterogeneity allow me to
characterize the following testable predictions about how pension freezes affect labor supply.
1. Between-age heterogeneity
21In the HRS sample the underlies the figure, about half of all DB eligible respondents have no DC wealth.
22In the post-65 age range, there is a second reason that freezes generate positive effects on total
compensation. DB formulas typically link benefits to pay earned over the last few years of a worker’s
career. Because pay falls after age 60, a worker in a non-frozen plan will see her benefit shrink as her pay
declines while a worker whose plan is frozen will see her benefit stay fixed.
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(a) The relative strength of wealth and substitution effects varies by age: Workers
under 55 when their plans are frozen have large accruals still outstanding and
experience substantial losses in compensation. Workers over 55 have less left to
earn from their DB pensions when their plans are frozen and therefore experience
smaller losses in compensation. As such, wealth effects are more important for
workers under 55. Conversely, substitution effects are more important for workers
over 55.
(b) The effect of freezes on employment is reversed after age 65: Because workers over
the age of 65 experience increases rather than decreases in deferred compensation,
their initial labor supply response should be reversed in sign relative to workers
under the age of 65.
2. Within-age heterogeneity
(a) Short-term responses are dominated by the substitution effect: Short ex-ante work
horizons reduce the role for wealth effects since workers are about to retire anyway.
Thus, the response of workers near the margin of retirement at the time of the
freeze (i.e. those with high values of gιa, Aιa, and W
DC
ιa ) is dominated by the
substitution effect. These workers will choose leisure over work when faced with
a freeze.
1.4 Data
In this section I describe three distinct data sources that I use to estimate the effect
of freezes on worker behavior. Pension plan data come from IRS Form 5500, employer
characteristics come from the Census Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), and matched
employer-employee data come from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD)
dataset. I am able to link 92 percent of plans from Form 5500 to employers in the LBD and
89 percent of those LDB employers to the LEHD dataset.23 Detailed descriptions of the
datasets and the linking procedures that I use are provided in Appendix A.1.
1.4.1 Pension characteristics: Form 5500
Form 5500 (F5500) is an annual plan-specific filing that is collected jointly by the IRS,
Department of Labor (DoL), and the PBGC to ensure compliance with ERISA. These
publicly available data contain rich information on the universe of privately sponsored
23These datasets have previously been used in conjunction to study the role of fringe benefits on employee
mobility in Decressin et al. (2009).
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pension plans. When DB plans are converted to CB plans or hard frozen, this information
is reported on F5500, thereby allowing me to identify plans whose participants are affected
by freezes.24 F5500 data also include important pension plan characteristics such as the
number of plan participants, present value of pension wealth for plan participants, the value
of pension accruals earned by participants in the filing year, and the typical age at which
participants claim benefits from the plan.
F5500 filings are identified by a combination of a Federal Employer Identification Number
(EIN) and a employer designated Plan Number (PN) that remain consistent over time. While
these identifiers are sufficient to match pension plans to single-unit (i.e. operating only
one establishment) firms, they are not sufficient for matching to multi-unit (i.e. operating
multiple establishments) firms. This is because payroll tax filings for establishments that are
part of a multi-unit firm may be recorded under different EINs than the one used in F5500.
Attempting to match the F5500 to establishment level data on EIN alone would therefore
generate many false non-matches. To overcome this issue, I turn to the Census Business
Register (BR).
1.4.2 Firm characteristics: Census Business Register and Longitudinal Business
Database
The Census Business Register (BR) is a database of the universe of establishments in
the United States.25 It includes information on business location, organization, industry,
and information on revenue, payroll, and employment that is collected from administrative
tax records as well as survey data. The relationship between establishments belonging to
multi-unit firms are determined using responses to the company organization survey, the
economic census, and the annual survey of manufactures. Establishments that are part of
the same multi-unit firm share the same Census assigned firm identification number even if
they have different EINs.
I rely on the presence of EINs in both the F5500 and the BR to create an initial link
between the two files. Secondary to this link, I use the Census firm identifier to identify
all the establishments associated with a multi-unit pension plan sponsor.26 Having matched
F5500 records to the BR, I use the Census firm identifier to further match those records to
24Plans are considered frozen in F5500 if they meet the following condition: “[a]s of the last day of the
plan year, the plan provides that no participant will get any new benefit accrual (whether because of service
or compensation).”
25Information about the BR is confidential and protected by Title 13 and Title 26, U.S. Code. Information
in the following paragraph is drawn from https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0600.html
26In the absence of the Census firm identifier, I would only be able to identify those multi-unit
establishments that shared the same EIN as the one reported on F5500, thereby generating a false non-match
problem alluded to earlier.
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the LBD. The LBD is a cleaned and research ready version of the BR that is restricted to
active employers in the private sector.27
1.4.3 Worker characteristics: Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
To study outcomes at the individual level, I turn to the LEHD which is a quarterly
matched employer-employee dataset constructed from state-level unemployment insurance
(UI) records.28 These data cover almost all wage and salary workers in the United States
but exclude individuals who are self-employed. In the LEHD, employers are identified using
a state UI account number known as the SEIN. I rely on the crosswalk between the SEIN
and the Census firm identifier developed in Haltiwanger et al. (2014) to link pension plans
in the matched F5500-LBD data to employers in the LEHD.29
An important feature of the LEHD is that states become part of the dataset at different
points in time. For example, Maryland enters in 1985:Q2 whereas Mississippi enters only in
2003:Q3. Because of staggered entry, the scope of the data grows continuously over time.30
As a consequence, when I link an employer from the LBD to the LEHD in a given year, I
only capture those individuals who work in a state that has already entered the dataset as
of that year.
1.4.4 Sample restrictions and data structure
Appendix Table A.1 describes the results of four data linking and sample restriction
procedures. The first row shows the match rate between the universe of DB plans extracted
from F5500 database between 1996 and 2014 and the BR. The massive scope of the BR
allows for a 92 percent match rate at the plan-year level and a 95 percent match rate at the
participant-year level.31
The set of plan-years represented in the F5500-BR merge contains a mix of firms that
sponsor just one DB plan and firms that sponsor multiple DB plans.32 I limit my sample to
firms that have a single plan within the 1996-2014 window for which I have F5500 data. When
firms have multiple plans, I retain only those employers who choose either to never freeze their
plans, or freeze them all at the same time. The principle driver of this restriction is that I
27See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for details.
28See Abowd et al. (2009) for details.
29I rely on the 2014 snapshot of the LEHD, which incorporates UI data from 49 states and the District of
Columbia through the first quarter of 2015. Alabama is not included in the version of the data that I use.
30A number of populous states enter the data relatively early. Illinois enters in 1990, California and
Pennsylvania in 1991, Florida in 1992, and New York and Texas enter in 1995.
31F5500 reports the count of active participants — i.e. covered workers — in each plan.
32Firms that sponsor multiple DB plans typically do so to cover different types of workers. For example, a
firm may sponsor different DB plans for salaried and hourly workers or unionized and non-unionized workers.
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cannot observe individual pension plan coverage. Consequently, when firms sponsor multiple
plans, there is no way of knowing — using the F5500, LBD, or LEHD data — which plan
a worker may be covered by. By imposing this restriction, however, I can ascertain whether
workers at a given firm have been affected by a freeze in a given year. This sample restriction
allows me to retain 94 percent of firm-years but only about 40 percent of worker-years. The
discordance between these two rates reflects the fact that only the very largest employers
sponsor multiple DB plans.
Having matched F5500 records to the BR and the LBD, I structure the data as follows.
I treat each year from 2001-2014 as an experiment year, which is indexed by l.33 This
terminology reflects the research design wherein each experiment year yields a fresh sample
of firm-level pension freezes. Workers employed at freezing firms five years prior to a given
experiment year constitute the treated group while workers employed at non-freezing firms
five years prior to a given experiment year constitute the comparison group. I impose the
restriction that firms file F5500 for 5 calendar years prior to the experiment year, which I refer
to as the pre-period. I then match the firm-experiment year data to the LEHD, the results
of which are shown in the third row of Table A.1. I recover 89 percent of firm-experiment
years and 93 percent of employee-experiment years. Finally, as shown in the fourth row of
Table A.1, I restrict the sample to firm-experiment years for which important pension plan
data is not missing.34
When considering the implications of pension freezes on worker decisions, it is worth
reiterating that I do not observe individual information on pension plan coverage. To study
worker responses in a way that limits the potential for misclassification error, I restrict the
sample to firms where DB eligibility is near universal. I impose this restriction by retaining
firms where the DB coverage rate is 80 percent or greater in the pre-period.35 Within the
high-coverage rate firms, I select all workers employed at l − 5, who have at least two years
of tenure as of l − 5, and who will be between the age of 50 and 70 in year l.36
33I start with 2001 because it is the first year in which pension freezes are reported in F5500. Only a
handful of firms engaged in CB conversions prior to 2001.
34Important pension plan information includes plan assets and liabilities, accruals earned during the plan
year, and the typical benefit claim age for the plan.
35The firm-wide DB coverage rate is the ratio of active participants in the plan as reported in F5500 to
the count of total employees in the LBD. The 80 percent average coverage rate requirement is based on years
[l− 5, l− 2], i.e. between 5 and 2 years prior to the experiment year. Restricting the sample this way likely
eliminates soft freezes in which the firm’s plan is closed to new workers. A firm that imposes a soft freeze is
likely to see its DB coverage rate decline as workers quit or retire but are not replaced with new, DB eligible,
workers.
36The two year tenure restriction ensures that workers are fully vested in their pensions as of the cohort
year when they may become subject to a freeze. This calculation is based on the 7 year maximum full vesting
period allowed for DB plans by ERISA. Note that tenure measurements are right censored in the LEHD
when a worker’s employment spell begins prior to the year in which the state that they work in enters the
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Having discussed the key sources of data and explained how I link and organize these
data for analysis, I turn next to the regression framework and associated identification
assumptions that I use to estimate causal effects.
1.5 Empirical framework for estimating treatment effects
This section describes the regression framework I adopt to analyze the impact of pension
freezes on a variety of labor market outcomes. The identifying assumption is that pension
freezes are independent of unobserved determinants of labor supply, conditional on a set
of worker characteristics, firm characteristics, and fixed effects. Summary statistics lend
credibility to the identifying assumptions.
1.5.1 Regression specification
Let i index firms, let j index cells that bin together workers with the same firm, state,
gender, age, tenure, and experiment year, and let t index calendar years. Let k = t − l
index years relative to the experiment year. Within each cell, the firm represents a worker’s
employer as of k = −5, and tenure represents the duration of employment at firm i as of
k = −5. Consider the following regression framework for a given experiment year, l,
ylj(i)t = αi + γ
l
t + x
l′
j(i)tβ
l +
m(l)∑
k=−5
δlkT
l
ik + ε
l
j(i)t (1.5.1)
where ylj(i)t measures a labor supply outcome of interest, αi is a firm fixed effect, γ
l
t is
a calendar year fixed effect, and xlj(i)t is a vector of controls for age, gender, state, race,
education, tenure, and prior earnings.37 T lik is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
firm freezes its plan and the current period is k. εlj(i)t is the error term which represents
unobserved determinants of labor supply.38 The parameters of interest are the δlk coefficients
which capture the dynamic treatment effect of pension freezes on worker outcomes.
To maximize the precision of the estimates, I stack data from each of the experiment
data.
37State is defined based on the location of the workplace in k = −5. I control for prior earnings using
two variables: the log of average annual earnings prior to k = −5 and the growth rate of earnings prior to
k = −5.
38The upper limit of the sum, m(l) , represents the number of available post-period years for experiment
year l. The maximum available post-period duration is 13 years (this happens when l = 2001 as the data
runs out in 2014).
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years together and estimate a version of equation (1.5.1) where
ylj(i)t = αi + γlt + x
l′
j(i)tβ +
13∑
k=−5
δkT
l
ik + ε
l
j(i)t. (1.5.2)
In equation (1.5.2), calendar year fixed effects are replaced by experiment year-by-calendar
year fixed effects which allow economy-wide shocks to differentially affect workers in each
experiment year. In contrast, the effect of the xlj(i)t and T
l
ik variables are assumed to be
constant across experiment years. This estimation strategy allows workers in the comparison
group in a given experiment year to enter the treated group in a subsequent experiment year
if their employer freezes pensions in the future. In this implementation, the δk coefficients
are identified by within-experiment year between-firm variation in worker outcomes as well
as within-firm between-experiment year variation in worker outcomes. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
1.5.2 Identification
The δk parameters in equation (1.5.2) represent causal effects of pension freezes on
worker outcomes under the assumption that E[εlj(i)t|αi, γlt,xlj(i)t, T lit] = 0. Put differently,
unobserved determinants of worker labor supply are assumed to have zero mean conditional
on firm fixed effects, experiment year-by-calendar year fixed effects, worker level controls,
and the freeze indicators. This assumption might be violated by two important sources
of bias. First, firm-specific economic distress in the pre-period may result in a subsequent
freeze as well as a reduction in firm-specific labor demand through downsizing.39 Second,
it is possible that freezing and non-freezing firms systematically differ in terms of pension
generosity and benefit claiming provisions in the pre-period which can influence post-period
differences in labor supply behavior.
To account for time-varying pre-period confounders, I rely on propensity score
re-weighting. The main idea behind the use of propensity scores is to make the treatment
and comparison group units more comparable in terms of observed pre-period characteristics
thereby mitigating concerns that post-period differences in behavior are subject to bias.
In this setting, the propensity score is the cell-level probability of experiencing a freeze
expressed as a function of pre-period variables which influence both firms’ decision to
freeze and workers’ labor supply responses. To mitigate concerns related to pre-freeze firm
distress as an omitted variable, the propensity score model includes the pre-period trend
39Along with a broader set of statistics on firm dynamics around the freeze, I show in Appendix A.3 that
freezing and non-freezing firms do not differ in terms of their pre-period probability of experiencing distress.
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in firm size and in worker compensation. To mitigate concerns that differences in plan-
and firm-level characteristics between treatment and comparison groups are responsible for
post-period labor supply decisions, the propensity score model also includes pre-period trends
in pension wealth, pension accruals, benefit claim ages, the age structure of employment at
the firm, retirement rates, employment rates, and employer-to-employer transition (E-E)
rates. Appendix A.4 provides more details on the conditioning set and explains how the
propensity scores are transformed into weights when estimating equation (1.5.2).
Beyond these key threats to the identification strategy, two other confounding effects are
potentially at play. First, it is possible that funding deficiencies that lead firm’s to freeze their
DB plans also resulted in cut backs to health insurance benefits. These unobserved changes
could generate their own income and substitution effects on labor supply choices.40 While
these changes are not directly verifiable in the data that I use, indirect evidence from surveys
suggests that firms have not altered health benefits as a consequence of freezes.41 Second,
it is possible that observed changes in labor supply are influenced by network effects within
the firm. This breakdown of the so called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
could occur if freeze-affected workers’ retirement decisions are influenced not only by changes
in compensation but also changes by the retirement decisions of their peers. I ignore peer
retirements as a first order concern when interpreting the results because available evidence
on the magnitude of peer effects of this variety indicate that they are extremely small.42
1.5.3 Summary statistics
Before showing the impact of freezes on worker outcomes, I present a summary of raw
data on pre-period characteristics of workers and their employers. These statistics are based
on workers employed at the sample of firms where the pre-period coverage rate is in excess
of 80 percent. A table showing firm characteristics for the full sample of DB sponsoring
employers is provided in Appendix A.3.
In Table 1.1 I show pre-period summary statistics for workers split into three different
40Employer sponsored health insurance is reported on F5500 filings. However, the reporting requirement
only exists for employers who cover more than 100 workers. More importantly, changes in health insurance
plan characteristics cannot be ascertained from F5500.
41There are no reports of changes to employer provided health insurance benefits in a sample of 17
large publicly traded firms that froze their plans between 2004 and 2008 as compiled by the Boston
College Retirement Research Center (see http://crr.bc.edu/uncategorized/fact-sheets/). Similarly,
a Government Accountability Office (GAO) survey of freezing employers indicates no reported changes to
health benefits (see Bovbjerg et al. (2008)).
42Hamman et al. (2016), who use large-scale linked employer-employee data from Germany to investigate
these spillovers on retirement behavior, find that one additional peer retirement (at the establishment level)
increases the probability of retirement for men by 0.01 percentage points and produces no detectable effect
on women.
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groups based on age as of the experiment year.43 Workers in the sample are employed
with DB sponsoring firms as of l − 5, and the statistics are computed by averaging over
five pre-period years. The top panel shows worker characteristics while the lower panel
shows pension plan and firm characteristics. Because the statistics are computed from
a worker-level dataset, pension and firm characteristics are worker weighted. For each
age-specific panel, the first column shows the propensity score re-weighted comparison group
mean, the second column shows the difference between the treatment and the comparison
group, and the third column shows the p-value for the null hypothesis that there is
no difference between the two groups. Across the three sub-samples, workers are well
educated with relatively high earnings and the gender split is close to 50-50. Demographic
characteristics, pre-period labor market outcomes, pension plan generosity, and firm-level
characteristics are very similar in the treated and control groups.44
Secondary to the differences between treatment and comparison groups within each age
bin, there are also several notable differences between the three age bins. Workers in the
younger two age bins are less likely to be white and male, more likely to have a college
degree, and have higher earnings. Tenure, measured five years prior to the experiment year,
is approximately equal across the three age groups.45 Finally, the oldest workers are employed
at substantially smaller firms with a higher proportion of workers over age 60 and a lower
proportion of workers under age 45. Differences in firm-wide age structure across the three
age groups could reflect differences in DB pension formulas or other unobserved workplace
characteristics. Some of these differences are reflected in higher average pension wealth
and delayed retirement claim ages at firms that employ the oldest workers in the sample.
Appendix Table A.5 shows the same statistics without propensity score re-weighting provides
additional evidence of broad similarity between workers in the treated and control groups.
1.6 How pension freezes affect labor supply and employer
attachment
In this section, I use the regression framework and identification strategy developed
earlier to investigate the causal impact of pension freezes on the labor supply and employer
43Using 55 and 65 as the modal ERA and NRA in DB plans, 50-55 year-old workers are below the ERA
at the time of the freeze, 56-64 year-old workers are between the ERA and the NRA at the time of the freeze,
and 65-70 year-old workers are over the NRA at the time of freeze.
44It is important to note that the measures of pension wealth are based on plan-wide totals and should
not be seen as representative of the workers in each age bin
45The absence of variation in tenure between workers of different ages is an artifact of the way that
states enter the LEHD dataset. If a state enters the dataset after a given employer-employee relationship is
established, then the employer-employee history is left censored and tenure is understated.
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attachment. I show how freezes have heterogeneous labor supply effects based on the age at
which workers experience them. In addition, I show that freezes have heterogenous effects
holding age fixed. The treatment effects I present here are consistent with the testable
implications developed in the theoretical model.
1.6.1 Employment, retirement, and earnings
Figure 1.4 plots the δk coefficients from specification (1.5.2) using the cell-level
employment rate as the outcome variable. To investigate age-specific heterogeneity in labor
supply responses, I split the data by age as of the experiment year using the same age groups
as in Table 1.1. I then estimate the regression model on each age group separately and show
the coefficients in the respective panels of the figure.
Looking first at the far left panel shows that treated workers in the 50-55 year-old
age group exhibit a small reduction in employment rates in the first six years of the
post-freeze period. Reductions in employment reflect substitution effects (i.e. reduced
lifetime labor supply), although the economically small magnitude of the coefficients and
their statistical insignificance suggests that offsetting wealth effects (i.e. increased lifetime
labor supply) are equally important for workers in this age group. After about 8 years
post-freeze, wealth effects start to dominate the labor supply response and workers in the
treated group experience a 1.5 - 3.3 percentage point increase in employment relative to the
comparison group. Another way of stating this finding is that the employment rates of both
treated and comparison groups are declining in this age range, but the decline is markedly
slower for treated workers. The muted substitution effect and substantial wealth effect that
characterizes labor supply responses for 50-55 year-old workers aligns with the fact that large
DB accruals are earned before age 55. As such, workers at or under 55 when first faced with
a freeze experience large net losses in compensation thereby eliciting strong wealth effects in
favor of continued employment.
Moving next to the central panel of the figure shows that substitution effects play an
important role on impact for treated workers in the 56-64 year-old age group. In the first
six years of the post-freeze period, employment rates for treated workers fall by 1.0 - 1.7
percentage points relative to the comparison group. Starting about 8 years post-freeze,
treated workers’ labor supply diverges in the opposite direction from the comparison group
as the employment rate differential rises by 1.2 - 2.1 percentage points. As with 50-55 year-old
workers, the tendency of freeze affected workers to lengthen their working lives relative to
the comparison group is indicative of dominant wealth effects. Appendix Figure A.3 shows
that freeze-affected women are more likely to exhibit substitution effect dominant responses
whereas freeze-affected men are more likely to exhibit wealth effect dominant responses.
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Most DB plans incentivize retirement by making the real value of DB accruals negative
after age 65. When DB plans are frozen and replaced with DC plans, this implicit tax
on continued employment is reduced as workers can obtain offsetting DC accruals at ages
where they would otherwise have been penalized. The right most panel of Figure 1.4 shows
labor supply behavior that is consistent with higher returns to work for the treatment group
relative to the comparison group. Treated workers over age 65 increase their employment
rates by 1.2 - 4.5 percentage points which reflects dominant substitution effects. While
these effects are not as precisely estimated, they are economically meaningful and align with
theoretical predictions and the institutional design of DB plans.
Empirical evidence shown in Figure 1.4 lines up with the three theoretical predictions
outlined in Section 1.3. Substitution effects are larger for 56-64 year-old workers relative
to 50-55 year-old workers which is a consequence of the former group losing less total
compensation than the latter group (prediction 1(a)). Substitution effects are positive
because of increased labor market returns for workers over 65, but negative for workers
under 65 because of reduced labor market returns (prediction 1(b)). Finally, looking within
the first two age groups, substitution effects play a dominant role in the short-term response
of the most marginally attached workers who lower their employment rates (prediction 2(a)).
Figure 1.5 shows the impact of freezes on retirement, which is defined as a permanent
departure from paid employment in the LEHD.46 Freeze induced changes in retirement rates
are virtually mirror images of the employment effects shown in Figure 1.4, indicating that
non-employment and retirement are essentially equivalent for workers affected by freezes.
This finding indicates that bridge jobs appear not to be an important transition phase
for freeze-affected workers who cut their careers short. It also substantiates the model’s
assumption of self-absorbing retirement. On the whole, the treatment effects for retirement
reinforce employment-based findings.
Figure 1.6 shows the effect of freezes on the log of annual earnings. All the estimates
shown here are conditioned on the sample of individuals with positive earnings in a given
year. The far left panel shows that there are no evident changes in earnings for 50-55 year-old
workers in the first 6-7 years of the post-freeze period. After 7 years, workers in the treated
group exhibit slower age-related earnings declines which manifest as a positive earnings
differential. In the final few years of the sample window, treated group workers’ earnings
exceed those of control group workers by about 15 log points. This difference likely arises
from continued full-time work for the treated group relative to transitions into part-time or
part-year work for the comparison group. It is consistent with wealth effects of the freeze
46See Appendix A.2 for details on how retirement status is measured in the LEHD and how it compares
with retirement status for a comparable sample of respondents in the HRS.
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inducing longer careers in full-time status.
For 56-64 year-old workers, who are shown in the central panel, the pattern is somewhat
different. Treated workers experience a statistically significant earnings dip of 1.5 - 4 log
points in the first five post-freeze years. This dip could arise for two reasons. First,
treated workers who shorten their careers — i.e. exhibit dominant substitution effects in
the short-term — may work less than full-time or less than full-year right after the freeze.
These reductions in labor supply would appear as earnings losses. Second, it is possible
that these workers experience wage declines in the short-term brought on by firm-specific
factors.47 The fact that 50-55 year-old workers do not experience earnings losses suggests
that wage reductions are unlikely to be the only cause for the observed earnings dip that
56-64 year-old workers experience. In contrast, the long-term pattern shows a 20-30 log
point increase in earnings relative to the comparison group, provides evidence of dominant
wealth effects wherein freeze-affected workers delay retirement and continue in full-time or
full-year employment while comparison group workers transition to part-time or part-year
employment. As was the case for the 50-55 year-old age group, it is important to reiterate
that the positive long-term earnings differential reflects a slower decline rather than an
increase earnings levels.
Earnings differences for 65-70 year-old workers, shown in the far right panel, are not
precisely estimated over the sample window. However, the post-freeze coefficients indicate
a fairly sustained drop in earnings of about 15 log points relative to the comparison group.
Thus, while freezes induce workers over 65 to delay retirement, the pattern of earnings
changes suggest that continued employment for these workers likely comes in the form of
more part-time employment. That the oldest workers in the labor market are willing extend
their careers at less than full-time rates complements recent survey-based evidence on the
importance of flexible hours in supporting longer working lives (Ameriks et al. (2020)).
1.6.2 Employer attachment
While the treatment effects shown thus far relate to the decision about whether to
work and how much to work, they do not address the decision about where to work.
E-E transitions are a potentially important margin of adjustment particularly given that
pension freezes induce employer-specific rather than worker-specific or market-wide changes
in compensation. In this subsection, I exploit the matched employer-employee structure of
the LEHD to study differences in worker mobility between the treatment and comparison
47Analyses of firm-level payroll data shown in Appendix A.3 indicate that freezes lower firm-wide average
earnings by approximately 2.5 log points. These earnings changes could stem from the changing post-freeze
age composition of the firm’s workforce or from reductions in offered wages.
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groups.
Figure 1.7 shows the percentage point change in the probability of leaving one’s DB
sponsoring employer.48 In the data, a worker is coded as having experienced an employer
change if the EIN associated with their UI record in the LEHD changes. It is worth noting
that not all EIN changes reflect employee mobility as some firms change their EINs in the
course of a merger or acquisition. The large spike in transitions for treated workers that
occurs four years prior to the freeze year in the left panel and the center panel is likely an
artifact of firm-level EIN recoding.
One period after the freeze, treated workers in the 50-55 and 56-64 year-old age group
appear to respond with small but statistically significant increases in employer transitions.
For 50-55 year-old workers the transition rate increases by 1.4 percentage points off a baseline
rate of 2.9 percent. For 56-64 year-old workers, the transition rate increases by 0.8 percentage
points off a baseline rate of 2.8 percent. The magnitude of these effects indicates that
relatively younger workers faced with compensation losses from a pension freeze have better
outside options to exercise than workers closer to retirement age. After the first year, there
is a statistically significant pattern of reduced E-E transitions among workers in the treated
group. Transition rates fall by 1.2 percentage points for 50-55 year-old workers and about 0.6
to 0.9 percentage points for 56-64 year old workers. When considered alongside the earnings
results, reduced E-E mobility is consistent with continued employment in career jobs for
treated group workers as opposed to the counterfactual transition to part-time or bridge
jobs for comparison group workers. E-E mobility for workers over 65 is largely unaffected by
freezes.49
Reduced E-E transition rates for workers in the younger two age groups lines up with
the time window where dominant wealth effects lead to increased employment and higher
propensity for full-time work. Ironically, the ability of workers to extend their careers in order
to make up for lost compensation comes from extended attachment to the very employers
responsible for the pension freeze. Reduced E-E mobility, even in the face of substantial
employer-specific compensation shock, indicates that full-time work opportunities are limited
outside of workers’ long-term employers. As such, robust demand for the labor services of
older workers within their long-term employers is a key requirement to accommodate policies
aimed at supporting longer working lives.
The results I have presented thus far characterize treatment effects of pension freezes on
labor supply outcomes. These estimates provide insights about heterogeneity in workers’
preference for long careers and illustrate the importance of the right type of labor demand
48I.e. the employer that worker’s are attached to in period l − 5.
49Coefficient estimates are suppressed due to small sample sizes for latter part of the estimation window.
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in sustaining those longer careers. Nevertheless, because I do not observe detailed pension
benefit provisions I cannot estimate the post-freeze value of lost DB accruals or the change
in DC accruals. The absence of data on pecuniary costs of pension freezes prevents direct
estimation of labor supply elasticities. To estimate elasticities indirectly, I rely on estimating
and simulating data from the structural model which I turn to next.
1.7 Solving and estimating the structural model
In this section, I explain how I solve and estimate the structural model numerically using
MSM (McFadden (1989), Duffie and Singleton (1993)). I identify the model’s parameters
by matching model-based simulations of employment responses to pension freezes to those
observed in real-world administrative data.
1.7.1 Estimation
I estimate the model in two steps. In the first step, I calibrate several parameters (e.g.,
earnings, pension accruals, DC match rates, Social Security benefits, tax rules, mortality
rates, discount factors, and interest rates) using HRS survey data and other external data
sources. Appendix A.5.1 provides a detailed description of the calibrations. In the second
step, I estimate the model’s preference parameters θ = (σ, γ, φ, ρ, σv) using MSM. The
procedure is as follows:
1. For a given value of θ, I numerically solve the model using value function iteration
under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, DB accruals progress normally. In
the second scenario, I freeze DB accruals for each age between 56 and 64 and compute
an alternative set of decision rules.
2. I simulate initial assets and work disutility draws for 5000 individuals who are initially
aged 51 to 59 using information from the HRS. I apply decision rules from the no-freeze
scenario to obtain work histories and asset accumulation paths from the initial age up
to age 80 (the terminal age) to create a simulated control group.
3. Next, I apply the freeze decision rules for the same population of individuals —
i.e. individuals with the same initial assets and work disutility draws —starting five
years after the initial age. Individuals in this exercise have the same work and asset
accumulation choices as the simulated control group for the first five years, but have
different work histories and asset accumulation choices once faced with a DB freeze. I
call this sample the simulated treated group.
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4. I compute two sets of moments using the simulated control and treated groups. The
first set of moments is the difference in average employment rates between the two
groups (the simulated treatment effect). I compute these differences for 12 periods,
starting from the period of the freeze (12 moments). The second set of moments is
the employment rate time trend for the simulated control group. I compute the trend
moments starting four periods prior to the freeze and lasting five periods after the
freeze (10 moments). I then compare the 22 simulated moments with same moments
estimated from LEHD data (real-world moments).
5. I iteratively repeat this procedure for different values of θ and choose the estimate that
minimizes the distance between the simulated moments and the real-world moments.
Further details on the solution algorithm and the estimation procedure are provided in
Appendix A.5.2.
1.7.2 Identification
Identification of the model’s parameters derives from two key sources of variation in
real-world data. The first set of moments, which capture the age-based decline in employment
rates in the comparison group, identify the constant (γ) and slope (φ) terms of the
deterministic component of g.
The second set of moments — i.e. the dynamic treatment effect — is informative about
within-age variation in individual preferences for continued work. Equation (1.3.12) helps to
explain the identification argument for (σ, ρ, σv). Notice that g¯ is composed of two separate
terms: the first term is the change in utility from consumption at retirement, and the second
term is the option value of working. Freezes affect both terms. Changes in g¯ driven by
post-freeze re-optimization of consumption choices provide information about individuals
preference for smooth consumption profiles over the life-cycle. This source of variation in g¯
aids in the identification of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), σ.50
The treatment effect estimates reveal that freeze-induced changes in the option value of
work induce early retirement for some workers and delayed retirement for others. These
differences are informative about the persistence (ρ) and variance (σv) of the idiosyncratic
component of g. In particular, ρ and σv need to be large enough so that workers of the
same age exhibit different retirement behavior when affected by a compensation shock of
the same magnitude. For workers of a given age, those with high values of g have stronger
50Note that consumption data are not directly used to identify σ; rather, variation in g¯ induced by freezes
indirectly aids in identification.
26
preferences for leisure and retire early. On the other hand, those with low values of g have
weaker preferences for leisure and choose to delay retirement.
1.7.3 Model fit and parameter estimates
Figure 1.8 shows how simulated moments compare with observed moments. The left
panel shows the employment rate trend for 56-64 year old workers who are not subject to
freezes. The light colored area shows the region where simulated moments are specifically
targeted to match real-world moments, whereas the shaded region shows out-of-sample fit.
The model fits the targeted moments well but slightly underestimates employment propensity
out-of-sample. The right panel compares simulated treatment effects to real-world treatment
effects, all of which are used as estimation targets. This panel shows that the model captures
the magnitude and the timing of employment rate fluctuations induced by pension freezes.
Table 1.2 shows the estimated parameters. The IES estimate is close to 1, which is
equivalent to log utility. Because the 5 preference parameters in θ are identified using 22
moments, I am able to conduct a χ2 overidentification test. The model is formally rejected
on the basis of this test, which I report in the last row of the table. The main reason that the
test statistic is large is that the estimation procedure does not account for variance associated
with first-step parameters obtained from the HRS (e.g, earnings profiles, DB pension wealth
accruals, DC match functions, etc.) Consequently, the variance of second-step simulated
moments is understated and the weight attached to each moment (which is inversely related
to variance) is large.51
1.7.4 Employment elasticities
In the model, labor supply responses to changes in compensation are governed by the
fraction of individuals who are marginal with respect to the decision to work or retire which,
in turn, is a function of the preference parameter θ. I compute elasticities non-parametrically
by plugging averages from simulated data into the following expression
ηˆa =
Eˆ [∆empιa] /Eˆ
[
empCιa
]
Eˆ [∆χιa] /Eˆ [χCιa]
. (1.7.1)
In equation (1.7.1), ηˆa is the elasticity of employment with respect to a one period shock in
current compensation for workers aged a.52 I estimate ηˆa by simulating a 5 percent increase
51Standard errors are understated for the same reason.
52Because retirement is self-absorbing in the model, ηˆa calculated using model based simulations are not
directly comparable to elasticity estimates based on model simulations or real-world data where workers can
leave and re-enter the labor market (see, e.g., French (2005), Brown (2013), and Gelber et al. (2017)). With
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in pre-tax wage compensation and reading off the model implied change in employment
rates for different ages. ∆empιa is the difference in a worker’s employment status with and
without the age a shock to compensation. empCιa is a worker’s employment status without
the compensation shock. Analogous definitions apply to the post-tax current compensation
measures ∆χιa and χ
C
ιa. ηˆa is defined for the sample of workers who are employed at a− 1.
ηˆa is the extensive margin labor supply elasticity governing employment responses to
short-lived tax changes. This definition of the labor supply response to compensation
changes does not account for the option value of continued work as in Stock and Wise
(1990). To account for this forward-looking dimension of retirement behavior, I define ηˆPVa
as the elasticity of employment with respect to the present value of future compensation:
ηˆPVa =
Eˆ [∆empιa] /Eˆ
[
empCιa
]
Eˆ [∆ωιa,R∗ ] /Eˆ
[
ωCιa,R∗
] , (1.7.2)
where
ωιa,R∗ =
R∗∑
t=a
(1− pa)(1 + r)t−aχιt︸ ︷︷ ︸
PV from k to retirement
. (1.7.3)
Conditional on being employed at age a−1, ωιa,R∗ is the present value of future compensation,
R∗ is the period in which the worker retires, (1− pa) is the likelihood of being alive at age a,
and r is the real interest rate. Because R∗ is the ex-ante or pre-shock expected retirement
age, ∆ωιa,R∗ in equation (1.7.2) represents the change to the present value of compensation
that the worker was expecting to receive before retirement. ηˆPVa re-casts a one period shock
to compensation at age a and expresses it in terms of a change in the present value of
compensation that the worker was expecting to earn before retirement. This parameter is
consistent with the notion that retirement decisions involve a comparison of the value of
working and retiring at all future ages. I estimate ηˆPVa using the same simulated 5 percent
shock to wage compensation at age a but I calculate the present value impact of that shock
using equation (1.7.3).
Table 1.3 shows the two types of elasticities for workers who experience compensation
shocks at age 58, 60, and 62.53 The estimates in the table show that while workers
self-absorbing retirement, the value of retirement (V R) does not nest future re-entry into the labor market.
Thus, larger compensation cuts — or reductions in option value — are needed to induce retirement relative
to a model where V R nests future re-entry into the labor market. Consequently, the elasticity estimates that
I present are lower bounds relative to a model where retirement is not self absorbing.
53In the estimates presented in the table, I estimate Eˆ [∆empιa], Eˆ [∆χιa], and Eˆ [∆ωιa,R∗ ] using
within-person variation thereby holding age and work disutility (g) fixed. When computing elasticities,
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appear to be only weakly responsive to a single period change in compensation, re-casting
the change in terms of its effect on the long-term compensation yields a substantially
larger elasticity. At age 60 for instance, the estimated employment elasticity with respect
to a one period change in after-tax compensation is 0.15 while the option value-based
elasticity is 0.9. This difference in elasticities illustrates how measuring the retirement
response to one-period-ahead changes in the reward to working understates the importance
of forward-looking behavior in explaining retirement decisions.
In the next section, I exploit the full structure of the estimated model to emphasize this
difference by examining how a permanent elimination of OASI payroll taxes for older workers
affects their retirement behavior.
1.8 Evaluating the effectiveness of a counterfactual payroll tax
reform
In this section, I study the effect of eliminating the OASI component of the payroll tax for
older workers. I focus on transition cohorts for whom the policy change is unexpected. The
main idea behind this reform proposal is to remove disincentives for longer careers that exist
under current law. While payroll taxes are applicable to all years of work, the Social Security
benefit formula is based on the 35 years of highest paid work. For the typical older worker
over the age of 55 or 60 who no longer experiences real earnings growth, an additional year
of work generates no substantial increase in Social Security benefits. Nevertheless, because
all workers contribute OASI payroll taxes regardless of age, workers who remain employed
beyond the 35 year vesting age experience tax burdens with no offsetting benefit increases.
By relieving these fully “paid up” workers from additional payroll tax contributions, the
reform has the potential of lengthening careers. Understanding the costs and benefits of the
reform requires quantifying behavioral responses which I do here using the estimated model.
The flavor of reform that I consider involves an unexpected elimination of the OASI
payroll tax for workers who are over age 60. To simplify the analysis, I assume that workers
currently bear the full burden of the tax which implies that the counterfactual reform raises
income by 10.6 percent (under current law workers and firms each pay 5.3 percent). I assume
that the disability insurance (DI) and hospital insurance/Medicare (HI) components of the
payroll tax are unaffected as is the Social Security benefit formula.54 To more accurately
portray incentives affecting the majority of employees in the current and future workforce, I
I assume that R∗ is known to the worker with perfect certainty. This assumption ignores the effect of
randomness in g.
54DI and HI payroll tax components collectively amount to 4.7 percent.
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remove DB pensions from the model.
Figure 1.9 shows model simulations of employment rate trends for workers between the
age of 56 and 75 under current law and under the reform.55 The two trends diverge starting
at age 60, with employment rate differences peaking at 15.3 percentage points at age 66.
Averaging over the entire post-60 age window, the reform increases employment rates by 5.2
percentage points.
Table 1.4 provides additional statistics comparing the two different regimes. The left
panel shows moments from the distribution of a variety of outcomes under current law,
while the right panel shows the same moments under the reform. The third panel shows
the mean difference in outcomes. Reflecting the overall increase in employment rates, the
average retirement age under the reform rises by 1.1 years. Longer careers allow workers to
accumulate almost $8,000 more in their DC retirement accounts and provide about $23,000
more in federal income taxes. These gains accrue against a loss in payroll tax revenue of
approximately $28,000. Finally, as shown in the lower panel of the table, I find that equivalent
variation from the reform averages almost $75,000 per worker implying a substantial welfare
gain. This estimate is an order of magnitude larger than the one reported by Laitner and
Silverman (2012) which is attributable primarily to the fact that I do not attempt to make
the reform revenue neutral in this basic analysis.56
Taken together, the counterfactual analysis presented here shows that the relatively
elastic labor supply of older workers can be harnessed to extend their careers with an OASI
payroll tax sunset at age 60. I find that older workers would obtain non-trivial welfare gains
from the reform and have more income in retirement although net revenues collected from
workers after age 60 decline by about 4 percent.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I exploit widespread and understudied shifts in employer-sponsored pension
benefit programs to better understand how retirement behavior responds to changes in
compensation. Over the last 20 years many employers have reneged on long-standing
promises to continue supporting traditional retirement benefits in the face of rising costs
of provision. Although these changes are substantial, there is no evidence on how
they have affected workers’ labor market outcomes. Creating a new dataset that brings
55Because the reform is unexpected there is no difference in employment rates prior to age 60. Simulated
workers are included in the sample if they are employed at age 55.
56The way that Laitner and Silverman (2012) build revenue neutrality into their analysis is to require a
small increment to payroll tax contributions in the pre-vesting period. This increase in pre-vesting age taxes
results in lower consumption over the entire life-cycle and smaller equivalent variations.
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together detailed administrative information on pension plan characteristics with matched
employer-employee data, I study the impact of these unexpected shocks on employment,
retirement, earnings, and employer attachment for workers between the age of 50 and 70.
I find evidence of substantial heterogeneity among workers, even among those of the same
age. When faced with freeze-induced compensation changes, some workers choose to retire
early while others choose to delay retirement, thereby illustrating that differences in wealth
and preferences for leisure are important in explaining retirement decisions. Using these
quasi-experimental treatment effects as targets, I estimate a structural model of retirement
and saving that allows for heterogeneity in wealth and leisure preferences. I use the model to
simulate the effect of a counterfactual policy that eliminates OASI payroll taxes for workers
who are fully vested in their Social Security benefits. Simulations from the estimated model
show that eliminating the tax at age 60 induces a 1.1 year delay in the average retirement
age and produces large welfare gains.
The empirical setting and the model adopted in this paper highlight the importance
of forward-looking behavior in determining labor supply decisions, particularly retirement
decisions. It is likely that unobserved determinants of the relationship between employers and
employees, such as implicit contracts with a rich set of contingencies, drive the association
between current labor supply and expected future compensation (see, e.g., Lazear (1981)
and Akerlof and Katz (1989)). These contingencies create tight bonds between employers
and employees that many standard models of labor supply do not incorporate. Notably,
the durability of these relationships and the impact they have on forward-looking labor
supply behavior are not unique to DB-style incentives, which are no longer common in the
U.S. private sector. For instance, median tenure for workers between the age of 55 and 64
has remained unchanged for two decades despite major economic transitions including the
demise of DB pensions.57 This fact suggests that a better understanding of the mechanisms
driving long-term employer-employee relationships is critical in explaining lifetime labor
supply behavior.
57Median tenure, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for workers in the 55-64 age range in
1998 and in 2018 was 10.1 years.
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Figure 1.1: DB plans hard frozen or converted to cash balance
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Notes: The dashed red line shows the share of private sector, single employer, DB pension plans that
have been hard frozen or converted to cash balance plans. The solid blue line shows the share of active
participants in DB plans that have been hard frozen or converted to cash balance plans. Time series are
based on 1999-2015 F5500 microdata.
32
Figure 1.2: Pension costs and funding ratios
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Notes: This figure shows total contributions and aggregate funding ratios for private sector, single employer,
DB sponsors. Total contributions (solid blue line) are measured on the left axis. Funding ratios (dashed
red line) are measured on the right axis. The funding ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to the
present value of future pension liabilities. Contributions data are drawn from the Department of Labor’s
Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs 1975-2015. Funding ratios are drawn from the
PBGC Pension Insurance Data Book, 2016.
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Figure 1.3: Simulated effect of pension freezes on total compensation
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Notes: This figure is based on data from DB eligible HRS respondents in the 2010 wave who are employed
in the private sector. For simulated freeze compensation paths, post-freeze DB accruals are set to zero.
Respondents with DC plans are assumed to continue participating in them at the same rate; post-freeze
contribution rates for respondents without DC plans are imputed using the sample average rate for actively
contributing respondents. See Appendix A.6 for details on the sample and simulation of post-freeze
compensation.
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Figure 1.4: Impact of freezes on employment
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Notes: This figure shows the time path of the treatment effect of the freeze on employment rates for
workers in the three different groups based on age at the time of the freeze. The p-values for F-tests that
the coefficients for periods -5 to -1 are jointly zero are .41, .38, and .35 for each of the three age groups
respectively. Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals which are based on standard errors clustered
at the firm-level.
35
Figure 1.5: Impact of freezes on retirement
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Notes: This figure shows the time path of the treatment effect of the freeze on retirement rates for workers in
the three different groups based on age at the time of the freeze. The p-values for F-tests that the coefficients
for periods -5 to -1 are jointly zero are .64, .77, and .35 for each of the three age groups respectively. Dotted
lines show 95 percent confidence intervals which are based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level.
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Figure 1.6: Impact of freezes on log annual earnings
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Notes: This figure shows the time path of the treatment effect of the freeze on log annual earnings for
workers in the three different groups based on age at the time of the freeze. The p-values for F-tests that
the coefficients for periods -5 to -1 are jointly zero are .17, .30, and .31 for each of the three age groups
respectively. Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals which are based on standard errors clustered
at the firm-level.
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Figure 1.7: Impact of freezes on employer attachment
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Notes: This figure shows the time path of the treatment effect of the freeze on log annual earnings for
workers in the three different groups based on age at the time of the freeze. The p-values for F-tests that
the coefficients for periods -5 to -1 are jointly zero are .01, .06, and .58 for each of the three age groups
respectively. Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals which are based on standard errors clustered
at the firm-level.
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Figure 1.8: Data moments compared to model simulated moments
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Notes: The left panel shows the employment rate trend for 56-64 year-old workers, all of whom are employed
5 periods prior to the freeze. The right panel shows the difference between the treated and control group
employment rates. Dotted lines show moments from simulated data. Dashed lines show moments from
observed data. The shaded region includes moments that are not targeted in the estimation.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of OASI tax sunset at age 60 on employment rates
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the employment rate under two scenarios. The dashed blue
line shows the employment rate trend under current law. The dotted red line shows the counterfactual
employment rate trend under a regime where the OASI payroll tax is unexpectedly eliminated at age 60.
The trends are based on model simulations for a sample of workers who are employed at age 55.
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Table 1.1: Pre-period summary statistics split by age group
50-55 56-64 65-70
Variable Comp. mean Diff. p-value Comp. mean Diff. p-value Comp. mean Diff. p-value
Worker characteristics
Age 52.5 0.001 0.93 59.6 -0.031 0.32 67.0 0.016 0.56
Male 0.475 0.025 0.46 0.487 0.023 0.55 0.494 0.014 0.76
High school 0.232 -0.001 0.93 0.232 -0.001 0.93 0.294 0.001 0.98
Some college 0.324 -0.006 0.55 0.312 -0.007 0.42 0.290 -0.005 0.58
College or more 0.386 0.008 0.81 0.392 0.010 0.77 0.311 0.008 0.76
White 0.791 0.022 0.20 0.826 0.020 0.25 0.838 0.027 0.25
Black 0.096 -0.011 0.15 0.079 -0.010 0.12 0.069 -0.010 0.21
Hispanic 0.068 -0.003 0.81 0.053 0.000 0.97 0.049 -0.005 0.61
Other race 0.045 -0.008 0.27 0.043 -0.009 0.23 0.044 -0.013 0.31
Earnings ($) 65,140 -1,477 0.75 65,280 -2,337 0.58 47,770 -3,562 0.13
Tenure at l − 5 7.8 -0.943 0.15 8.2 -0.977 0.11 8.0 -0.623 0.17
Retired 0.022 0.000 0.99 0.056 0.002 0.57 0.189 0.006 0.59
In labor force 0.964 -0.001 0.83 0.927 -0.003 0.47 0.779 -0.006 0.66
Switched l − 5 employer 0.047 0.012 0.22 0.042 0.012 0.24 0.030 0.003 0.45
Pension and firm characteristics
Log DB pension wealth/active participant 10.07 0.072 0.86 10.15 0.039 0.92 10.43 0.043 0.82
Log DB pension accrual/active participant 7.43 0.094 0.80 7.49 0.054 0.88 7.60 0.052 0.77
Pension plan claim age 62.8 -0.1 0.70 62.9 -0.1 0.72 64.4 0.0 0.88
Log firm size 8.55 -0.017 0.98 8.40 0.007 0.99 7.31 -0.162 0.74
Fraction workforce ≤ 45 0.580 0.010 0.44 0.568 0.007 0.61 0.542 -0.003 0.80
Fraction workforce [46,50] 0.146 -0.002 0.62 0.141 0.000 0.91 0.135 0.001 0.79
Fraction workforce [51,55] 0.124 -0.002 0.61 0.127 -0.001 0.78 0.124 0.001 0.89
Fraction workforce [56,60] 0.087 -0.002 0.63 0.095 -0.002 0.67 0.098 0.001 0.74
Fraction workforce [61,65] 0.044 -0.002 0.40 0.047 -0.002 0.52 0.066 0.000 0.99
Fraction workforce [66,70] 0.012 -0.001 0.38 0.013 -0.001 0.54 0.022 0.000 0.87
Fraction workforce ≥ 71 0.007 -0.001 0.33 0.008 -0.001 0.56 0.013 0.001 0.70
Comparison group workers 383000 373000 77000
Treated group workers 60000 66500 11000
Comparison group firms 7700 8600 4600
Treated group firms 1500 1700 900
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, statistics reported in the table average over the five year period preceeding any freeze activity. Pension wealth per active participant is computed as the
present value of the liability owed to active participants divided by the number of active participants. Tenure is understated because the LEHD does not capture the complete history of
an employer-employee relationship when states enter the dataset after a given employee-employer relationship is established. P-values for the difference between treatment and control
groups are obtained by regressing the statistic of interest on a indicator variable for treatment status and clustering standard errors at the firm-level.
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Table 1.2: Structural model parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard error
IES σ 0.958 0.004
Labor disutility persistence ρ 0.869 0.003
Labor disutility standard deviation σv 0.108 0.0005
Labor disutility age slope φ 0.046 0.0001
Labor disutility constant γ -2.59 0.006
χ2 statistic, 17 d.f. 236.8
Notes: This table shows preference parameter estimates and standard errors for the
structural model. See Appendix A.5 for details.
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Table 1.3: Employment elasticity estimates
Age
58 60 62
Intertemporal elasticity ηˆ 0.180 0.154 0.302
(0.044) (0.040) (0.057)
Option value elasticity ηˆPV 1.17 0.92 1.77
(0.279) (0.238) (0.322)
Notes: This table shows two different definitions of the employment
elasticity for older workers. Standard errors are computed using the delta
method. See Section 1.7.4 for definitions.
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Table 1.4: Counterfactual effects of OASI tax sunset at age 60
Current law Reform Difference
Variable p25 p50 p75 Mean p25 p50 p75 Mean Mean
Retirement age 62 64 66 64.6 64 65 67 65.7 1.1
DC wealth at retirement ($) 130,040 184,790 277,880 225,575 133,870 189,060 286,970 233,518 7,943
PV income tax remitted after 60 ($) 62,230 81,329 94,662 79,380 83,153 103,343 121,465 102,540 23,160
PV payroll tax remitted after 60 ($) 22,569 43,692 63,251 48,290 14,844 18,236 24,605 19,992 -28,298
p25 p50 p75 Mean
Equivalent variation ($, PV at age 60) 50,620 67,941 92,874 75,134
Notes: Estimates are derived from model simulations under current law and under the reform. Simulated workers in the sample are all employed at age
55. Estimates are conditioned on not having retired before age 60. Monetary estimates are reported in 2010 dollars and present values are computed as of
age 60. See text for details.
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CHAPTER II
Bad Times, Bad Jobs? How Recessions Affect Early
Career Trajectories
2.1 Introduction
The state of the business cycle at labor market entry has substantial and persistent effects
on the earnings and career trajectories of young workers.1 Because of the strong element of
chance associated with labor market entry during a recession, the popular press has labeled
cohorts with the misfortune of being exposed to years of earnings losses as “unlucky.”2
Initial wage losses for unlucky cohorts stem from the fact that availability of high-wage
jobs is strongly procyclical (see, e.g., Okun, 1973 and McLaughlin and Bils, 2001); however,
the translation of short-term fluctuations in wages into long-term scarring effects is a product
of several different factors. First, search frictions can hinder the movement of workers
between employers thereby extending the duration of recession-induced losses. Second, when
these frictions rise with tenure, they can generate long-term human capital mismatch if
recession entrants do not find work in jobs, occupations, and industries for which they have
already specialized (see, e.g., Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Third, employers may be slow to
learn about the true quality of recession entrants relative to expansion entrants because of
greater initial mismatch. Finally, the fact that much of the labor market is characterized
by long-term wage-setting rather than a spot market slows down the convergence between
recession entrants and expansion entrants (see, e.g, Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991).
In this paper, we make two advances relative to the literature. First, we provide a
precise estimate of the importance of employer-specific and non-employer-specific factors
1See, e.g., Kahn (2010) and Altonji et al. (2016) for evidence from the United States and Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) for evidence from Canada.
2See, e.g., during a recession: Catherine Rampell, “Many With New College Degree Find the Job Market
Humbling,” New York Times, May 8, 2011. In contrast, during an expansion: Ben Casselman, “This Year’s
College Grads Are The Luckiest In A Decade,” FiveThirtyEight, May 6, 2016.
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in explaining the long-term impact of recessions on the wages of labor market entrants.
While prior studies have found that employer and occupational characteristics play a role
in explaining recession-induced penalties (see, e.g., Oyer, 2006, Oyer, 2008, Oreopoulos
et al., 2012, and Rinz, 2019), the precise, quantitative role employers play in generating
scars for recessionary entrants remains unknown. Our approach relies on the two-way
fixed effect wage decomposition developed in Abowd et al. (1999) (AKM), which we use
to partition recession-induced wage losses into components that are employer-specific and
non-employer-specific. This exercise provides a more concrete comparison of between- versus
within-employer explanations of the long run consequences of entering the labor market
during a recession relative to existing literature.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we provide the first evidence regarding how
non-pecuniary compensation changes for unlucky cohorts relative to lucky cohorts. We
estimate the value of working for each employer in our dataset by implementing a revealed
preference-based estimator of job utility developed in Sorkin (2018). Within this framework,
non-pay amenities are measured as variation in employer-specific pay holding employer value
fixed, whereas rents accruing to workers are measured as variation in employer-specific pay
that is explained by employer value.3 From a welfare perspective, this exercise facilitates a
more holistic accounting of recession-induced scarring because utility losses depend not only
on losses in pay but also on changes to non-pay amenities (see, e.g., Rosen, 1986).
Our analysis uses linked employer-employee administrative data from Germany and
studies the trajectories of new graduates of vocational training programs. Over two-thirds
of the German workforce holds a vocational training degree, making our results relevant for
a large proportion of the labor market—including a variety of skill types, occupations, and
industries. Using these data, we establish three central findings. First, we show that the
broad story of recession-induced scarring exists even in an economy with strong active labor
market programs for employment and re-training. The typical recession in Germany lowers
wages for new entrants by 4.9 percent cumulated over a 10 year horizon.4 Second, we show
that 1.9 percentage points (40 percent) of the total loss is explained by workers matching to
lower paying firms. The remaining 3 percentage points (60 percent) of the total loss comes
from non-employer-specific factors, including human capital mismatch, slow market-wide
employer learning, and infrequent wage renegotiation. Our results therefore indicate that
3Under the revealed preference approach, job utility combines all unobserved amenities including such
factors as job security, hours flexibility, commuting convenience, etc.
4The magnitude of recession-induced losses for unlucky cohorts in Germany is approximately equal to
that found in Canadian data. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find that a typical recession results in a 5 percent
loss of earnings cumulated over 10 years. Estimates for recession-induced losses on unlucky cohorts in the
United States are substantially larger. For each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, Kahn
(2010) finds a 6-7 percent loss in wages that decays to 2.5 percent after 15 years.
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the majority of recession-induced losses in pay come from factors that are not specific to
employers but rather a product of the labor market in general.
Finally, we show that 1.5 percentage points of the 1.9 percentage point
employer-specific-pay penalty is compensated for by non-pay amenities whereas only 0.4
percentage points reflect losses from rent sharing. Thus, fully three-fourths of the
employer-specific pay penalty is explained by higher non-pecuniary compensation. After
netting out relative gains in non-pay amenities, the cost of recessions for young German
labor market entrants drops by 30 percent from 4.9 percent of wages cumulated over 10
years to 3.4 percent. These estimates indicate that the welfare costs of labor market entry
during a recession are overstated by a non-trivial margin if evaluated using only pecuniary
losses.5
Using rich data on workers and establishments, we then assess the mechanisms that drive
disparate career trajectories in the face of differing entry conditions. We show that low-pay,
high-amenity employers are more likely to make job offers during recessions. Young workers
in unlucky cohorts are beholden to the offer distribution they face upon entry, and their set of
options are tilted towards towards employers that offer amenities in lieu of pay. This finding
is consistent with prior research that links compensating differentials to unemployment risk
(see, e.g., Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981). It is also consistent with the observation that
sectors which feature cyclically stable labor demand, such as education or healthcare, are
often associated with higher job satisfaction than sectors which feature cyclically sensitive
labor demand, such as construction or finance.
In addition, we show that recessionary entrants are much less likely to work at the same
employer, in the same occupation, or in the same industry for which they trained. Our
findings therefore suggest that much of the wage penalty faced by unlucky cohorts owes
to losses in employer-, occupation-, and industry-specific human capital, analogous to the
experience of workers who face involuntary job loss.6 By illustrating the importance of
changes in pay and amenities over the business cycle, our results also provide new evidence
for the view that wage gains associated with industry switching during expansions are partly
driven by lower non-pay amenities.7
5It is important to add that our conclusion on welfare implications relates only to employer-specific utility
and may not capture other welfare relevant consequences of young workers’ exposure to adverse aggregate
conditions. For instance, Maclean (2013) and Schwandt and von Wachter (2016) find evidence of worse
health and increased mortality among unlucky cohorts in the United States.
6See, e.g., Neal (1995) emphasizing the importance of industry-specific human capital in displacement
scarring. See von Wachter and Bender (2006) emphasizing the importance of firm-specific human capital
especially in the context of German vocational trainees.
7McLaughlin and Bils (2001) conjecture that such a phenomenon is possible but do not verify it
empirically.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a simple theoretical
framework that formalizes the role of labor market risk in generating compensating
differentials and explains how cyclical shocks alter the relative composition of wages and
amenities available in the labor market. Section 2.3 describes linked employer-employee
data from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment
Agency, and how we utilized this data to construct our variables of interest. Section 2.4
describes our empirical strategy and presents our main results along with robustness checks.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical framework
This section outlines a simple model of compensating wage differentials generated by
variation in unemployment risk across firms. The model formalizes one important channel
through which workers who enter the labor market during recessions could obtain higher
non-pay amenities relative to those who enter during expansions.
2.2.1 Setup
Consider an economy with homogenous risk-averse workers and two types of firms: type
R firms and type S firms. The production function for each firm type j ∈ {R, S} in period
t is
yjt = zjtF (h, k), Fh > 0, Fk > 0, Fhh < 0
where zjt is an firm-specific productivity draw and F is a production function whose argument
h represents hours employed in production and whose argument k represents capital. Fhh <
0 simply operationalizes a diminishing marginal product of labor. From an employment
perspective, type R firms are deemed to be risky whereas type S firms are deemed to be safe
in the sense that: [
zRt
zSt
]
∼ N
([
z¯
z¯
]
,
[
σ2R ρRS
ρRS σ
2
S
])
(2.2.1)
ρRS > 0 (2.2.2)
σ2R > σ
2
S (2.2.3)
In equation (2.2.1), the mean productivity level z¯ represents the steady state. Although the
shocks are positively correlated, type R firms exhibit greater variance in productivity than
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type S firms. A cyclical shock is defined to occur when both firm types obtain productivity
draws that are jointly above or jointly below the steady state level. In recessions, zjt < z¯
and in expansions, zjt > z¯ for each j.
For any realization of firm-specific productivity shocks and for fixed capital stock k¯,
equilibrium labor demand, h, can be generically written using the firm’s first order condition
for profit maximization as
Fh(h
∗
jt, k¯) =
w
zjt
, (2.2.4)
where w is the equilibrium wage rate and h∗jt is the optimal hours demand for the firm.
Fhh < 0 guarantees that
∂h∗jt
∂zjt
≥ 0.
2.2.2 Wage determination
We assume that the labor market does not function as a spot market. Instead, as in
Azariadis (1975) and Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981), workers and firms agree to long-term
implicit contracts where wages are fixed but hours are variable. The key element of these
long-term implicit contracts is that they insure risk averse workers against future labor
market shocks that are propagated through firms’ productivity draws.8 The wage associated
with each contract can be ascertained as follows. First, define the indirect utility for a worker
who receives a wage w at firm j as V (w, hjt), with utility an increasing, concave function of
earnings, U(w ·hjt). At a common wage rate, w, the expected indirect utility associated with
a type R contract will be lower than the expected utility associated with a type S contract.
This conclusion follows from the fact that zRt is drawn from a distribution that second order
stochastically dominates zSt and that higher variability in productivity translates directly
into higher variability of hours demand through (2.2.4). Consequently, risk aversion on the
part of workers implies that
E[V (w, hRt)] < E[V (w, hSt)].
Figure 2.1 illustrates this gap in expected indirect utility over a range of potential hours
realizations around the steady state level h¯. Because R and S firms compete to obtain
labor, workers demand a wage premium to compensate for the additional risk associated
with employment at type R firms. Define the risk premium as the compensating wage
differential ∆ ≡ wR − wS > 0 where wR is the wage rate for a type R firm and wS is the
8See Rosen (1985) and references therein on other models of risk premia in long-term implicit labor
market contracts.
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wage rate for a type S firm. The equilibrium wage rates are those which ensure that the
expected indirect utility associated with employment at each firm type is equalized:
E [V (wS + ∆, hRt)] = E [V (wS, hSt)] .
2.2.3 Effect of cyclical shocks
Cyclical shocks re-order the expected relative productivity of each firm type. In
expansions the following condition holds due to (2.2.1) and (2.2.3)9:
E[zRt|zRt > z¯] > E[zSt|zSt > z¯].
That is, risky firms are expected to be more productive than safe firms. Conversely, in
recessions10:
E[zRt|zRt < z¯] < E[zSt|zSt < z¯].
That is, safe firms are expected to be more productive than risky firms. Combining the
productivity shifts over the cycle with the labor demand equation (2.2.4) generates the
following implications. First, expansions generate an increase in hours demanded by risky
firms relative to safe firms. Thus,
E[hRt|zRt > z¯] > E[hSt|zSt > z¯]. (2.2.5)
Second, recessions generate an increase in hours demanded by safe firms relative to risky
firms. Thus,
E[hRt|zRt < z¯] < E[hSt|zSt < z¯]. (2.2.6)
Finally, combining (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) shows us how the state of the economy affects hours
demanded by risky relative to safe firms11:
|E[hRt|zRt < z¯]− E[hRt|zRt > z¯]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Drop in hours demanded by R during recession
> |E[hSt|zSt < z¯]− E[hSt|zSt > z¯]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Drop in hours demanded by S during recession
.
9Specifically, E[zjt|zjt > z¯] = z¯ + σj
√
2
pi because zjt is distributed normally for each j.
10Specifically, E[zjt|zjt > z¯] = z¯ − σj
√
2
pi .
11The same intuition holds in extensions with multiple firm types and firms with different average
productivities (and therefore different levels of hours demand during steady state).
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This simple framework illustrates two key implications for the observed wages of labor
market entrants. First, the potential for cyclical shocks generates compensating wage
differentials that are designed to indemnify workers against risk. Second, the state of the
economy materially influences the share of hours demanded by risky firms relative to safe
firms. This generates a composition effect in which recessions see relatively more hours
demanded by safe firms compared to risky firms. Thus, we should expect labor market
entrants to be relatively more likely to receive offers from low-wage/low-risk firms during a
recession. We work toward an empirical test of this hypothesis in the following sections.
2.3 Data and construction of key variables
Our analyses are based off the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB)
(vom Berge et al., 2013). These data comprise a longitudinal two percent random sample
of all individuals in Germany that ever worked, claimed unemployment insurance benefits,
or sought job seeking assistance. In total, the sample describes the labor market histories of
just over 1.6 million workers starting in 1975 and ending in 2010.12
The SIAB is a linked establishment-worker dataset that is organized in terms of spells.
For employed individuals, each spell enumerates a match between a given worker and
a given establishment. For non-employed individuals, a spell can enumerate a period
of unemployment benefit receipt or a period of participation in an active labor market
program. Spell lengths are measured at daily precision. In addition to demographics, data on
individuals include average daily wages, educational qualifications, occupation, and state of
residence. Establishment information is available at annual frequencies and includes industry
codes, location, size, and median wage rates.
Because vocational training earnings are subject to Social Security contributions, spells
of young workers who are apprentices in Germany’s vocational training system are fully
enumerated in the SIAB. With precise information on the occupation, wage rate, and start
and end dates of training, the SIAB provides us with an unusually detailed set of information
on workers both before and after they graduate from vocational training. In addition to
exploiting the linked worker-establishment nature of the data, we rely on the timing of labor
market entry made possible by observing workers before and after their training is complete.
Before delving further into how we estimate the impact of business cycle shocks on
the career trajectories of young German workers, we first discuss how we use the SIAB
12The data exclude employment in the civil service as well as self-employment. Marginal part time
employment or so called “mini-jobs” are tracked in the SIAB starting in 1999. Mini-jobs are low-wage jobs
with a monthly income threshold of 450 euro. Participation in active labor market programs is tracked
starting from 2000.
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to estimate variables that are critical inputs in our analyses. These variables include
establishment-specific measures of wage premia, utility, compensating differentials, rents,
and occupation-specific unemployment rates at the state level.
2.3.1 Wage decomposition
Following AKM, Card et al. (2013) (CHK) use the Integrated Employment Biographies
(IEB)—which is the universe of data from which the SIAB sample is drawn—to estimate
person and establishment fixed effect components of daily average wages. For worker i
employed at establishment j in year t, the decomposition can be summarized as
log(wageit) = αi + ψj1{i works at j in t}+ x′itβ + rit (2.3.1)
Person fixed effects, αi, incorporate individual specific skills that are rewarded equally across
employers. The establishment fixed effect, ψj, is a proportional premium that is paid by
establishment j to all its employees. xit is a vector of unrestricted year dummies as well
as quadratic and cubic terms in age fully interacted with educational attainment. These
controls account for aggregate and life-cycle determinants of wages. Consistency of the
parameter estimates requires that the error term, rit, is uncorrelated with αi, ψj and the xit.
CHK provide a detailed discussion about the validity of the identifying assumptions.
The CHK person and establishment fixed effects are identified only within the connected
set of establishments—i.e., the set of establishments that either hire from or lose workers
to other establishments in the set. CHK find that the largest connected set encompasses
95 percent of establishments in the IEB. Because the SIAB is a two percent random
sample of worker histories drawn from IEB, the set of connected employers is relatively
small. Fortunately, the original CHK person and establishment fixed effects are provided
as supplements to the SIAB dataset, precluding the need for analysts to re estimate (2.3.1)
within a sparsely connected dataset.
2.3.2 Estimating establishment values
Much of the literature that builds on the AKM decomposition treats the establishment
fixed effect as a measure of economic rents shared by workers. However, a long tradition
in economics has posited that employer-specific components of pay (ψj) can vary not only
because of factors such as rent sharing or efficiency wages, but also because of amenities that
are priced in the labor market as compensating differentials.13
13See, e.g, Rosen (1974) and Rosen (1986) for theory, and Lucas (1977), Freeman (1978), and Brown
(1980) for empirical evidence.
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Building on this tradition, Sorkin (2018) proposes a novel methodology to estimate
employer-specific utility, exploiting the voluntary movements of workers between employers
in order to infer the relative utility of each employer, which is also referred to as employer
value. Implementing this revealed preference argument requires three key assumptions.
First, all workers have the same ex-ante preferences over jobs. Second, all jobs within
an employer are deemed to be identical from the standpoint of non-pay characteristics.
Finally, all workers—both employed and non-employed—search randomly from the same
offer distribution.
Taking these assumptions to linked employer-employee data, Sorkin develops an estimator
that aggregates the choices of workers into unique establishment values, the utility an
employee derives from working at a particular establishment. Intuitively, the estimator
rewards employers for making more hires from other high-quality employers and penalizes
them for voluntary departures. Akin to the connectedness requirement in AKM and CHK,
values are only calculable within the strongly connected set of employers. Strong connectivity
is defined as a set of employers who both gain and lose workers to other employers in the
set.
Because the establishment values are estimated using a revealed preference argument, a
crucial step in this procedure is to separate voluntary from involuntary movements of workers.
This distinction is required both for employer-to-employer movements (EE moves) and
movements from employment to non-employment (EN moves).14 Sorkin’s methodology relies
on the notion that workers who separate from establishments that are shrinking are more
likely to be involuntarily displaced, whereas workers separating from growing establishments
are more likely to be voluntary departures. Thus, comparing the rate of worker exit from
shrinking and growing establishments provides a benchmark for the probability that a given
move from a shrinking establishment is involuntary.15 We mimic this procedure in our
establishment value estimation.
Unlike Sorkin (2018), whose analyses are based on the universe of U.S. workers covered by
unemployment insurance in the Longitudinal Household Employer Dynamics (LEHD) data,
we rely on the set of establishments that employ workers in our two percent longitudinal
sample. Differences across these data settings necessitate additional modifications to Sorkin’s
methodology. First, while he limits strong connectivity to firms linked only by EE flows,
14Note that unemployment and labor force non-participation are taken to be the same for the purposes
of this estimation procedure.
15The rate of worker separation from growing establishments represents “expected” turnover that is fueled
by worker quits. Then, the rate of worker separation from shrinking establishments that is above and beyond
this “expected” rate disciplines the probability that a given worker move from a shrinking establishment is
involuntary. The methodology thus assumes that all moves from growing establishments are voluntary. The
likelihood of voluntary exit is separately estimated for EE and EN moves.
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we expand the set to include employers linked both by EE flows as well as transitions of
workers through non-employment. Because of the ubiquity of movements in and out of
non-employment, this modification expands the scope of strong connectivity and makes the
computation of values feasible even within a two percent random sample like the SIAB.16
This modification is fully consistent with the estimating equations in Sorkin’s model which
allow non-employment to obtain its own relative value.17 Second, when coding EE and
EN transitions, Sorkin reduces the quarterly LEHD data where workers potentially have
multiple employers in a given year, into a data set where each worker is associated with
a single employer—also known as the annual dominant employer—in a given year. In the
SIAB, job spell lengths are measured at daily precision, allowing us to take advantage of a
more complete set of job-to-job transitions. When a worker has two or more overlapping
job spells in a given year (i.e. works for multiple employers at the same time), we select
the spell associated with the highest total earnings. We treat periods between jobs that are
longer than 90 days as non-employment spells regardless of whether an individual received
unemployment benefits or sought job seeking assistance. Third and finally, unlike Sorkin, we
do not impose any earnings or age restrictions on workers in our sample in order to maximize
the number of establishments that we can include in the strongly connected set.
2.3.3 Decomposing establishment-specific fixed effects into rents and
compensating differentials
Within the framework of the utility posting job-search model he proposes, Sorkin assumes
that the value of being employed at employer j (Vj) can be written as an additively
separable function of the employer-specific component of pay and an employer-specific
non-pay amenity:
Vj = ω(ψj + aj). (2.3.2)
where ω is utility per log euro, ψj is the employer-specific component of pay, and aj is
the employer-specific non-pay amenity. Using establishment value estimates and CHK
establishment fixed effect estimates, we re-arrange equation (2.3.2) to estimate
ψj = piVj + j (2.3.3)
16We rely on the MATLAB package MatlabBGL provided by David Gleich to find the largest strongly
connected set in the SIAB.
17Put differently, workers who make EN and NE transitions help to identify both the estimate of
non-employment value as well as estimates of employer values.
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and then obtain the residual terms ˆj = ψj− pˆiVj. Because the residuals are orthogonal to Vj
by construction, they capture components of aj that generate variation in pay holding utility
constant. As such, they correspond to the non-pecuniary amenities defined as compensating
differentials in Rosen (1986). The fitted value, pˆiVj, is an estimate of rents accruing to
workers because it captures variation in pay that is correlated with utility.18
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between studentized values and establishment fixed
effects in the SIAB replicating a Figure 5 from Sorkin (2018), but with German data. The
blue circles plot average establishment value and average fixed effects within each ventile of
the establishment value distribution. The red lines show one standard deviation bands of the
establishment fixed effect distribution within each value quintile. The upward slope of the
line of best fit shows that workers typically value employers that pay more, thereby indicating
the importance of rents. Nevertheless, there is a wide spread of establishment-specific pay
variation conditional on a given level of establishment utility, thereby indicating the presence
of compensating differentials.19
Figure 2.3 plots average values and establishment fixed effects across firms within broad
industry categories. The line depicting the overall relationship between Vj and ψj across
firms is the same as that in Figure 2.2, but the scatter plot across industries gives us further
information about which sectors are associated with high pay and/or high amenities. As
expected, sectors associated with higher pay and low amenities (above the line) include
Mining, Construction, and Finance. Meanwhile, establishments in the Health & Social Work
sector impart roughly the same value to their employees as Manufacturing establishments
despite paying substantially lower, on average. This indicates that Health & Social work
establishments offer more non-pay amenities to their workers, consistent with our prior beliefs
about relative work satisfaction in these sectors. In total, we view Figure 2.3 as important
qualitative validation that the values we have estimated have economic meaning.
18The CHK establishment fixed effects are estimated separately by gender, giving us two observations per
establishment. Due to sample size limitations, we pool together worker flows of both genders when estimating
establishment values. Thus, we additionally include a dummy variable for gender on the right-hand side of
equation (2.3.3) to remove average differences in establishment-specific pay between men and women.
19Our estimates of establishment value are based off a 2 percent sample of workers and therefore embody
measurement error. As a consequence, the slope of the line of best fit shown in Figure 2.2 is attenuated.
In Appendix B.2, we use a split-sample instrumental variable (IV) approach to evaluate the quantitative
impact of measurement error in our analyses. We find that OLS-based estimates of equation (2.3.3) are indeed
attenuated relative to the IV estimates. However, correcting for this bias has no economically substantive
impact on our key findings. Given that ˆj (compensating differentials) and piVj (rents) are ultimately used
as outcome variables, this is to be expected as long as the measurement error is classical.
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2.3.4 Occupation-specific unemployment rates
In order to capture variation in business cycle conditions relevant to the young workers we
study, we take advantage of the SIAB’s extensive data and large sample size to estimate two
customized unemployment rates. Our preferred measure is the state- and occupation-specific
unemployment rate. This measure provides an effective representation of labor demand,
especially for workers entering the labor market in a given state with training in a given
occupation. In addition, we calculate the occupation-specific national unemployment rate.
This unemployment rate provides a broader measure of labor demand that allows us to test
whether our results are driven by endogenous migratory responses.
Each unemployment rate is calculated using a similar methodology. We first assign
every worker in our dataset a status of employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force
on the 15th of each month using the SIAB’s labor market status variable.20 We assign
employed individuals the occupation of their current job and unemployed workers their
last known occupation. For employed workers who are currently in multiple jobs with
multiple occupations, we assign them the occupation of the job that paid higher daily
wages. Using the state of residence variable included in the SIAB, we then aggregate these
observations into monthly, occupation-specific unemployment rates. Finally, we aggregate
monthly unemployment rates into yearly unemployment rates by averaging across months
and weighting monthly rates by the underlying number of observations associated with each
month.
The primary value of using the SIAB to construct unemployment rates is to better
characterize the state of the business cycle specific to young workers as they enter the labor
market. Given that the data come directly from administrative sources, they also have the
advantage of capturing the the unemployment rate as well as, or better than, survey-based
unemployment rates. Nonetheless, to demonstrate that unemployment rates calculated
directly from the SIAB match publicly-available unemployment rate measures for Germany,
we present a comparison between our estimates of the national unemployment rate from
the SIAB and two measures provided by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) in Figure 2.4. The first OECD unemployment measure is survey-based
while the second is the registered unemployment rate, calculated from administrative data
by counting the number of individuals who register with the government as unemployed in
order to receive unemployment benefits, auxiliary benefits like community assistance and
health assistance, or to signal the need for assistance with job search. The administrative
data-based OECD measure more closely aligns with the SIAB-based estimates in levels
20The SIAB provides detailed information about worker status that we aggregate to three simple
categories.
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because both use registration for unemployment benefits rather than survey self-reports to
ascertain unemployment.21
The trends of these three measures track each other closely, which is the relevant check
for our panel data-based analysis. Furthermore, at the sub-national level, a within-state
regression of survey-based OECD unemployment rates on unemployment rates estimated
from the SIAB produces a coefficient of 0.978 (t =16.39).22 In sum, while the OECD does not
report occupation-specific unemployment rates for direct comparison, we are confident that
our measure identifies relevant changes to business cycle conditions. Meanwhile, constructing
the unemployment rate with administrative data allows us to define an individual’s labor
market based on both occupation and state, which more accurately represents the conditions
they face when entering the labor market.
2.3.5 Sample construction
An important characteristic of the SIAB is that it distinguishes between employment
spells associated with vocational training from those that are not. Since this distinction
is crucial for the implementation of our identification strategy, our most important sample
restriction is to only consider workers whose first spell in the SIAB is in vocational training.
We make four additional restrictions to hone in on the career paths of young trainees during
the first ten years of their labor market experience. First, we limit our sample to those who
complete their training before turning 30. Second, in order to keep comparisons consistent
over time, we restrict our sample to April 1999 and later, after which the SIAB began
enumerating mini-job work spells.2324 Third, we drop observations in occupation-state-years
from which unemployment rates were computed with 20 or fewer observations. Finally, in
order to avoid shifting composition based on outcome variables, we restrict the analysis
21The difference in levels between the two OECD sources arises for two reasons. First, non-employed
survey respondents may indicate that they are job-seekers even though they are not registered as unemployed
(if, for example, they are not eligible for unemployment benefits and thus see no advantage in registering).
Second, survey respondents who have registered to receive unemployment benefits may indicate that they
are not seeking a job when responding to the survey (if, for example, they register primarily to get auxiliary
benefits such as health or community assistance). The latter group outweighs the former in our study period
and likely also accounts for the fact that unemployment rates estimated from the SIAB are higher than the
survey-based measure. In addition, unemployment rates obtained from the SIAB are higher in levels because
these data exclude civil servants and self-employed workers who likely exhibit lower rates of joblessness than
the rest of the labor force.
22The specification is UOECD survey-basedst = α + ρU
SIAB
st + θs + εst where s is a state. Registered
unemployment rates are not available at the state level from the OECD.
23Data drawn before and after this period are difficult to compare because of the change in enumeration.
24CHK estimate Equation (2.3.1) using different time windows in the IEB. We rely on estimates from the
2002-2009 time window and extrapolate these backward to 1999 and forward to 2010 to cover our sample
window.
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dataset to those individuals who are employed at establishments where establishment fixed
effects and values are available, when they are employed. As noted in Sections 2.3.1 and
2.3.2, this restriction amounts to analyzing workers who are employed by establishments in
the strongly connected set.
In order to align the timing of the analysis, we assign each worker a dominant employer
for each year. The dominant employer is defined as the employer that pays a given worker the
most in earnings for a calendar year. We obtain earnings for a given job spell by multiplying
daily wages by spell length, then sum within employer to determine the total earnings from
each employer for a given worker within a year. The employer with the highest earnings is
given “dominant” status, and it is this employer’s value, daily wage, and other associated
characteristics that are used as outcomes below.25
2.4 Identification
Our identifying assumptions exploit key features of Germany’s apprenticeship training
system. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we first provide some institutional
background on how the system works and why it lends itself to our estimation strategy.
Apprenticeship training in Germany is also known as dual vocational training because
it combines workplace and classroom training in a roughly 60-40 split. The typical
young worker begins her vocational training after secondary schooling by starting an
employer-sponsored apprenticeship in one of approximately 350 officially recognized
occupations. Employers, unions, and government agencies jointly regulate the course content
and program length associated with training in each of the occupations to meet quality
standards. Trainee wages are set by collective bargaining agreements which vary both by
state and by occupation (Kuppe et al., 2013). Apprenticeships are the most common form
of higher education in Germany, with over two-thirds of the workforce holding a vocational
training degree.
Two aspects of the German apprenticeship system are particularly important for
our analyses. First, occupational segmenting of the German labor market is a natural
consequence of a system that is designed to promote occupation-specific skills among young
workers. This feature makes between-occupation heterogeneity a more important dimension
of youth labor market sorting in Germany than the United States, for example. Second, the
duration of training programs are regulated, with the typical course taking about 3 years
and culminating in a qualifying examination. The pre-set training duration makes it less
25In cases where there is more than one spell with the dominant employer, the daily wage is a weighted
average across spells where the weight is the number of days.
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likely that young workers can selectively enter the labor market when cyclical conditions
are favorable. Even so, we use the mode within detailed training occupation to measure
expected, rather than observed, training duration. This allows for a reduced form strategy
in which we assign individuals a date of labor market entry based on expected training
duration rather than their true labor market entry date, which could be subject to limited
manipulation. Year of entry is thus defined by the training start date plus the modal training
duration time in a given occupation.
Given this institutional setting, our identifying assumption is that occupation-specific
unemployment rates prevailing at the time of expected labor market entry are unrelated
to the timing of labor market entry. Given that we assign the timing of labor market
entry based on the modal training duration within an occupation, this assumption rests
on the notion that individuals do not change their training occupation or the timing of
their training start based on labor market conditions that manifest (usually 3) years later.
This broad assumption encompasses two important points: first, workers with particular
unobserved characteristics cannot manipulate their initial labor market conditions through
selective entry; and second, that the introduction of a particularly poor cohort in terms of
unobserved variables is not responsible for adverse aggregate conditions.
Under this framework, we estimate the effect of initial aggregate conditions on labor
market outcomes by exploiting variation in the occupation-state-cohort (osc) specific
unemployment rate Uosc using the following specification:
yit = βeUosc + ΓXi + θs(i) + θo(i) + θc(i) + θe(i) + θt + εit (2.4.1)
In equation (2.4.1), i represents an individual, θs(i) is a vector of state of training fixed effects,
θo(i) is a vector of training occupation fixed effects, θc(i) is a vector of year-of-expected-entry
(training start + modal training duration in the detailed occupation) fixed effects, θe(i) is a
vector of potential experience (year minus year of expected entry) fixed effects, θt is a vector
of year fixed effects, and Xi is a vector that contains a dummy for the individual’s gender,
a dummy for whether the individual is a German citizen, and a vector of fixed effects for
the individual’s age at start of training.26 We use βe to trace out the average effect of initial
labor market conditions Uosc on outcomes yit for the first ten years of young workers’ careers,
where career start is defined by predicted training end. We cluster standard errors at the
occupation-state-cohort level.
Table 2.1 provides initial evidence for the validity of our identifying assumptions by
showing that workers are similar in terms of age, training wages, nationality, gender,
26As in Oreopoulos et al. (2012), we identify θc(i), θe(i), and θt by dropping an extra year fixed effect.
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and successful completion of apprenticeships whether they enter the labor market when
the unemployment rate is below or above the median of a given occupation-state cell.
To the extent that they are economically meaningful, any differences in these observed
characteristics are eliminated because we include them in the conditioning set Xi.
To provide further evidence for our identification strategy, we formally test whether young
workers are able to speed up or delay entry based on aggregate labor market conditions by
re-estimating Equation (2.4.1) using training duration as the outcome:
[Training Duration]i = βUosc + ΓXi + θs(i) + θo(i) + θc(i) + θe(i) + εit (2.4.2)
We do this under two scenarios: in the first, c(i) is an individual’s actual year of entry,
and in the second, c(i) is expected year of entry based on modal training duration within
occupation—our preferred measure. Table 2.3 shows the results from this validation exercise.
Two key points emerge. First, there appears to be some ability for workers to manipulate
training duration based on the business cycle, but on average, this ability is very small. When
entry is defined by the last day of an individual’s training, a one standard deviation increase
in Uosc generates 12 day increase in training duration, on average. In contrast, when entry
is defined by training start date plus the modal training completion time in an occupation,
there is no relationship between Uosc and training duration. We take this as evidence that
our reduced form strategy corrects a small endogeneity bias relative to assigning individuals
their true date of training completion.
2.5 Effect of cyclical shocks on pecuniary and non-pecuniary
compensation
2.5.1 Primary results
The four panels of Figure 2.5 show the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in Uosc
at expected labor market entry on daily wages, establishment fixed effects, rents, and
compensating differentials over 10 years of potential experience. The top left panel illustrates
that young workers face an initial wage loss of about 0.6 percent, a gap that steadily narrows
over the next 10 years. The wage losses incurred in these first 10 years are economically
meaningful: our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in Uosc at the time
of labor market entry induces a 4.9 percent present discounted value (PDV) loss in daily
wages cumulated over the next decade.27 Assuming away differences in earnings arising from
27To conduct this calculation, we use the mean daily wage at each potential experience year, w¯e, the
standard deviation of Uosc, σU = 7.34, a discount rate r = 0.05, and the βe coefficients in the following
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the number of days worked, our PDV daily wage loss estimate from Germany is similar to
the 5 percent earnings loss accrued over 10 years for the average Canadian recession graduate
estimated in Oreopoulos et al. (2012).28
Establishment fixed effects, shown in the top right panel, drop by about 0.2 percent
on impact, and slowly rise. Taken on its own, the establishment fixed effect result hides
important dynamics that would be invisible were they not decomposed into rent and
compensating differential components. The effect of adverse entry conditions on these
sub-components of wages are shown in the lower two panels. The initial gap in rents is
small and closes steadily over time, with no statistically significant that it still exists after
10 years. In contrast, non-pay amenities (or negative compensating differentials) rise by
about 0.15 percent on impact and then slowly converge by year 10. These results imply
that unlucky workers start their careers in lower-paying jobs that feature higher non-pay
amenities compared to their lucky counterparts. Over time, these workers are successful
in transitioning to higher paying establishments and closing the gap in rents. However,
they continue to work at establishments that provide a relatively higher share of non-pay
amenities until year 10.
2.5.2 Career paths of “lucky” and “unlucky” cohorts
Figure 2.6 illustrates the career paths of young workers in absolute rather than relative
terms. Establishment value (V ) is shown on the horizontal axis and establishment fixed
effects (ψ) are shown on the vertical axis. The lines show the first 10 years of career
trajectories in (V, ψ) space for two different initial conditions, obtained by plotting the
predicted values of V and ψ from Equation (2.4.1) for each level of potential experience
using counterfactual values of Uosc. The “Low U” group faces initial unemployment rates
at the 10th percentile of within occupation-state unemployment rates, while the “High U”
group faces initial unemployment rates at the 90th percentile. Lastly, the gray dashed lined
plots a fitted line estimated from Equation (2.3.3) showing the average relationship between
establishment fixed effects and establishment values for employers in the SIAB.
Both “Low U” and “High U” groups move to the northwest, gaining in value and in
employer specific pay on essentially the same line—an approximation of the early-career job
ladder in (V, ψ) space. Workers who face low initial unemployment rates begin their careers
expression: 100×
(
1−
∑10
e=0
[
w¯e(1+σUβe)/(1+r)e
]
∑10
e=0
[
w¯e/(1+r)e
] ).
28Oreopoulos et al. (2012) construct their estimate assuming that recessions induce a 5 percentage point
change in the regional unemployment rate. During our study period (1999-2010), the regional unemployment
rate in Germany exhibited a standard deviation of 4.9 percentage points.
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at higher paying, higher value firms. However, a part of this pay gap comes from lower
non-pay amenities (this is evidenced by the fact that the “Low U” career path is further
above the dashed line than the “High U” career path in any given year). Both types of
workers retain the higher-pay/lower-amenity trade off as they gain experience, but “High
U” workers start from a lower level. In general, the career path has a higher slope than the
average relationship between establishment fixed effects and establishment values indicating
that individuals trade non-pay amenities for pecuniary compensation as they move up the
job ladder.
2.5.3 Decomposition of recession-induced losses
We next decompose recession-induced losses into four major categories in Table 2.4.29
Appendix B.1 provides details on how we calculate the various estimates presented in the
table. As mentioned above, the total pecuniary loss for cohorts who enter the labor market
during a recession is estimated as a 4.9 percent reduction in the present value of wages,
cumulated over a decade.
The subsequent rows of the table illustrate various novel decompositions that we are
able to calculate by applying unique data and empirical techniques. The first row shows
that 1.9 percentage points, or 40 percent, of the total loss is attributable purely to the fact
that unlucky cohorts match with lower paying employers. These employer-specific losses
are further split into rents and amenities in the second and third rows of the table. The
1.9 percentage point reduction in employer-specific pay arises from a 0.4 percentage point
reduction in rents and a 1.5 percentage point gain in amenities. Thus, fully three-quarters
of employer-specific pay reductions are compensated for by relative gains in amenities. The
final row of the table shows that 3 percentage points, or 60 percent, of the total loss is not
explained by employer-specific factors. This 60 percent incorporates losses due to factors
such as human capital mismatch, changes in outside offers, slow market-wide learning, and
infrequent wage re-negotiation.
Taken together, the results shown in Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, and Table 2.4 present new
perspective about the effects of cyclical conditions on the early career outcomes of young
workers. The welfare cost of recession entry, when viewed only in pecuniary terms, is a 4.9
percent reduction in the present value of wages. However, when we account for the fact that
1.5 percentage points of that loss is compensated for by relative gains in non-pay amenities,
the overall impact of typical recession is effectively a 3.4 percent reduction in the present
value of wages. Consequently, using pecuniary measures alone overstates the overall loss by
29These estimates reflect a one standard deviation increase in unemployment rates at entry which is
intended to simulate a recession.
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about 30 percent. In other words, a purely pecuniary comparison between the two cohorts
presents an incomplete picture about the welfare losses imposed by initial labor market
conditions.
2.5.4 Mechanism 1: cyclical variation in hiring by establishment type
Having illustrated the major implications of cyclical shocks on young workers’ career
trajectories, we now turn to investigate the mechanisms that drive the results we discussed
above. The first of these mechanisms is based on the model we presented in Section 2.2
which explicitly incorporates a compensating differential for employment stability (lack of
unemployment hazard) into the competitive equilibrium wage rate. In this framework, some
establishments are less cyclical in their hiring and firing decisions, and can therefore offer
lower equilibrium wages. The overall composition of hiring establishments would tilt toward
these stable establishments during a contraction, decreasing the average establishment
fixed effect measured for contractionary entrants and increasing the average measured
compensating differential. This divergence across firms could occur for a variety of reasons,
including both cross- and within-sector differences in the cyclicality of productivity.
Here, we investigate whether firms with higher measured non-pecuniary amenities are less
cyclical in their hiring by relating establishment growth to the business cycle, stratified by an
establishment’s measured time-invariant amenity value, aj. The regression model generally
takes the form
gjst = α + γU(Ust) + γa(a
CD
j ) + γint(Ust × aCDj ) + αs + αt + εjst (2.5.1)
where gjst represents establishment growth between year t and t + 1, Ust is the state-year
unemployment rate, and aCDj is a studentized version of −ˆj from Equation (2.3.3) — our
measure of non-pecuniary amenities that generate variation in pay holding utility constant.
γint is our key coefficient of interest, measuring the extent to which establishments with
higher non-pecuniary amenities are more (γint > 0) or less (γint < 0) cyclical in their hiring.
The results from estimating Equation (2.5.1) can be seen in Table 2.5. They offer evidence
that establishments that provide higher non-pay amenities are less cyclical in their net
employment growth. This suggests a direct link between the amenities we measure and an
establishment’s hiring decisions: those establishments that are more likely to hire during a
recession naturally offer more job security, and this job security is itself an amenity. Workers
are naturally more likely to receive job offers from more stable establishments (and industries)
when they enter the labor market during an economic contraction, which naturally increases
their non-pecuniary compensation and decreases their wage rate.
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2.5.5 Mechanism 2: displacement-induced human capital mismatch
We further use the rich structure of the SIAB to uncover patterns of worker mobility
that underpin the results from Section 2.5. The four panels of Figure 2.7 summarize these
mechanisms by showing the impact of a one percentage point increase in Uosc at labor
market entry on the probability of remaining in one’s training industry and the probability
of remaining in one’s training occupation. As with the previous results, we show these
impacts over a 10 year horizon.
Figure 2.7 indicates that adverse initial conditions have the effect of displacing
newly trained workers from their training industries and training occupations. Because
training employers are important contributors to wage growth in the German context,
the displacement we see in these figures suggests that there are strong parallels between
labor market entry during adverse cyclical conditions and the unemployment scar that
follows involuntary job loss (e.g. Jacobson et al., 1993, Davis and von Wachter, 2011, and
Krolikowski, 2017). Furthermore, mismatch in industry- and occupation- specific human
capital engendered by this displacement likely explains some of the wage penalties, which
also has analogs in the literature that proposes mechanisms for earnings losses following job
loss (e.g. Jarosch, 2015 and Krolikowski, 2017).
However, focusing purely on pecuniary losses as much of the prior literature has, would
have led one to conclude that the cumulative effect of these mobility scars is overwhelmingly
negative. In contrast, we find that affected cohorts recover completely in terms of rents and
values even though they are more likely to work outside of the industries and occupations in
which they trained. These displacements also shed light on the nature of cyclical upgrading
in the career paths traversed by lucky and unlucky cohorts. For example, McLaughlin and
Bils (2001) note that the wage gains obtained by workers who enter high-wage industries
during expansions could, in fact, be attributable to a compensating differential channel.30
While they do not seek to empirically verify this possibility, the patterns we present here
provide evidence both of its existence and of its magnitude. Taken together, the evidence
on outcomes and mechanisms suggests that the overall costs of industry and occupational
displacement may not be as damaging as one might have been led to conclude in the absence
of richer measures of compensation.
2.5.6 Robustness checks
In this section we investigate the robustness of our identification strategy to a variety of
potential threats. We consider the effect of potential simultaneity that arises from estimating
30McLaughlin and Bils (2001) focus on a Roy-model and a queuing model to explain cyclical upgrading.
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values as well as regression coefficients with the same underlying sample of worker mobility.
Next, we examine the extent to which connectedness restrictions required for the estimation
of establishment fixed effects and values generate selection bias in our sample. We find that
our results remain robust to these concerns.
2.5.6.1 Simultaneity of value and regression model estimation
A potential concern about our empirical strategy comes from the fact that identification
of the βe coefficients in Equation (2.4.1) exploits some of the same worker moves that identify
establishment values as described in Section 2.3.2. If rents and compensating differentials,
dependent variables in Equation (2.4.1), are estimated using the same underlying source
of variation as the βe coefficients, then our estimates could exhibit simultaneity bias. In
particular, the establishments that employ the workers in our sample could have higher
values precisely because the workers in our sample chose to work there.
In order to purge our econometric analysis of such a bias, we re-estimate the establishment
values by dropping all individuals who were trainees as of April 1999 or later from the set
of worker moves. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 2.8. The upper panel
shows results based on values estimated from the restricted sample, whereas the lower panel
duplicates the results from Figure 2.5 based on values estimated from the full sample. It
appears that there is some scope for upward bias in estimated coefficients from Equation
(2.4.1) on value-related outcomes. However, this bias does not alter the basic patterns of
our results: workers who face worse initial aggregate conditions recover in terms of rents but
not in terms of compensating differentials eight years later.
2.5.6.2 Sample selection bias
As discussed in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, our analysis is restricted to the set of
establishments for which establishment fixed effects and establishment values are estimable.
The first restriction requires connectedness and the second requires strong connectedness.
While these restrictions allow us to estimate Equation (2.4.1) using a variety of outcomes for
a fixed sample, we want to ensure that our results are not influenced by endogenous sample
selection. To do so, we take advantage of the fact that daily wages are available for all
individual-establishment observations in our data, regardless of whether the establishments
are in either of these connected sets.
Figure 2.9 contrasts our Figure 2.5 results for log wages from the restricted sample in the
left panel to an unrestricted sample of all young workers in our data in the right panel.31
31These estimates are obtained using actual year of entry and Uosc (our preferred specification from Section
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Comparing the two panels, we see that adverse initial labor market conditions have a very
similar effect on log wages across the restricted and unrestricted samples, starting from a 0.6
percent dip for each percentage point increase in Uosc and recovering to around 0.4 percent by
the eighth year of an individual’s post-training career. Thus, while our analysis is confined
to the 115,673 individuals represented by the left panel, this test provides good evidence
that their labor market experience reflects the broader early career paths of young German
workers.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper provides a new perspective on the costs imposed by cyclical shocks on
young workers. Using rich employer-employee linked data from Germany we replicate
the major finding of existing research showing that adverse cyclical conditions at labor
market entry generate persistent wage losses on affected workers. Implementing a revealed
preference based method of measuring compensating differentials across a large sample of
establishments, we find that low wages for unlucky cohorts are explained by reduced rents
and by offsetting compensating differentials, with the latter accounting for the majority.
We offer suggestive evidence that employers hiring workers during downturns provide more
long-term job security than those who hire workers during expansions, which explains part
of the offsetting compensating differential that unlucky cohorts obtain. Our findings indicate
that focusing on earnings losses alone overstates the long-term welfare losses of labor market
entry during recessionary periods.
We find that cyclical shocks in Germany displace workers away from the occupations and
industries in which they gained specialized apprenticeship training. As such, the wage losses
that unlucky workers face is explained by the mismatch in human capital similar to that
experienced by workers who suffer involuntary job loss. Nevertheless, our results indicate
that these unlucky workers continue to climb the utility ladder of job quality by accruing
returns in the amenity rather than rent component of establishment-specific pay. These
findings shed new light on the role that compensating differentials play in cyclical upgrading
and downgrading.
The sample of newly trained workers that we study includes a wide variety of skill
types, broadening the relevance of our results beyond college graduates. Nevertheless, our
conclusions are specific to the German labor market which differs substantially in terms
of employment protections, unemployment benefits, healthcare provision, and re-training
2.5), but the comparative results are qualitatively similar within any of the robustness checks discussed in
this section.
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programs relative to the United States and Canada which are the two other countries in which
recession-induced wage losses have been studied. Furthermore, the utility consequences that
we focus on are isolated to job specific components and do not speak to factors such as health
or consumption.
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Figure 2.1: Compensating wage variation due to hours volatility
V
h
hR hS h¯ hS hR
EzR [V (w, h)]
EzS [V (w, h)]
Notes: Thresholds illustrated on the horizontal axis represent the bounds of potential hours demand at risky
(R) and safe (S) firms. h¯ is the steady state level of hours demand associated with productivity z¯. Underbars
represent average values of h conditional on z < z¯. Overbars represent average values of h conditional on
z > z¯.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between establishment values and compensation
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Notes: The value and establishment fixed effect estimates shown in this graph are studentized. The blue
circles show the average establishment fixed effect and average establishment value within each ventile of
the establishment value distribution. The red lines show one standard deviation bands of the establishment
fixed effect distribution.
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between establishment values and compensation across
industries
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Notes: The value and establishment fixed effect estimates shown in this graph are studentized.
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Figure 2.4: OECD versus SIAB national unemployment rates
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Notes: OECD unemployment rate obtained from OECD Stat. See Section 2.3.4 for details of of how
unemployment rates are estimated using the SIAB.
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Figure 2.5: The effect of entry conditions (Uosc) on early career outcomes
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Notes: See Equation (2.4.1). All estimated coefficients are in log wage units. Sample size for each specification is 115,673. 95% confidence intervals represented by bars, with
standard errors clustered at the state-cohort-occupation level. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training occupation and training state in the individual’s
year of entry. Controls included are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of entry fixed effects, training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects,
median wage paid by training firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German national indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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Figure 2.6: Implied career paths of young workers
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Notes: See Section 2.5 for details.
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Figure 2.7: The effect of entry conditions (Uosc) on early career mobility
Working in Training Sector Working in Training Occupation
-
.
0
0
8
-
.
0
0
6
-
.
0
0
4
-
.
0
0
2
0
β
e
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years After Entry
-
.
0
0
6
-
.
0
0
4
-
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
4
β
e
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years After Entry
Notes: See Equation (2.4.1). All estimated coefficients are in log wage units. Sample size for each specification is 115,673. 95% confidence intervals represented by bars, with
standard errors clustered at the state-cohort-occupation level. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training occupation and training state in the individual’s
year of entry. Controls included are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of entry fixed effects, training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects,
median wage paid by training firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German national indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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Figure 2.8: Simultaneity bias robustness
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Notes: Sample size for “Out-of-Sample Value Estimation” figures is 119,988. Sample size for “Full Sample Value Estimation” figures is 125,363. 95% confidence intervals
represented by dashed lines. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training occupation and training state in the individual’s year of entry. Controls included
are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of entry fixed effects, training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects, median wage paid by training
firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German national indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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Figure 2.9: The effect of entry conditions (Uosc) on log wages—restricted versus unrestricted sample
Restricted to Connected Sets (N=115,673) Unrestricted (N=401,982)
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Notes: 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training occupation and training state in the individual’s
year of entry. Controls included are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, year of entry fixed effects, training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects,
median wage paid by training firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German national indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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Table 2.1: Mean individual characteristics by aggregate entry conditions
Uosc < U
MED
os Uosc ≥ UMEDos
Age at start of training 17.4 17.3
Median wage at training firm 87.9 86.2
Share German 0.94 0.95
Share female 0.41 0.43
Obtained vocational training certification (=1) 0.79 0.78
Notes: UMEDos refers to the median occupation-state-specific unemployment rate
during the study sample, 1999-2010. Median wage at training firm refers to median
wage at individual’s training firm in the year of training completion.
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Table 2.2: Identifying variation—unemployment rates faced by young workers at time of entry
Percentile
Independent Variable Description Mean St. Dev. 10 25 50 75 90
Uosc State-Occupation Unemployment Rate 10.88 7.34 4.05 5.56 8.85 14.20 21.05
Uoc National Occupation Unemployment Rate 9.94 3.80 6.18 7.67 9.57 11.24 12.86
Notes: Occupation assigned to individuals based on the occupation of their training apprenticeship. Unemployment rates
calculated as described in Section 2.3.4.
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Table 2.3: Identification strategy—validation tests
Training Duration (yrs) Training Duration (yrs)
Uosc 0.0044** -0.0015
(0.0021) (0.0030)
Year of Entry Definition Last day of training
Predicted last day of training
based on occ. mode
Notes: See Equation (2.4.2). * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.4: Decomposition of recession-induced losses
∆ PDV wage (10 years)
Losses in employer-specific pay 1.9%
Due to losses in rents 0.4%
Due to relative gains in non-pay amenities 1.5%
Other losses 3.0%
Total wage loss 4.9%
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Table 2.5: Establishment growth over the business cycle
(1) (2) (3)
Establishment Establishment Log Establishment
Growth Growth Size
Ust: State-Year Unemployment Rate -0.0050*** -0.0051** -0.0079***
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0018)
aCDj : Non-Pay Amenities 0.0019 — -0.0035
(0.0054) — (0.0069)
Ust × aCDj 0.0017*** 0.0088** 0.0015**
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Establishment FE No Yes No
Lagged Log Establishment Size No No Yes
Notes: All models include state and year fixed effects. aCDj is studentized.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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CHAPTER III
Finding Needles in Haystacks: Multiple Imputation
Record Linkage Using Machine Learning
3.1 Introduction
Increasingly, researchers are interested in linking survey and administrative data for
measurement and analysis. In most record linkage applications, the units being linked
originate from the same frame. For instance, individuals in a given dataset are linked to
same individuals in a different dataset, or businesses in one dataset are linked to the same
businesses in another dataset. In this paper, we consider the problem of linking across frames.
We match individual respondents in household survey data to administrative data on the
universe of employers. How does one use a household report of a business to link to the
correct employer? It would be possible to build in these linkages from the start, especially
where a sampling frame is created from administrative data. In that case, linkage is part
of the design. This paper addresses the problem of linking individuals and employers where
the linkage is not pre-designed into a survey. This situation typically arises in surveys of
households, which are built from sampling frames of household addresses, often without the
purpose of linkage as part of the design. Even in an idealized world where the survey and
administrative frames were developed in tandem, additional linkages to other administrative
data, that are not part of the design, may be desirable.
In the absence of unique identifiers, we treat record linkage as a missing data problem
where true match status is unknown and must be imputed. To do this, we need to accomplish
two related tasks. First, we need a way to predict whether any given pair of records drawn
from the two datasets constitutes a true match. Second, we need a way to characterize
uncertainty in the prediction of true matches and propagate that uncertainty into inferences
drawn from the linked data set by subsequent analyses.
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The task of predicting true match status is difficult because the size distribution of firms
is very skewed. Consider the striking empirical fact that 0.3 percent of all firms employ 53
percent of all workers in the United States.1 There are however millions of firms, so the
flip side of this fact is that most firms are very small. With so many small firms, matching
individuals to employers is inherently noisy because a large number of small employers among
a set of potential candidates are feasible matches for any given respondent. This is our needle
in the haystack problem. For example, imagine a set of candidate matches included a large
insurance company, an independent credit union at the same location using the name of
the insurance company, and a cafeteria operated by a third-party vendor also at the same
location and using the name of the insurance company. The names and address of the
candidate matches are all similar. When presented with this information, a human reviewer
may use auxiliary information such as the respondents industry, occupation, or reported firm
size to guess the correct match. We automate and speed-up what a human reviewer would do
by using a supervised machine learning (ML) approach to predict the matching firm. ML is
particularly valuable for record linkage because it makes flexible use of a very large number
of predictors, including auxiliary information, to mimic the heuristics used by a human
reviewer. Furthermore, relying on a rich set of predictors lends support to the assumption
that imputation errors are ignorable thereby improving inferences in subsequent analyses of
the imputed data. Finally, our ML estimator is tuned to deliver high out-of-sample accuracy
which improves the quality of predictions beyond the sample used for estimation.
To propagate uncertainty about true match status, we rely on multiple imputation
(MI). For each record in household survey data, our procedure samples multiple candidates
from administrative employer-level data by using ML-based match probability estimates as
weights. In cases where the match probability estimates are highly concentrated, household
survey records are linked to just one employer. Conversely, for cases where the match
probability estimates are highly diffuse, household survey records are linked to many different
employers. In the completed (matched) dataset, variability between implicates for a given
household survey record captures uncertainty associated with the linkage for that household.
Subsequent analyses of the completed dataset can then combine the multiple implicates for
valid statistical inference as in Rubin (1987).
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 3.2 describes record linkage methodologies
in deterministic and probabilistic contexts. Section 3.3 provides details on the files that we
attempt to link and explains the three major steps of our record linkage procedure. Section
3.4 assesses the fit of our imputation model and evaluates the accuracy of the linkage.
Section 3.5 compares selected employer characteristics derived from HRS self-reports to
12017 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), U.S. Census Bureau.
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BR imputations obtained using a variety of imputation methods. Section 3.6 illustrates
an application of the matched data to shed new light on the incidence of nonclassical
measurement error and nonresponse bias in household survey respondent’s reports of
employer and establishment size. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Foundations of Record Linkage
This paper builds on an important literature that developed widely-used techniques for
record linkage. The simplest approaches are non-probabilistic. In these deterministic file
matching applications, researchers accomplish record linkage by isolating a set of variables
that are common to a given record in both files. This procedure constitutes both the
first and the last step in the linkage. It is the first step because it enumerates the set
of possible matches. It is the last step because only those records that have exactly one
match conditional on variable agreement are retained. In some instances, a sufficiently rich
set of accurately measured variables can allow a large fraction of the original file to be
unequivocally matched (see, e.g., Warren et al. (2002), Hammill et al. (2009), Lawson et al.
(2013), and Setoguchi et al. (2014)). In other cases, the matched file consists of a small and
potentially non-random subset of the original file that limits the usefulness of the matched
dataset for analysis. This concern is highlighted in the context of linking historical data, for
example, in Bailey et al. (2017).
The Fellegi and Sunter (1969) (FS) method is an early and widely-used probabilistic
linking approach that picks the best match from the set of multiple potential matches. In this
method, researchers estimate the probability that a particular characteristic (such as gender
or first and last name) agrees in the two files, given that the records should link (match) and
given that they should not link (non-match). To estimate match probabilities the FS method
relies on the strong, and sometimes untenable, assumption that the agreement status of each
characteristic is independent conditional on true match status. Next, the data are used to
determine log odds cutoffs above which potential matches are coded as true matches and
below which they are treated as non-matches. Candidate pairs that fall between the cutoffs
are evaluated manually, a procedure which has been criticized, for example, in Belin and
Rubin (1995) because the error properties of manual review are unknown, may be subject
to inconsistent standards across reviewers, and may fail to yield a substantial number of
unequivocal matches.2
ML methods for record linkage constitute a growing alternative to the FS approach.
2While manual review of the entire set of blocked records has been adopted in some applications (e.g.,
Ferrie (1996)), it is prohibitively expensive in many settings and remains subject to the same criticisms as
the manual review step of the FS method.
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These methods estimate highly flexible non-parametric functions using observed covariates
and classify record pairs into matches and non-matches. For example, Cochinwala et al.
(2001) and Elfeky et al. (2002) use decision trees for classification while Christen (2008a) and
Christen (2008b) rely on support vector machines. ML approaches have been implemented
with training data (supervised) and without it (unsupervised), with the former typically
yielding more accurate linkage (see, e.g., Christen (2008b)). The key advantage of the
ML-based record linkage approach is its high degree of accuracy. These implementations
of ML create a deterministic classifier. Hence, like FS, existing ML-based record linkage
applications select the best match among a set of candidate matches. That is, conditional
on the matching algorithm, matches are treated as deterministic.
The Bayesian approach to record linkage characterizes uncertainty associated with
parameters in the linkage process (Fortini et al. (2001) and Larsen (2004)). In this method,
researchers specify prior distributions of parameters that govern the mixture of matches and
non-matches that generate the comparison vector of agreement status for variables observed
in both files. Draws from the posterior predictive distribution of the parameters are then
used to produce estimates of pair-specific match probability. One-to-one matching is enforced
using the mode of the posterior predictive distribution or by minimizing a loss function.
Tancredi and Liseo (2011) refine this procedure by relying on actual observed discrete
matching variables rather than a comparison vector of agreement status for those variables.
Steorts et al. (2016) provide a method of linking multiple files, each with potentially
duplicated records, within the Bayesian framework. Gutman et al. (2013) and Gutman et al.
(2014) further develop the Bayesian approach by applying it to situations where variables
used in the linkage model are available in both files as well as variables available in only
one file. Moreover, they jointly model the linkage step as well as relationships between
variables in the linked dataset (the analysis step). Then, by repeatedly sampling from the
posterior distribution of the linkage step parameters they generate multiple implicates of
linked datasets that are used in the analysis step and combined using the formulas in Rubin
(1987). This procedure has the advantage of propagating uncertainty in the linkage step
parameters into the analysis step.
Work that is highly germane to the household-employer record linkage problem we
consider in this paper began as a part of the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
(LEHD) program in two projects that were initiated in the early years of that effort. The
first of these projects linked employers to job histories in the 1990-1996 Surveys of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP).3 Abowd and Stinson (2013) evaluates this linkage and
3This work also developed improved linkages within the 1990-1993 SIPP job histories, and integrated
data from the Census Business Register into the SIPP (Stinson (2003)).
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uses it to compare self-reports and administrative reports of earnings. The LEHD program
also links establishments in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, called the
Employer Characteristics File in LEHD, to individual workers via the state Unemployment
Insurance account number, called the SEIN in LEHD. This linkage starts with deterministic
methods using the SEIN. When these methods do not find a one-to-one match, a Bayesian
posterior predictive distribution is used to generate ten implicates linking establishments to
the candidate worker employment history (Abowd et al. (2009)).4 These ten implicates are
used to associate workplace characteristics to each worker history.5 The ten implicate threads
are processed according to the Rubin (1987) combining formulas to produce the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI). McKinney et al. (2017) provides a complete assessment of the
total variability in the QWIs due to the MI and other edit procedures.
The methodology we develop relies on the accuracy of the ML approach to record
linkage while using MI to characterize uncertainty in the linkage and to propagate that
uncertainty into subsequent analyses. To our knowledge, this combination of methods has
not been previously employed in record linkage applications.6 Our ML approach allows to
us to leverage a very large number of predictors to estimate match probabilities including
both discrete and continuous observed variables from either file as well as agreement status
variables constructed using both files. Furthermore, the flexibility inherent in this method
accommodates rich complementarity between predictors and allows us to dispense with the
assumption that predictor variables are independent conditional on true match status as
has been posited in many prior applications. In addition, tuning our prediction models to
achieve high out-of-sample accuracy facilitates scalability and precision linkage in a way
that is difficult to achieve using Bayesian or FS methods. Finally, unlike prior ML-based
record linkage methods that use binary classification to select the single best match, the
ML algorithm that we use provides a match probability estimate for each record pair. By
repeatedly sampling candidate matches from the estimated match probability distribution
when constructing MI linkages, our procedure characterizes uncertainty regarding latent
match status.
4See Goldstein et al. (2012) for a similar approach applied to medical records.
5Other incomplete data in the LEHD infrastructure, such as incomplete data for education, are completed
using similar Bayesian methods.
6ML methods have been used to improve MI in applications that do not involve record linkage. See, e.g.,
Reiter (2005) for the creation of partially synthetic public use microdata and Burgette and Reiter (2010) for
missing variable imputation.
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3.3 Our procedure
In this section, we describe our MI-based record linkage procedure for matching
household-level survey data to employer-level administrative data. We rely on three distinct
steps to address the needle in the haystack problem associated with record linkage in this
setting. We begin by enumerating the set of candidate employers that constitute feasible
matches for each survey report about a particular job using a technique known as blocking.
Second, we assign match probabilities to each of the feasible candidates by building a
training dataset and using it to estimate a flexible ML model that is tuned for out-of-sample
accuracy via cross-validation. The model takes a given record pair as an input and returns
the estimated match probability. The third step of our procedure uses MI to construct
links for each survey report by resampling employer candidates using the estimated match
probabilities as weights.
Before delving further into the details of our methodology, we briefly describe the datasets
that we use in our application. The household survey that we use is the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) which samples more than 22,000 Americans over the age of 50 every
two years. It is a large-scale longitudinal project that studies the labor force participation
and health transitions that individuals undergo toward the end of their work lives and in the
years that follow. The HRS elicits information about employer identity from respondents to
construct measures of pension wealth. These data are obtained at the baseline (i.e., when
new respondents are enrolled in the study, generally every six years when a new cohort is
added to the study) and in each subsequent wave if the respondent reports having changed
jobs. Although the names, addresses, and phone numbers captured in these reports were
originally intended to aid the HRS in contacting employers about pension benefits, we use
this information for record linkage. We match employer reports in the HRS to the Census
Business Register (BR) which is the Census Bureau’s list of essentially all employers in the
United States. The BR contains information on employer names and address, company
affiliation, size, payroll, industry classification and other employer-level characteristics and
can be linked to other Census Bureau survey and administrative data on employers. We
refer to the dataset created by matching the HRS to the BR and associated Census Bureau
employer-level data as the CenHRS.7
7The original design of the CenHRS was predicated on having Federal employer identification numbers
(EINs). EINs would provide tight, but not perfect, linkage to an employee’s firm. The reliance on
business name and address matching was necessitated by challenges in receiving permissions to use EINs for
linkage. The BR includes EINs, and most HRS respondents have given permission to the Social Security
Administration (SSA) to provide EINs for their employers to HRS for purposes of enhancing the HRS data
infrastructure. We expect that we will evaluate the approach implemented here with a comparison to the
matches achieved using EINs when access is obtained. This paper aims to link to both firm and establishment
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Notably, employer names and addresses collected by the HRS are not provided to
researchers in order to protect respondent confidentiality. Similarly, information about
employers stored in the BR is restricted by Federal statute. While we have obtained
permission to use personally identifying information to create the CenHRS dataset, the
underlying data needed for record linkage will remain restricted. Consequently, imputing
matches and then analyzing the matched dataset are necessarily disconnected steps in our
application.
Step 1: Blocking
Let jobs in the HRS be indexed by i = 1, ..., NHRS. A job in the HRS is defined as
a spell of employment with a unique employer. Let employers in the BR be indexed by
j = 1, ..., NBR. If we start with the prior that every record in the BR is a potential match
for each job in the HRS, we would need to search over a set of NBR ×NHRS pairs. Because
this set is of the order 106 × 104, the computational cost of such a prior is prohibitive.
To reduce the dimensionality of the search problem, we establish a blocking strategy.
Blocking is a way of grouping together record pairs that share specific characteristics wherein
pairs that agree on at least one characteristic are regarded has having a positive probability of
being matches, while pairs that fail to agree on any characteristics are deemed as non-matches
(see, e.g., Christen (2012)). We block on 3-digit zip code, 10-digit phone number, telephone
area code, and city-state. Any BR candidate match that fails to share at least one of the
blocking values with an HRS job is assumed to have 0 probability of being a true match.
Employing this strategy substantially reduces the number of potential BR candidate matches
paired with each HRS job.
Step 2: Supervised machine learning for match probability estimation
Training data
We create a training data set by selecting a sample of NT ≈ 1000 unlabeled HRS-BR
pairs for human review. We heavily oversample pairs with a high likelihood of being true
matches using data and the methodology described in Appendix C.1.
Define xHi as a vector of self-reported employer characteristics for HRS respondent i
that includes, for example, name, address, phone number, industry, size, etc. Define xBj as
a vector of characteristics for employer j drawn from administrative data in the BR. Let
(i.e. the specific location at which they work), so even were EINs available, the method developed here would
be necessary to link to establishments. We also want to have the capacity to link households that provide
employer names and addresses, but may not consent to linkage with SSA administrative data.
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k = 1, . . . , NT index HRS-BR pairs in the unlabeled sample. These data are examined by
reviewers who observe certain pair characteristics, xk, which are a subset of (x
H
i ,x
B
j ); Table
3.1 lists the elements of xk . Notably, each HRS-BR pair is evaluated by two reviewers.
Define yk,r = 1 if reviewer r scores pair k as a match and yk,r = 0 otherwise. To the extent
that they disagree, the two reviewer assessments — i.e. the yk,r — reflect uncertainty about
latent match status.8
For each HRS-BR pair in the unlabeled sample, reviewers consider employer and
establishment match status separately. An employer match means that the employer’s
identity (e.g., Dunder Mifflin Paper Company) in the HRS corresponds to the employer’s
identity in the BR. In contrast, an establishment match implies that, in addition to an
employer match, the workplace identified by the HRS respondent exactly corresponds to
the physical location in the BR (e.g., Dunder Mifflin Paper Company, 1460 Main Street,
Scranton, PA). This distinction is important because workplace characteristics can differ
substantially even at different locations of a single employer. For example, different
establishments of a given employer may experience differential expansion or contraction,
produce different types of goods or services, or employ workers of different skill types or
ages. Consequently, we construct two different training datasets. In the employer match
dataset, yk,r refers to employer match status; in the establishment match dataset, yk,r refers
to establishment match status.
Once reviewers complete their assessments, each of the training datasets can be
represented by the following matrix:
T =

y1,1 x1
y1,2 x1
...
...
yNT ,1 xNT
yNT ,2 xNT

. (3.3.1)
Because there are two reviewer outcomes associated with each HRS-BR pair, l = 1, . . . , 2NT
indexes the rows of T .
Estimating match probabilities
We estimate match probabilities using a set of variables that supplements the information
observed by reviewers (xl). The supplemented set of predictors is given by the vector
8A total of eight reviewers conducted these reviews inside the Federal Statistical Research Data Center
(FSRDC) computing environment.
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x˜l(ij) = f(xl,x
H
i ,x
B
j ) where the function f(·) supplements and transforms observed data.
Table 3.2 shows the elements of x˜l(ij). The first two variables are cubic splines of Jaro-Winkler
(JW) scores for employer name and establishment address which flexibly capture reviewers’
assessments of the similarity in the HRS and BR names and addresses.9 The next two
variables capture the importance of specific employers in the local (i.e. within blocking
variable) and national labor market on match probability. These variables account for
institutional factors such as specific knowledge about dominant employers that reviewers
may have relied upon in ascertaining match status. To flexibly capture all complementarities
across name and address similarity and the role of specific employers, we fully interact all
four cubic splines together, expanding the set of predictors substantially.
The lower panel of Table 3.2 shows the set of binary predictors. These variables
capture agreement between the HRS-BR candidate match on a number of dimensions. Some
predictors, such as 10-digit phone agreement can be highly influential in predicting match
probability, but it is rare for candidate pairs to share such granular characteristics. On the
other hand, sharing SIC industry codes or 4-digit zip codes is more likely but less predictive
of a match. The final two variables — employer provision of health insurance and retirement
plans — incorporate information obtained purely from HRS respondents. We include these
predictors because they are typically associated with large employers and serve as proxies
for employer size when such information is missing in the HRS. Altogether there are 1413
variables in x˜l(ij).
Having defined the set of predictors, we then estimate
yl(ij) =Λ(x˜
′
l(ij)β + l(ij)), (3.3.2)
where Λ(·) represents the logistic transformation. Because of the high dimension of x˜l(ij),
we rely on the Elastic Net (EN) shrinkage estimator for model selection and estimation of
β (Zou and Hastie (2005)). Tuning parameters for the EN estimator are estimated using
10-fold cross validation; see Appendix C.2 for additional details. Plugging βˆ into Equation
(3.3.2) provides an estimate of P (yl(ij) = 1|x˜l(ij)) which is the probability that a human
reviewer would regard a given pair as a match.
Notably, because each pair is scored by two reviewers, observationally equivalent cases
(i.e. pairs with the same x˜l(ij)) can receive different evaluations about true match status
(i.e. different yl(ij)). We posit that these differences in reviewer evaluations owe to random
factors that are independent of the x˜l(ij) which constitutes ignorability as in Rubin (1976).
9JW scores, which range from 0 to 1, combine edit distance and q-gram-based comparison techniques to
measure string similarity.
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Formally, our linkage procedure is unbiased if
P (yl(ij) = 1|x˜l(ij)) = P (yl(ij) = 1|x˜l(ij), zl(ij)), (3.3.3)
where zl(ij) represents a vector of all other observed and unobserved variables that influence
match status for a given pair. The high dimension of x˜l(ij) with non-linearities and rich
interactions makes assumption (3.3.3) more tenable and facilitates valid inferences for a
richer set of subsequent analyses with the linked data.10
Step 3: Multiple-imputation of matches
In the final step of our procedure, we follow MI-based approaches to record linkage which
we implement as follows.
1. We estimate model (3.3.2) using the training data and denote the parameter vector by
βˆ.
2. We then plug βˆ into Equation (3.3.2) to obtain the match probability estimate for
each HRS-BR pair. Because of the asymmetric nature of the size distribution of firms,
each HRS job is mapped to a large number of BR candidates that have a trivially low
estimated match probability. Consequently, sampling an implicate with probability
proportional to the estimated match probability will often result in a low-quality match
being selected — typically a smaller firm or establishment. To overcome mismatch
errors of this nature, we impose a data-driven match probability cutoff that further
restricts the set of potential candidates surviving the blocking step. The cutoffs are
estimated with the training data so as to optimally trade-off the out-of-sample true
positive rate (sensitivity) and the out-of-sample false positive rate (1-specificity). We
provide additional details about this procedure in Section 3.4.2.1.
3. After eliminating BR candidates with estimated match probability below the cutoffs,
we normalize the probabilities to sum to one over the surviving candidates. Then,
for each HRS job, we sample M = 10 BR candidates with replacement using the
normalized match probabilities as weights.
This procedure yields M multiply imputed employer and establishment links for each
HRS job thereby constituting M completed datasets. For any statistic generated using
imputed data, we can combine estimates obtained from the M completed data sets using the
10See, e.g, issues of congeniality in imputation models as noted by Meng (1994), Rubin (1996), and Murray
(2018).
91
formulas in Rubin (1987) to compute the variance owing to sampling noise (within-implicate
variability) and the variance due to linkage uncertainty (between-implicate variability).11 For
some scalar parameter of interest θ, let θˆm represent estimates derived from the m = 1, . . . ,M
completed data sets. Let σˆ2m represent the variances associated with each of the M parameter
estimates. The multiply imputed estimate of θ is
θˆ = M−1
M∑
m=1
θˆm (3.3.4)
The within-implicate variance is
σˆ2W = M
−1
M∑
m=1
σˆ2m (3.3.5)
The between-implicate variance is
σˆ2B = (M − 1)−1
M∑
m=1
(
θˆm − θˆ
)2
(3.3.6)
The total variance associated with θˆ is
σˆ2 = σˆ2W + (1 +M
−1)σˆ2B (3.3.7)
3.4 Assessing model fit and linkage accuracy
In this section we implement our record linkage methodology by matching the 2010 wave
of the HRS to the BR. We begin by showing partial effects of the EN-based employer and
establishment matching models and compare their accuracy with simpler logit models. We
then explain how we estimate data-driven cutoffs for implicate selection and examine the
extent to which their use improves the quality of the imputations. Finally, we show a variety
of statistics to validate the predictive accuracy of the matching models.
11In complementary work in a regression context, potential matches can be aggregated using match
probability estimates as weights as in Lahiri and Larsen (2005).
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3.4.1 ML matching model estimates
3.4.1.1 Partial effects of matching model
Figure 3.1 shows the partial effects of the employer and the establishment matching
models. The top row of the figure shows the partial derivative of the employer prediction
model for four selected covariates holding all other variables at their means. The bottom row
shows analogous effects for the establishment prediction model. For both models, similarity
between HRS and BR names and addresses deliver the largest effect on the likelihood that
a pair is a true match. This effect only manifests at very high levels of similarity and does
so in a highly non-linear fashion. The partial effects in the employer model are uniformly
higher than those in the establishment model, reflecting that employer matches are easier to
confirm than establishment matches.
The partial effects of the two models underscore the value of employing the EN estimator
and relying on cubic splines to model the covariate space. The models we estimate capture
sharp inflection points in the curvature of the match likelihood, reflecting non-linearities in
reviewer decisions that would be infeasible to replicate using a simpler parametric approach.
3.4.1.2 Predictive accuracy evaluated using cross-validated ROC curves
Although we do not use our models as binary classifiers, we illustrate their predictive
performance by showing receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves in Figure 3.2. For
probability thresholds ranging from 0 to 1, the ROC curve plots the true positive rate
(sensitivity) on the vertical axis against the false positive rate (1-specificity) on the horizontal
axis. A model that was only as good as chance in classifying matches would have an ROC
curve that ran along the 45-degree line, while a perfect classifier would have an ROC curve
that hugged the left and top edges of the graph. The area under the curve (the c-statistic)
would be 0.5 for the good-as-chance classifier, while it is 1.0 for a perfect classifier. As such,
the c-statistic captures the predictive ability of the model in a single number which aids in
evaluating in the quality of the model relative to the two extremes of 0.5 and 1.0.
The left panel of Figure 3.2 compares employer match prediction performance using
ROC metrics. The blue curve is based on the EN estimator while the red curve is based
on a traditional logistic regression model estimated using JW scores of name and address.
Applying tuning parameters from the minimum deviance EN model, we estimate model
coefficients using 9/10ths of the training data and compute sensitivity and specificity
estimates by projecting the model on the remaining 1/10th of the sample.12 Iterating
through each hold-out tenth yields the out-of-sample ROC estimate. The c-statistics
12Deviance is defined as −2 times the maximized log likelihood. Lower deviance implies better model fit.
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from the two models are 0.98 and 0.94 respectively. The right panel shows the same
contrast for the establishment prediction model; the c-statistics for these two models are
0.94 and 0.88 respectively. Employer matches are easier to ascertain than establishment
matches. Employer matches depend mainly on address while establishment matches depends
importantly on address in addition to name, so establishments are unconditionally less likely
to be found relative to employers.
Table 3.3 compares the relative precision of each model at pre-selected sensitivity levels
of 0.85, 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99. For the employer match model, EN attains false positive
rates (1-specificity) which are 2-to-5 times lower than the corresponding values attained by
traditional logistic regression. At the same sensitivity levels for the establishment match
model, EN attains false positive rates which are 1.5-to-3 times lower than the corresponding
values attained by traditional logistic regression. Taken together, the results shown in Figure
3.2 and Table 3.3 indicate that the EN prediction models deliver very high predictive ability
out-of-sample, outperforming the simpler logit models in both cases.
3.4.2 Implementing probabilistic matches
3.4.2.1 Cutoff estimation
Although the blocking step dramatically shrinks the number of potential BR candidates,
the number of candidate matches is still very large for many HRS jobs. This empirical
regularity is a consequence of seeking to match household-level survey data to an
establishment-level frame. Most individuals are employed at a relatively small number
of large employers whereas the vast majority of employers are, in fact, very small. As
a consequence, the set of potential candidates for each HRS job is populated with many
small employers each of which receive a trivial match probability, a problem that is made
more acute when EINs cannot be employed for blocking. To illustrate the impact of block
size on match uncertainty, consider an example where an HRS job is paired with 1000
BR candidate matches with one large employer candidate being the correct match and
999 small employer candidates being non-matches. Suppose the large employer candidate
obtains a match probability of 0.5 while the remaining 999 small employer candidates receive
match probability = 0.5
999
. In this instance, random small employers will populate half of the
implicates even though they are two orders of magnitude less likely to be the right match
relative to the large employer. To address this concern, we propose a data-driven procedure
that mitigates the impact of block-size induced noise in the linkage process.
The details of the procedure are as follows. First, we estimate out-of-sample ROC curves
using the Bayesian bootstrap weighted training data. We then pick the probability threshold
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p∗ that minimizes
D(p) =
(
(1− sensitivity)2 + (1− specificity)2)1/2 . (3.4.1)
The cutoff probability p∗ minimizes the distance between the ROC curve and the upper left
corner of the graph. Put differently, p∗ is the feasible cutoff closest to the infeasible point
where the sensitivity and specificity are both 1 (see, e.g., Coffin and Sukhatme (1997) and
Youden (1950)).13 We estimate these cutoffs separately for each quartile of the block size
distribution in the training data. Table 3.5 shows the average number of pairs in each quartile
of the block-size distribution along with estimates of the associated cutoff probabilities.
Having obtained block-size dependent cutoffs, we leave as unmatched any candidate pairs
whose estimated match probability is below the cutoff. Any matching procedure, of course,
should admit the possibility that there is no reasonable match. Our procedure handles this
possibility systematically based on the estimated matching model, its uncertainty, and a
well-specified objective function. Hence, determining that a case is a non-match is entirely
integrated into the procedure. It does not rely on ancillary determination, for example, that
a case is treated as a non-match if the match probability is below a externally specified
threshold.
3.4.2.2 Selecting the implicates
We now have the ingredients to implement the match. The previous subsections describe
estimating the matching model which assigns a probability to each record pair, and finding
the optimal cutoffs where probabilities below the cutoff are set to zero when selecting the
implicates. We re-normalize the probability of pairs above the cutoff to sum to one over
the set of surviving candidates and select implicates from this set using the normalized
probabilities as weights. We implement this procedure on the 2010 wave of the HRS, the
remainder of the paper uses this dataset to evaluate the properties of the match procedure
and to do an application.
13This loss function gives equal weight to sensitivity and specificity and, of course, one could consider
other weights. Given that the estimated ROC curves for our matching models are symmetric and hug the
left and top edges of the graph, varying the weights would not change the cutoffs substantially.
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3.4.3 Evaluating the linkage
3.4.3.1 Match uncertainty reduction using cutoffs
Table 3.6 illustrates the degree of concentration for MI linked data.14 Concentration
among the implicates is defined as the proportion of unique matches among the 10 multiply
imputed matches for each HRS job. The left panel shows employer-match concentration
whereas the right panel shows establishment-match concentration; for both models, we show
concentration rates without cutoffs and with cutoffs. The first row of the table shows the
fraction of HRS jobs for which a single BR record populated all 10 implicates, which is the
maximum level of concentration. Subsequent rows show the share of implicates associated
with successively higher numbers of unique BR entities. Cases with 5 or more unique matches
are binned together.
The table shows that the imposition of minimum match probability cutoffs increases the
concentration of BR entities across the implicates; that is, less disparate BR entities are
realized as potential links after imposing the cutoff. For both models, the fraction of HRS
jobs mapped to a single BR candidate rises by a factor of approximately 50 after cutoffs are
used to exclude low quality matches. Concentration increases in the range of 10-to-30 fold
are seen for jobs mapped to two or three unique BR entities. Because employer matches are
easier to ascertain, the level of concentration is higher overall as compared with establishment
matches.
3.4.3.2 Internal validation via employer identity concordance across models
Our models predict employer and establishment match status independently. As an
internal check on prediction accuracy, we use MI linked data to compare the concordance
between employer identity from the employer match model with employer identity from the
establishment match model.15 A high degree of overlap in this dimension indicates that
both models select the same set of employers. Greater agreement between the two models
is therefore not only an internal consistency check, but also a measure of match certainty.
Table 3.7 shows the average fraction (out of 10) of employer identities that are common
to both the employer and establishment predictions for each HRS job. These rates are
reported for each quartile of the block-size distribution, and for the sample as a whole. Prior
14For 33 percent of HRS jobs, exactly 0 BR candidates survive the employer match threshold. For the
establishment match model, 8 percent of HRS records have 0 BR candidates. These HRS jobs represent
cases where there is not enough information to produce a plausible match candidate from within the blocked
set. Nevertheless, to the extent that exclusion from the imposition of cutoffs is non-random, it can generate
selection bias. We investigate this issue in Appendix C.3.
15Employer identity is ascertained on the basis of Census firm identifiers. All establishments associated
with a particular employer have the same Census firm identifier.
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to imposing probability cutoffs, smaller block sizes yield greater concordance between the
models: the average rate in the bottom quartile is 14 percent whereas the average rate in
the top quartile is almost halved to 6.6 percent. This decline occurs because uncertainty
grows in the number of potential matches. Once cutoffs are imposed, these concordance
rates increase by 4-to-8 fold. Furthermore, the monotonic decline in match uncertainty
vanishes in the cutoff based sample. Taken together with the concentration improvements
highlighted earlier, these statistics show that the application of a simple filtering technique
can dramatically reduce between-implicate variability among multiply imputed matches.
The less than perfect concordance reflects intrinsic uncertainty in record linkage.
Researchers might not be happy with this uncertainty, but making it explicit is clearly
superior to choosing a deterministic procedure and proceeding as if it were exact.
3.4.3.3 Out-of-sample validation using pension plan information
We exploit the availability of pension plan information for respondents from the 2010
wave of the HRS as a secondary check of the fit of our employer prediction model that is
entirely independent of the training data set. For respondents in the 2010 wave, the HRS
pension project collected employer pension plan information from Internal Revenue Service
Form 5500 (F5500) filings which include a Federal Employer Identification Numbers (EINs).
Using our sample of MI linked data, we match each respondents F5500 EIN to the BR
to determine the employer who sponsored their pension plan.16 Then, for each HRS job,
we ascertain whether the employer identified by the HRS pension project appears among
the set of 10 implicates. Table 3.4 shows that the average of this concordance rate over
approximately 1900 jobs with linked F5500 EINs is 0.42. When we impose data-driven
cutoffs to filter away low quality matches, the concordance rate rises to 0.63.Notably, this
validation method understates the accuracy of the matching model because, although many
pension plan EINs represent the respondent’s current employer, others could represent EINs
for union-sponsored pensions that do not have corresponding entries in the BR.
3.5 Comparing self-reported and imputed employer
characteristics
In Table 3.8 we show moments of the employer and establishment size distribution. We
consider four different methods of measuring employer and establishment size which we
16Employer identity is ascertained on the basis of a variable known as the Census firm identifier. All
establishments associated with a particular employer have the same Census firm identifier even if they have
different EINs.
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illustrate by reporting averages within selected percentiles of employer and establishment size
distribution. The top panel of the table shows employer size statistics while the bottom panel
shows establishment size statistics. The percentiles of the size distribution are re-computed
separately for each row. The table hence illustrates what a researcher would infer about the
size characteristics of HRS respondents using either the HRS self-report or the population
of linked employers or establishments.
For each panel, the first row is the HRS self-reports and the next three rows use different
imputation methods for linkage to the BR:
1. SI-highest selects the implicate with the highest predicted match probability; this
procedure is similar to FS methods where subjective judgment is used to reconcile the
presence of multiple potential matches. The benefit of SI-highest over purely subjective
match selection is that match probability estimates provide a well-defined metric to
select between alternative candidates.
2. MI draws 10 implicates with replacement using normalized match probability estimates
as weights.
3. MI-optimized first imposes data-driven cutoff probabilities on the estimated match
probability distribution, eliminates cases below the cutoff, and then re-samples
implicates with replacement using the normalized probabilities as weights.
For the MI-based statistics we show, in addition to means and standard errors, the fraction of
variance that owes to between-implicate uncertainty (the missingness ratio). The missingness
ratio captures variability that is relevant for inference that is ignored using SI-based methods.
The standard errors and missingness ratio for MI-based estimates are computed using
Equations (3.3.5)-(3.3.7).
Comparing moments of the employer and establishment statistics using each of these
procedures facilitates comparison with other linkage applications and highlights the value
of our preferred method. Employer and establishment size as reported by HRS respondents
is consistently larger than MI imputation from the BR.17 In contrast, the SI-highest
and MI-optimized based estimates of employer and establishment size are larger than MI
estimates. Reflecting the approximately log-normal distribution of firm size, most matching
blocks contain many small firms. In contrast, the dominant fraction of workers are employed
17Employer size in the HRS is first elicited as a continuous variable. If respondents do not report a
number, they are given the option of reporting one of six bins: [1,4], [5,14], [15,24], [25,99], [100,499], and
500+. In Table 3.8, we convert binned reports of employer and establishment size to continuous values by
using the midpoint of the interval. For respondents who report “500+”, we impute a continuous value by
randomly drawing an employer size from the set of continuous valued reports that are above 500.
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at large firms. This dichotomy has the potential to generate non-trivial bias especially
because our task is to match household survey data to an establishment level frame.The MI
procedure over-represents small firms because it draws implicates from a set of candidates
where the count of small firms far exceeds large firms. Because self-reports of establishment
size are likely to be more reliable than employer size (individuals know how many workers are
at their workplace more readily than how many workers a firm employs across workplaces),
we use the lower panel of the table to establish the bias reduction gains of SI-highest and
MI-optimized imputation strategies. Across much of the establishment size distribution,
these two measures more accurately correspond to self-reports while conventional MI
is consistently downward biased. Improvement in imputation accuracy obtains because
SI-highest and MI-optimized select larger employers with greater probability and, therefore,
produce estimates that are closer to HRS self-reports.18
While both SI-highest and MI-optimized mitigate bias, only MI-optimized incorporates
linkage uncertainty into the standard error estimate. For the middle tenth of the employer
and establishment size distribution, about 3.5 percent of the variance in average size owes
to linkage uncertainty respectively. This variability is ignored in the SI-highest procedure
thereby downward biasing the associated standard errors. Secondary to the improvement
of MI-optimized over SI-highest, we see that the cutoffs based procedure generally reduces
between variability relative to conventional MI, reinforcing earlier measures of concentration
and concordance among the 10 implicates.
3.6 Application: The wage-firm size gradient
Using both household and firm level survey data as well as administrative
employer-employee linked data, a number of studies have established that larger employers
pay observationally equivalent workers higher wages (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989),
Oi and Idson (1999), and Bloom et al. (2018)). In this section we discuss an application of
CenHRS by re-examining the relationship between wages and employer size. In particular,
our approach reveals how systematic biases generated by measurement error and nonresponse
would remain hidden without establishing linkages to administrative data.
18As we show in the next section, HRS self-reports of employer and establishment size are downward
biased due to nonclassical measurement error and nonresponse bias.
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3.6.1 Wage-firm size gradient in household-survey data
Consider the following statistical model for the relationship between firm size and worker
wages in the cross section
wij = γ0 + γ1s
∗
ij + vij, (3.6.1)
where wij is the log hourly wage of worker i employed at firm j, s
∗
ij is an error-free measure
of the log of worker i′s employer’s size, and vij is an error term that captures other factors
influencing worker wages. The HRS provides household survey-based measures of hourly
wages, wij, as well as potentially error-ridden measures of employer size, sij , where
sij = s
∗
ij + uij. (3.6.2)
Under the classical measurement error model, discrepancies in survey reports are not
systematically related with the underlying variable of interest implying that Cov(uij,vij) = 0.
Given this framework, it is well known that the presence of added noise in the explanatory
variable attenuates the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of γ1. Alternatively, if
discrepancies in survey reports are systematically related to the underlying variable of
interest — i.e. if the measurement error is non-classical — then the OLS estimate of γ1 may
be either amplified or attenuated depending on the sign of Cov(uij,vij) and its magnitude
relative to V (sij). In the following subsections, we use our MI-optimized measures of employer
size to determine whether the measurement error is classical or non-classical and assess its
effect on the wage-size gradient.
3.6.2 Using MI-optimized variables to assess the nature of measurement error
Define sˆ
∗(m)
ij := g(x˜ij; βˆ, pˆ
∗) as the m-th implicate of log firm size obtained using the
MI-optimized procedure. Recall that x˜ij is the high-dimensional vector of match predictors,
βˆ is the parameter vector that indexes the matching model used for imputation, and pˆ∗ is
a vector of block-size specific match probability cutoffs. We can write the true value of log
firm size under our imputation procedure as
s∗ij = sˆ
∗(m)
ij + ηij. (3.6.3)
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Ignorability as posited in Equation (3.3.3) implies the following moment conditions:
Cov(sˆ
∗(m)
ij , ηij) = 0 (3.6.4)
Cov(sˆ
∗(m)
ij , vij) = 0 (3.6.5)
i.e., the imputed variable is uncorrelated with imputation error, ηij, as well as the error in
the regression model, vij.
The probability limit of γˆ1 estimated using the MI-optimized measures of firm size by
OLS is
γˆ1 →
p
Cov(sˆ
∗(m)
ij , γ0 + γ1s
∗
ij + vij)
V (sˆ
∗(m)
ij )
= γ1
Cov(sˆ
∗(m)
ij , s
∗
ij)
V (sˆ
∗(m)
ij )
, (3.6.6)
where the second expression follows from Equation (3.6.5). Finally, from Equations (3.6.3)
and (3.6.4) it follows that Cov(sˆ
∗(m)
ij , s
∗
ij) = V (sˆ
∗(m)
ij ) which implies that the estimate of γˆ1
based on MI-optimized variables is consistent.
Having established the consistency of OLS estimates of γ1 based on MI-optimized
measures, we turn next to assess the nature of measurement error in HRS reports by
comparing the wage-size gradient obtained using survey self-reports of workplace size along
side MI-optimized measures of workplace size.
3.6.3 HRS reporting error about workplace size is correlated with wages
We begin by showing non-parametric evidence of the positive wage-size gradient in our
sample. The left panel of Figure 3.3 shows average log hourly wages for each decile of
the log employer-size distribution, while the right panel shows average log hourly wages for
each decile of the log establishment-size distribution. In both panels, the gradient based
on self-reported size is steeper than the gradient based on MI-optimized size. If employer
and establishment size were subject to classical measurement error — as is often the case
in self-reports of earnings — one would expect the survey based gradient to be attenuated
relative to the administrative data based gradient. However, the converse is true.
Figure 3.4 explains amplification bias by showing how measurement error and selective
nonresponse in HRS are systematically correlated with wages. The top left panel shows
average log employer size for each decile of the log wage distribution and illustrates a stark
pattern: workers in lower deciles of the wage distribution underreport the size of their
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employer. This error diminishes as wages increase but does not vanish even at the top of the
wage distribution. As such, self-reporting error about employer size is positively correlated
with wages. Thus, Cov(uij,vij) > 0, and we observe amplification bias in the survey-based
wage-size gradient. The lower left panel of Figure 3.4 shows the same qualitative relationship
between self-reported error in establishment size and wages. Relative to employer-size
discrepancies, the magnitude of these errors are substantially smaller and the confidence
interval estimates for the two curves overlap across the entire wage distribution. Biases such
as these could occur if low-wage workers are less informed about the employment structure
of a firm than are say, high-wage, managerial workers who have more institutional knowledge
of the firm’s operations. They could also emerge if low-wage workers at multi-establishment
firms tend to report establishment size as a proxy for employer size more frequently than do
high-wage workers.
To illustrate the role of nonresponse bias, the two right-hand panels of Figure 3.4 show
similar contrasts but restrict the sample of administrative data imputations to coincide
with the sample where HRS respondents provide self-reports. This restriction eliminates
nonresponse bias as a reason for the difference between self-reports and administrative data
imputation by focusing purely on reporting error. The similarity between the plots in the
left half of the figure and those in the right half indicate that reporting error is, in fact, the
main driver of amplification bias.
To examine these differences more carefully, Table 3.9 shows measurement error and
nonresponse bias within each decile of the wage distribution.19 Measurement error is
consistently negative and declining in wages for employer and establishment size, whereas
nonresponse errors are typically positive and are largest in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th deciles of the
log wage distribution. With a few exceptions in the tails of the wage distribution, these data
reveal that non-responders in the HRS predominantly work at larger firms and establishments
than do responders. Furthermore, because selective nonresponse is concentrated in lower
deciles of the log wage distribution, relying purely on self-reports would make it appear that
lower-wage workers are employed at smaller firms and establishments than is actually the
case. This bias further amplifies the survey-based wage-size gradient.
The patterns discussed here provide new evidence on how survey responses about
employer characteristics are selectively misreported or not reported at all. With linkages
to administrative information on employers in CenHRS, we are able to characterize
measurement and nonresponse errors that are unobservable in other household survey
datasets.
19Appendix C.4 formalizes how measurement error and nonresponse bias terms are computed using
moments from HRS self-reports and MI-optimized variables.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper describes the construction of a new dataset, CenHRS, that is obtained by
linking a household-level survey to an establishment-level frame in the absence of unique
identifiers. The between-frame linkage task that we undertake is complicated by asymmetries
in the distribution of employment across firms that makes matching inherently noisy. To
address these issues, we resort to probabilistic linkage and utilize a supervised machine
learning model to estimate the probability that specific employers and establishments in the
BR are matches for individuals in the HRS. Our prediction model relies on a rich set of
covariates and a high degree of flexibility to replicate important non-linearities inherent
in the training data. Using probabilities estimated from the model, we employ MI to
characterize uncertainty in the linkage. To further refine the posterior distribution of
candidate matches we estimate probability cutoffs that provide the best sensitivity and
specificity combination out-of-sample. Eliminating candidate matches that fail to meet these
cutoffs dramatically reduces between-implicate variability while also reducing biases inherent
in the between-frame linkage that we construct. We use these newly linked data to provide
new evidence that reporting errors as well as selective nonresponse to survey questions on
employer characteristics vary systematically with wages.
Beyond issues related to record linkage, CenHRS opens new avenues for research by
extending pre-existing measures of activities, experiences, and outcomes for individuals
from their family and home context to the work context. These new measures will provide
data necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of the determinants of health and
well-being over the lifespan. To validate and extend the linkages that we have developed
in this paper we will exploit the availability of EINs in subsequent efforts, substantially
improving the quality of these data for future research.
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Figure 3.1: Partial effects of the matching models
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Notes: Each graph shows the partial derivative of the matching function for a given predictor holding all other predictors at their mean. Name and
address agreement are based on Jaro-Winkler scores for similarity between HRS and BR names and addresses. These variables range from 0 to 1.
Block share is the fraction of employment within the block (i.e. 3-digit zip, 10-digit phone number, telephone area code, or city-state that are common
between a given HRS-BR pair) accounted for by a given establishment in the BR.
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Figure 3.2: ROC curves of the matching models
Notes: ROC estimates are computed using 10-fold cross-validation. Hollow black circles show the model’s optimal cutoff probability which minimizes
the distance to the top left corner of the graph (i.e. yield maximum sensitivity and specificity).
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Figure 3.3: HRS versus CenHRS wage-size gradient
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Notes: Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Some HRS respondents report hourly wages directly. Others report compensation at daily,
weekly, monthly, or annual levels. When compensation is reported at a different level than hourly, we convert it using the respondent’s report of how
many hours per week and weeks per year worked. Data in the 1-3 deciles and the 4-5 deciles of the BR imputed employer size distribution are binned
together to prevent disclosure of information in small cells.
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Figure 3.4: Measurement error and nonresponse bias across the wage distribution
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Notes: Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. For multiply imputed statistics from the BR, the confidence interval accounts for within-
and between-implicate variability. Some HRS respondents report hourly wages directly. Others report compensation at daily, weekly, monthly, or
annual levels. When compensation is reported at a different level than hourly, we convert it using the respondent’s report of how many hours per
week and weeks per year worked. In the left-hand column, the MI-optimized plot uses all available data, regardless of whether respondents provide
a report of their employer’s or establishment’s size. In the right-hand column, the MI-optimized plot is restricted to the sample of respondents that
report employer and establishment size.
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Table 3.1: Reviewer’s information set
Category Review variables (HRS and BR)
1 Employer name, establishment address, and phone number
2 Employer single or multi-unit status
3 Employer and establishment size
4 Employer industry code and code description
108
Table 3.2: Key predictors in the matching models
Predictor Description
Cubic spline JW score name Similarity in HRS and BR name
Cubic spline JW score address Similarity in HRS and BR address
Cubic spline block share Importance of establishment in local (within blocking variable) labor market
Cubic spline employer size (BR) Importance of employer in national labor market (employer size from BR)
Full interaction of cubic splines All complementarities between continuous variables
Employer size agreement 1 if employer size in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
Establishment size agreement 1 if establishment size in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
Multi-unit status in BR 1 if employer is multi-unit, 0 if single-unit
7-digit phone number agreement 1 if 7-digit phone number in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
10-digit phone number agreement 1 if 10-digit phone number in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
3-digit zip code agreement 1 if 3-digit zip code in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
4-digit zip code agreement 1 if 4-digit zip code in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
5-digit zip code agreement 1 if 5-digit zip code in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
SIC industry code agreement 1 if SIC code in HRS and BR agree, 0 if missing or disagree
Employer provides health insurance 1 if HRS respondent indicates employer provides health insurance, 0 if missing or no provision
Employer provides retirement plan 1 if HRS respondent indicates employer provides retirement plan, 0 if missing or no provision
Notes: The cubic splines for JW scores for name and address have 10 cut points each. The cubic splines for block share and employer size have 3 cut points
each. There are a total of 1413 predictors prior to model selection.
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Table 3.3: Prediction accuracy: Elastic Net versus Logistic
regression
1-Specificity
Employer match Establishment match
Sensitivity Elastic Net Logit Elastic Net Logit
0.85 0.026 0.057 0.080 0.266
0.90 0.034 0.136 0.145 0.361
0.95 0.068 0.354 0.309 0.697
0.99 0.311 0.634 0.605 0.887
Notes: Sensitivity and specificity estimates are computed using 10-fold
cross-validation.
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Table 3.4: Validation with pension plan
information
No cutoffs Cutoffs
Employer ID agreement 0.421 0.625
N 1900 1250
Notes: Pension plan EINs are obtained through
an independent linkage exercise where the HRS used
employer names to search for IRS Form 5500 pension
filings.
111
Table 3.5: Receiver Operating Characteristics curve-based cutoff estimates
Cutoffs
Quartiles of block size Avg. block size Employer match Establishment match
1 13620 0.154 0.066
2 26390 0.343 0.154
3 44340 0.600 0.171
4 99270 0.534 0.123
Full sample 46220 0.236 0.157
Notes: ROC estimates are computed using 10-fold cross-validation. Cutoff estimates provide
probability thresholds which minimizes the distance to the top left corner of the ROC graph (i.e.
yield maximum sensitivity and specificity). The training data set has ≈ 2000 observations.
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Table 3.6: Concentration of multiple implicates
Employer match Establishment match
Unique matches No cutoffs Cutoffs No cutoffs Cutoffs
1 0.009 0.478 0.001 0.057
2 0.015 0.283 0.002 0.058
3 0.020 0.158 0.002 0.051
4 0.031 0.055 0.002 0.060
5-10 0.926 0.027 0.993 0.774
N 5700 3700 5700 5200
Notes: This table is based on the set of working HRS respondents in the 2010
wave. Totals may not sum to 1 because each cell is independently rounded.
HRS jobs with 5 or more matches are binned together to prevent disclosure of
information in small cells.
113
Table 3.7: Concordance between employer
and establishment models
Quartiles of block size No cutoffs Cutoffs
1 0.140 0.547
2 0.103 0.694
3 0.066 0.718
4 0.066 0.522
Full sample 0.110 0.586
Notes: This table is based on the set of working HRS
respondents in the 2010 wave. Block size is defined
as the number of candidate BR pairs within a block
defined on an HRS job (i.e. 3-digit zip, 10-digit phone
number, telephone area code, or city-state).
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Table 3.8: Employer and establishment size statistics
A: Employer size percentile
Source [0,25) [25,45) [45,55) [55,75) [75,100]
HRS 17.6 177.8 710.5 2945 164800
(.51) (3.56) (10.92) (50.89) (13040)
SI-highest 2.4 124.6 917.1 6668 190100
(.08) (3.47) (15.63) (129.10) (8270)
MI 0.8 7.1 61.4 3537 126700
(.02) (.13) (1.79) (107.80) (5643)
[0.001] [0.007] [0.029] [0.008] [0.001]
MI-optimized 63.4 804.6 2673 8474 247300
(2.27) (15.97) (31.74) (156.20) (12210)
[0.002] [0.008] [0.033] [0.003] [0.000]
B: Establishment size percentile
Source [0,25) [25,45) [45,55) [55,75) [75,100]
HRS 5.6 25.4 54.5 127.3 1848
(.11) (.29) (.32) (1.70) (229)
SI-highest 0.8 5.0 13.5 58.5 14910
(.02) (.06) (.14) (1.02) (2613)
MI 0.5 2.4 4.1 8.6 2158
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.09) (983)
[0.001] [0.067] [0.472] [0.023] [0.001]
MI-optimized 1.0 7.8 26.45 120.4 42020
(.02) (.12) (.29) (1.97) (4880)
[0.022] [0.030] [0.034] [0.008] [0.001]
Notes: This table is based on the set of working HRS respondents in the 2010 wave. SI-highest
selects the BR candidate associated with the highest predicted match probability. MI selects
10 BR implicates for each HRS respondent using estimated match probabilities as weights.
MI-optimized imposes data-driven cutoff probabilities, eliminates BR candidates below the
cutoffs, and then selects 10 BR implicates using estimated match probabilities as weights.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. MI standard errors incorporate within and between
variablility. Missingness ratios (ratio of between-implicate variance to total variance) are shown
in square brackets.
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Table 3.9: Measurement error and nonresponse bias across the wage distribution
Log employer size Log establishment size
Log wage decile Measurement error Nonresponse bias Measurement error Nonresponse bias
1 -2.308 -0.094 -0.258 0.038
2 -1.798 0.091 -0.349 0.055
3 -1.264 0.261 -0.123 0.068
4 -1.084 0.339 -0.370 0.132
5 -1.334 0.217 -0.376 0.124
6 -1.192 0.164 -0.354 -0.082
7 -0.701 0.116 -0.249 -0.047
8 -0.374 0.044 -0.144 0.023
9 -1.038 -0.084 -0.166 0.005
10 -1.028 -0.085 0.060 -0.057
Notes: This table is based on the set of working HRS respondents in the 2010 wave. Measurement error is the difference
between MI-optimized measures conditional on the sample where HRS self-reports are nonmissing and the averages based
on HRS self-reports. Nonresponse bias is the difference between ML-MI-optimized measures for the whole sample and
ML-MI-optimized measures conditional on nonmissing HRS self-reports. See Appendix C.4 for details.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
Form 5500
F5500 is an annual plan specific filing collected jointly by the IRS, DoL, and the PBGC
to ensure compliance with ERISA.1 Each plan in the F5500 database is identified by a
combination of an EIN and plan number (PN). The PN is assigned by the plan’s sponsor
and stays fixed over the life of the plan. For form years 2000-2015, the DoL has prepared
an edited research sample of the data in which logical and arithmetic errors are corrected
and multiple filings for the same plan are de-duplicated. From 2000-2009, the research data
include all pension plans with more than 100 participants and a 5 percent sample of plans
with less than 100 participants. I use records from the research data where possible and
add back small plans (i.e. those with less than 100 participants) from the raw data if they
are excluded from the research sample. I de-duplicate multiple filings for the same plan in
the raw data files by retaining the most recent filing in a given year. I obtained pre-1999
data through a FOIA request to the DoL. The sample that I use covers plan years ending
1996-2014.
I focus primarily on DB plans, but also obtain data on DC plans offered by employers
who sponsor DB plans. Plan characteristics are coded using a set of numbers and letters.
In post-1999 F5500 data, DB plans have prefix 1, DC plans have prefix 2 and 3, and welfare
1F5500 data for form years after 1999 are available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/
about-ebsa/our-activities/public-disclosure/foia/form-5500-datasets.
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benefit plans — such as employer provided health insurance — have prefix 4.2 Hard frozen
DB plans are recorded using code 1I. Cash balance plans are recorded using code 1F. I
eliminate supplemental plans which I identify by searching for any case versions of the string
“supplemental” in the plan name field. I restrict my sample to single employer plans, thereby
eliminating multi-employer DB plans.3
In addition to the main form, I include data taken from the actuarial information
attachment. Prior to 2007 this attachment was labeled Schedule B. After 2009 it was labeled
Schedule SB for single employer plans. For 2008, I impute actuarial data by interpolating
between the 2007 and 2009 values because actuarial information is unavailable in electronic
format. The actuarial attachment contains important plan level data including detailed
breakouts of plan assets and liabilities, accruals earned during the plan year, the average
retirement age/benefit claim age, mortality and separation rate assumptions, etc.
Linking to the Census Business Register and Census Longitudinal Business
Database
The BR is a database of the universe of establishments in the United States.4 It includes
information on business location, organization, industry, and information on revenue,
payroll, and employment that is collected from administrative tax records as well as survey
information. The relationship between establishments belonging to multi-unit firms are
determined using responses to the company organization survey, the economic census, and
the annual survey of manufactures. Establishments that are part of the same multi-unit firm
share the same Census assigned firm identification number even if they have unique EINs.
To link the F5500 files to the BR, I match EIN-plan-end-years in F5500 to EIN-years in
the BR. Because the massive scope of the BR, I am able to match approximately 92 percent
of DB plan-years in the F5500 files to specific establishments in the BR (see row 1 of Table
A.1). Non-matches occur when a plan EIN does not map to any establishment with positive
payroll in the BR which could happen, for example, when a plan is sponsored by a union or
an employer-association.
The set of plan-years represented in the F5500-BR merge contains a mix of firms that
sponsor just one DB plan and firms that sponsor multiple DB plans.5 I limit my sample to
2The codes are different prior to 1999. Welfare benefit plans only need to be reported with a F5500 filing
when such plans cover more than 100 active participants.
3Multi-employer plans are arrangements between a group of firms and/or unions to provide pension
benefits to eligible employees within the group.
4Information about the BR is confidential and protected by Title 13 and Title 26, US Code. The following
information is drawn from https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0600.html.
5Firms that sponsor multiple DB plans typically do so to cover different types of workers. For example, a
firm may sponsor different DB plans for salaried and hourly workers or unionized and non-unionized workers.
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firms that have a single plan within the 1996-2014 window for which I have F5500 data. When
firms have multiple plans, I retain only those employers who choose either to never freeze their
plans, or freeze them all at the same time. The principle driver of this restriction is that I
cannot observe individual pension plan coverage. Consequently, when firms sponsor multiple
plans, there is no way of knowing — using the F5500, LBD, or LEHD data — which plan
a worker may be covered by. By imposing this restriction, however, I can ascertain whether
workers at a given firm have been affected by a freeze in a given year. This sample restriction
allows me to retain 94 percent of firm-years but only about 40 percent of worker-years (see
row 2 of Table A.1). The discordance between these two rates reflects the fact that only the
very largest employers sponsor multiple DB plans.6 Using Census firm identifiers, I match
these data with the LBD which is a cleaned and research ready version of the BR. The
LBD covers private sector establishments with non-zero payroll but excludes some industrial
sectors (see p.4 of Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for details).
Having matched F5500 records to the BR and the LBD, I structure the data as follows.
I treat each year from 2001-2014 as an experimental year, which is indexed by l.7 This
terminology reflects the research design wherein each year yields a fresh sample of firm-level
pension freezes. For a given experiment year, the panel dataset of workers employed at
freezing firms constitutes the treated group while the panel dataset of workers employed firms
that do not freeze their plans constitutes the comparison group. I impose the restriction that
firms file F5500 for their DB plans 5 calendar years prior to the experiment year, which I
refer to as the pre-period. By requiring plan stability in the lead up to the experiment year,
I implicitly follow a specific set of workers covered by a DB plan regardless of whether their
employer merges, grows from single-unit to multi-unit, or vice versa. I match information
on DC plans offered by the set of DB sponsoring employers to these data using the same
EIN-based linking procedure described above. The key DC-related variable is the number of
workers covered by DC plan(s). When a firm offers multiple DC plans, I pick the maximum
number of active participants across plans and use that count to estimate the DC coverage
rate at the firm.8
6When firms sponsor multiple plans and pass the sample screen, I sum plan-level variables such as assets,
liabilities, and participant counts across all plans sponsored by the firm. I compute the weighted average of
the retirement age reported on F5500 using the number of participants in each plan as weights.
7I start with 2001 because it is the first year in which pension freezes are reported in F5500. Cash
balance conversions are reported in earlier years but the number of firms making CB conversions before 2001
is small.
8I use the maximum across plans rather than the sum across plans because workers can participate in
multiple DC plans. The DC coverage rate is the ratio of the maximum number of DC participants from
F5500 to the count of employees from the LBD.
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Linking to the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics
The LEHD is a quarterly matched employer-employee dataset constructed from
state-level unemployment insurance (UI) records. The UI system covers 96 percent of wage
and salary employment nationally, although the data exclude independent contractors, the
unincorporated self-employed, railroad workers covered by railroad unemployment insurance,
and some other minor categories of workers who are not covered by state-level UI laws. State
and local government employees are included in the data but elected officials, members of
the judiciary, and some emergency employees are excluded. Federal government workers and
workers employed in Alabama are excluded from the version of the data that I use in this
paper.
An important feature of the LEHD is that states enter the dataset at different points in
time. For example, Maryland enters in 1985:Q2 whereas Mississippi enters only in 2003:Q3.
Because of staggered entry, the scope of the data grows continuously over time.9 I use the
2014 snapshot version of the LEHD, which provides matched employer-employee histories
from each state’s entry quarter up through 2015:Q1. I eliminate the single quarter of 2015
from these data as it represents partial year information on earnings and is not representative
of the annual data structure that I employ.
In the LEHD, employers are identified using a state UI account number known as the
SEIN while workers are identified using a variable known as a protected identification key
(PIK). I begin by matching firm-level data from the F5500-LBD linked sample to the T26
Employer Characteristics File (ECFT26) in the LEHD. The ECFT26 is a SEIN-quarter-year
level file that contains the Census firm identifier associated with each SEIN. Using this
common unique identifier, I can match national plan- and employer- level characteristics
from the F5500-LBD linked sample to state level employers in the LEHD. I recover 89
percent of firm-experiment years which corresponds to 93 percent of employee-experiment
years from the F5500-LBD linked sample (see row 3 of Table A.1). From this sample, I drop
a small percentage of observations where certain pension plan variables are missing (see row
4 of Table A.1).10
Worker sample
When considering the implications of pension freezes on worker decisions, it is important
to reiterate that I do not observe individual information on pension plan coverage. To study
9A number of populous states enter the data relatively early. Illinois enters in 1990, California and
Pennsylvania in 1991, Florida in 1992, and New York and Texas enter in 1995.
10Critical pension plan information includes plan assets and liabilities, accruals earned in the filing year,
the average benefit claim age for the plan.
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worker responses in a way that limits the potential for misclassification error, I restrict
the sample to firms where DB eligibility is near universal. I impose this restriction by
retaining firms where the DB coverage rate is 80 percent or greater in the pre-period.11
Within the sample of high-coverage rate firms, I use the LEHD Employment History File
(EHF) to obtain matched employer-employee data. The EHF is a SEIN-PIK-year level file
that provides the earnings history associated with each employer-employee combination. To
these data, I add information on date of birth, race and ethnicity, and education from the
Individual Characteristics File (ICF). I then select all workers employed at a DB sponsoring
firm in l− 5, who have at least two years of tenure as of l− 5, and who will be between the
age of 50 and 70 in the experiment year .12
Table A.1: Data linkage and sample restrictions
Match/restriction type N Match rate Person weighted rate
F5500-BR (plan-years) 852000 0.922 0.947
Multi-plan restriction (firm-years) 699000 0.942 0.378
LBD-LEHD (firm-experiment years) 1419000 0.885 0.933
No missing pension data (firm-experiment years) 1256000 0.930 0.972
Notes: F5500 data are based on years ending 1996-2014. Pension data is treated as missing if plan liabilities, assets,
accrual amounts, and claim ages are either missing or unreadable in electronic format and cannot be interpolated.
A.2 Imputing retirement in the LEHD
In the LEHD, a worker is employed if they have positive earnings in a given year. The
definition of retirement is somewhat more involved. I classify an individual as having
retired in year t if the last year in which she received non-zero earnings was t − 1.
In this definition, retirement only occurs when an individual completely withdraws from
paid employment. Recall, however, that both definitions exclude work in the form of
self-employment because the LEHD data are based on UI covered earnings. To examine the
potential for misclassification of retirement in administrative data, I compare the retirement
11The firm-wide DB coverage rate is the ratio of active participants in the plan as reported in F5500 to
the count of total employees in the LBD. The 80 percent average coverage rate requirement is based on years
[l−5, l−2] — i.e. between 5 and 2 years prior to the experiment year. Restricting the sample this way likely
eliminates soft freezes in which the firm’s plan is closed to new workers. A firm that imposes a soft freeze
is likely to see its DB coverage rate decline as workers quit or retire but are not replaced with new eligible
workers.
12The two year tenure restriction ensures that workers are fully vested in their pensions as of the
experiment year when they may become subject to a freeze. This calculation is based on the 7 year maximum
full vesting period allowed for DB plans by ERISA.
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rate of employed, DB eligible, respondents from the 2004 wave of the HRS with a comparable
sample of individuals in the LEHD drawn from the 2004 experiment year whose pensions
have not been frozen.13
These comparisons between HRS and LEHD data are shown in the three panels of Figure
A.1, which split the samples into three age categories as of 2004. The retirement rates align
very well for the 56-64 year-old age group but diverge somewhat for the 50-55 and 65-70
year-old age groups. For 65-70 year old individuals, the HRS-based rates are lower than the
LEHD-based rates which potentially reflects the fact that self-employment is not covered
in the LEHD. For the 50-55 year old age group, the HRS-based rates are higher than the
LEHD-based rates. This discordance exists even when HRS retirement rates are constructed
from a question asking respondents if they have zero earnings.
A.3 Firm and plan characteristics around the freeze
This appendix describes how firm and plan characteristics evolve around the freeze. I
establish three facts. First, I show that worsening plan finances rather than worsening firm
performance is the main predictor of DB pension freezes. Second, I show that the aftermath
of a freeze leads to small but persistent reductions in firm size and average pay. Third, I
show that DB freezes generate an immediate transition towards DC plan participation.
A.3.1 Pre-freeze environment
To describe the environment prevailing prior to the firms freeze decision, I show several
characteristics of firms and their pension plans averaged over a five year pre-period in Table
A.2. Comparing the left and right panels of the table shows the freezing firms are very similar
in terms of size, average pay, employee age structure, and DB pension plan characteristics.
DB and DC coverage rates within the two sets of firms are both approximately 70 and
35 percent respectively. The lack of any meaningful difference in employee age structure,
pension liability, pension accrual rates, and claim ages indicates that the freezing firms are
not disproportionately staffed by older workers at the threshold of retirement. Put differently,
firms that freeze their plans are not on the brink of a large liability cliff. The likelihood of
experiencing a mass layoff, which is recorded as a 30 percent reduction in employment and
13Retirement in the HRS is inferred from a respondent’s labor force status report. To align with the
LEHD-based definition of permanent departure from paid employment, I consider an HRS respondent as
retired only if they continually report their labor force status as retired. In this definition, a respondent
who reports being retired in 2006 but re-enters the labor force in 2010 will not be counted as a retiree in
the dataset. The labor-force-status-based retirement statistics are very similar to those constructed from a
question asking respondents if they have zero earnings from employment.
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Figure A.1: HRS versus LEHD retirements
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labeled firm distress, is about 5.5 percent in both groups. Economic distress driven by a
large negative shock in the output market is therefore not a leading reason for freeze decision
either.
They key distinction between freezing and non-freezing firms lies in the financial health
of their DB plans. For every dollar in future liabilities, non-freezing firms have $1.10 in
assets. The same ratio — referred to as the funding ratio — is 1.05 for firms that ultimately
freeze their plans. The PPA designates plans with funding ratios under 80 percent as
being “at-risk” or distressed. Using the PPA’s threshold, 20 percent of freezing firms are
have distressed plans whereas the same rate is 15 percent for non-freezing firms. Funding
deficiencies are particularly important from a cost management perspective because gaps
must be closed to meet statutory requirements. Furthermore, once underfunded, plans are
no longer buffered against financial market shocks the way overfunded plans are. Required
contributions towards underfunded plans therefore become larger and more volatile in the
face of market risk.
Table A.3 shows coefficients from a linear prediction model using freeze in the experiment
year as the outcome and a variety of pre-event characteristics as predictors. The regressions
are estimated on data pooling over a five year pre-period, thereby allowing for the inclusion
of firm fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 do not include firm fixed effects, while columns 3
and 4 do. The regressions show that a 1 percent improvement in the funding ratio lowers
the likelihood of a future freeze by 2.5 percentage points. This partial effect is stable and
statistically significant across all four specifications. Firm size is negatively correlated with
future freezes, but the magnitude of the effect is small: a 1 percent increase in firm size lowers
the likelihood of a future freeze by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. In specifications with firm
fixed effects, employee age structure has no statistically significant impact on freezes and the
magnitudes of the partial effects are negligible when expressed in proportional terms. DB
plans that are collectively bargained are about 2.5 percentage points less likely to experience
a freeze which implies that unions offer approximately the same protective effect as a one
percent improvement in plan funding. Industry fixed effects, which are included in columns 2
an 4 have no appreciable impact on the estimated coefficients indicating that industry-specific
factors are not important, conditional on the other predictors in the model.
A.3.2 Post-freeze changes
Figure A.2 compares the evolution of four variables between freezing and non-freezing
firms before and after the freeze. Each panel plots coefficients from an event study regression
using the specification described in equation (1.5.2) with firm-cohort-year level data. Note
that the estimated coefficients are net of firm fixed effects and therefore remove time invariant
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unobserved heterogeneity between firms. In each panel, the horizontal axis represents the
calendar year relative to the experiment year.
The upper row of Figure A.2 shows the difference in log of total employment and log of
average pay between freezing and non-freezing firms. The estimated coefficients show that
freezes lead to a persistent 2.5 percent reduction for both outcome variables — a gap which
closes only after about 10 years. Post-freeze differences in size and pay between the two
types of firms represent some combination of changes to the age or seniority composition of
the firm’s workforce after a freeze either through labor supply responses or changes in labor
demand, although it is not clear from firm-level data alone what the role for each channel is.14
The lower left panel of Figure A.2 shows that the fraction of DC covered workers starts to rise
about 2 years prior to the DB freeze reflecting expanded DC plan eligibility, more generous
DC match rates, or transitions to opt-out rather than opt-in DC enrollment.15 In the period
right around a DB freeze, DC coverage rates increase by about 5 percentage points off a
baseline coverage rate of about 35 percent. In subsequent years, non-freezing firms gradually
increase their DC coverage and catch up to the DC coverage rate prevailing at freezing firms.
Whether the catch up occurs through soft-freezes that close existing DB plans to younger
workers, or through more generous incentives for DC participation, the results shown here
provide evidence that DB freezes accelerate the inevitable transition towards DC pension
coverage within firms. Evidence for increased DC participation is important in explaining
the extended labor force participation of some freeze-affected workers as it allows them to
offset DB losses.
The lower right panel of Figure A.2 shows the change in the likelihood of a freezing
firm to experience economic distress, which is defined as a reduction in employment of 30
percent or greater. The coefficient estimates from an unweighted regression (in blue) show
that the immediate aftermath of a freeze induces a 1.5 percentage point increase in the
probability of distress which lasts for two years. When the same regression is weighted
by firm size (in red), thereby representing the change in the probability of freeze affected
workers experiencing large employment contractions, the point estimates are economically
and statistically insignificant. As such, it appears that distress is concentrated among smaller
firms.
14The person-level analyses presented in Section 1.6 isolate labor supply factors by using propensity score
methods to condition on the pre-freeze path of firm size which serves as a proxy for latent changes in output
demand for the firm.
15DC coverage is measured as the ratio of the maximum number of participants across a firm’s DC plans
to total employment.
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Table A.2: Pre-period firm and plan characteristics
Non-freezing firms Freezing firms
Variable Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
Size 273.7 3.3 254.6 19.5
Average earnings ($) 69300 252 68010 520
Firm age 20.9 0.0 21.2 0.1
Multi-unit 0.273 0.001 0.250 0.003
Fraction workforce ≤ 45 0.579 <0.001 0.578 0.001
Fraction workforce [46,50] 0.117 <0.001 0.115 0.001
Fraction workforce [51,55] 0.110 <0.001 0.109 0.001
Fraction workforce [56,60] 0.092 <0.001 0.095 0.001
Fraction workforce [61,65] 0.057 <0.001 0.060 0.001
Fraction workforce [66,70] 0.024 <0.001 0.023 <0.001
Fraction workforce ≥ 71 0.022 <0.001 0.020 <0.001
Distressed firm 0.056 <0.001 0.057 0.001
DC plan offered 0.502 0.001 0.521 0.003
DC plan coverage rate 0.348 0.001 0.362 0.002
DB plan coverage rate 0.723 0.000 0.708 0.001
DB pension wealth/ptcp ($) 98910 372 101600 1612
DB pension accrual/ptcp ($) 14200 41 14690 145
Average benefit claim age 63.2 0.0 63.3 0.0
Collectively bargained plan 0.040 <0.001 0.030 0.001
Funding ratio 1.11 0.00 1.05 0.00
Distressed plan 0.159 0.001 0.193 0.002
Firm-experiment years 428000 28500
Firms 22500 6500
Notes: Statistics reported in the table average over the five year period preceeding
any freeze activity. All dollar values are expressed in 2010 terms. Pension wealth per
participant is computed as the present value of the liability owed to active participants
divided by the number of active participants. Plan-years are coded as distressed if their
ratio of assets to liabilities is under 80 percent — the threshold below which DB plans
are considered ”at risk” in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. Firm-years are coded
as distressed if firm-wide year-on-year employment shrank by 30 percent or more.
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Table A.3: Predictors of future freezes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log funding ratio -0.0264*** -0.02545*** -0.0258*** -0.0258***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022)
DB coverage rate -0.0075** -0.0029 0.0008 0.0009
(0.003) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Firm age -0.00009 0.00001 0.00027 0.00034
(1.04e-04) (1.07e-04) (5.49e-04) (5.40e-04)
Log size 0.0026*** 0.0021*** -0.0055** -0.0056**
(6.32e-04) (6.51e-04) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Log average pay 0.00004 -0.00063 -0.00591*** -0.00598***
(0.00114) (0.00117) (0.00182) (0.00181)
Fraction workforce ≤ 45 0.0168* 0.0178* -0.0141 -0.0143
(0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Fraction workforce [46,50] 0.0097 0.0119 -0.0115 -0.0117
(0.01083) (0.0109) (0.013) (0.013)
Fraction workforce [51,55] 0.0085 0.0114 -0.0217* -0.022*
(0.01068) (0.0107) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Fraction workforce [56,60] 0.0223** 0.0251** -0.0106 -0.0108
(0.01087) (0.0109) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Fraction workforce [61,65] 0.0253** 0.0272** 0.0037 0.0036
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Fraction workforce [66,70] 0.0024 0.0036 0.0069 0.0069
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123)
DB plan collectively bargained -0.0215*** -0.0257***
(0.0035) (0.0036)
Firm offers DC plan 0.0016 0.0030*
(0.0016) (0.0016)
Multi-unit firm -0.0119*** -0.0069***
(0.0023) (0.0024)
Observations 456000 456000 456000 456000
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.362 0.362
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Experiment year-calendar year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Number of firm clusters 23500 23500 23500 23500
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Regressions are estimated on a panel dataset that pools the five year period preceeding any
freeze activity .
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Figure A.2: Firm characteristics around freezes
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A.4 Propensity score re-weighting
For workers in cell j(i), denote the probability of experiencing a freeze, or the propensity
score, by pˆ(zj(i)). zj(i) is a vector including all pre-period observations on log firm
size, firm-level averages of log total pension wealth and log pension accruals per working
participant, average benefit claim age from the pension plan, the age structure of the firm’s
workforce, cell-level annual earnings, retirement rates, labor force participation rates, and
employer-to-employer transition rates. I also condition on state, gender, tenure, and earnings
averaged over the workers LEHD history prior to l − 5. pˆ(zj(i)) is estimated using logistic
regression.
In the setting being considered in this paper, the parameter of interest is the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) — i.e. the impact of pension freeze shocks on the
labor supply of workers affected by those shocks. To estimate the ATET, each comparison
group unit is re-weighted by
pˆ(zj(i))
1−pˆ(zj(i)) . Following Busso et al. (2014), the weights are first
normalized to sum to 1 so that the number of weighted units in the comparison group is
unaffected by the re-weighting procedure.
Constructing good counterfactuals for treated group units requires that comparison group
units with the same pˆ(zj(i)) — i.e. the same ex-ante probability of experiencing the treatment
— can be found in the sample. This requirement is referred to as the “common support
condition” or the “overlap condition.” Formally, the common support condition for the
ATET parameter requires that pˆ(zj(i)) < 1 for all j(i). In practice, the treatment and
comparison groups in the data I use share a large region of common support and the
maximum pˆ(zj(i)) is lower than 1.
A.5 Solution and estimation of the structural model
A.5.1 Calibrated parameters
Most of the calibrated first-step parameters are drawn from pension eligible respondents
in the HRS. The HRS provides high quality information on DB pension wealth which
is computed using summary plan descriptions (SPDs) obtained either directly from
respondent’s employers or from attachments to F5500 administrative records. Information
from these documents is coded along with relevant data on respondent’s past and future
earnings projections and job tenure to calculate pension wealth at prospective retirement
ages. These calculations are done using a software system known as the Pension Estimation
Program (PEP).16
16See Fang et al. (2016) for more details.
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Linked pension data are available for the 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010 survey wave years
of the HRS. While the 2004 and 2010 samples are most relevant because they coincide with
the time period that I analyze, I rely exclusively on the 2010 linked pension sample for two
reasons. First, unlike prior waves, the 2010 wave explicitly separates public and private
sector plans. By focusing on respondents working in the private sector, I am able to align
the survey data to reflect private sector pension provisions which constitute the relevant
subset for the analysis. Second, the 2010 sample explicitly flags a small number of CB
plans as being different than conventional DB plans. This distinction allows me to isolate
the sub-sample where the evolution of pension accruals occurs under the status-quo — i.e.
where participants do not experience a freeze. Frozen DB plans are not common in the HRS;
only 6 respondents report having experienced one in the 2010 survey wave.
In what follows, I describe a variety of parameters that are calibrated using data on
pension eligible respondents in the 2010 survey wave of the HRS.
DB pension wealth accruals
DB pension wealth in the PEP is calculated using the following formula
WDBq =
119∑
t=q
pt
(
1 + COLA
1 + i
)t−T0
Bt|q, (A.1)
where WDBq is the present value of pension wealth at potential retirement date q, pt is the
probability of survival in period t conditional on being alive in period q, COLA (cost of
living adjustment) is the plan specific annual growth rate of payments (for most DB plans in
the HRS COLA = 0), i is the nominal interest rate, and Bt|q is the annual pension benefit in
period t conditional on retiring in period q.17 DB pension wealth is based on the maximum
of wealth at the plan’s normal retirement age, early retirement age, and vested deferred
value of benefits. When respondents have wealth in multiple plans, I sum pension wealth
over each plan. Nominal values of WDBq are then converted to 2010 dollars.
I average across respondents in the sample to compute real DB wealth at each prospective
quit age. I use the mortality and real interest rate assumptions from the PEP to convert these
values into their the annuity equivalents at each quit age which are denoted by {bDBa }80a=51.
17pt are based on the 2010 version of gender-specific cohort mortality tables published by the Social
Security Administration (SSA). The 2010 pension wealth calculations assume a nominal interest rate of 5.7
percent and an inflation rate of 2.8 percent according to economic assumptions detailed in the 2010 Annual
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust funds
of the SSA.
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Earnings
In the PEP, earnings from the 2010 survey wave are projected forward and backward for
different quit dates using the following formula
log(eq) = log(e2010) + αm(q − 2010) + β1ageq + β2age2q, (A.2)
αm is nominal wage growth and β1 and β2 adjust for age-based changes in earnings. I
estimate β1 and β2 separately for men and women using the within-job earnings histories
for DB eligible workers in the HRS. αm is set at 5 percent. I convert these values to 2010
dollars and then average the earnings projections across respondents by quit age to compute
an age-dependent earnings function {ea}80a=51.
Social Security benefits
For respondents who have yet to claim benefits, Social Security wealth in the HRS is
computed by passing the respondent’s administrative earnings record along with projected
future earnings into the Social Security benefit formula. The benefit levels obtained from the
formula are used to compute the present value of Social Security benefits at age 62, 65, and
70 (see Fang et al. (2016)). These values are reported in 2010 dollars. Because individuals
cannot claim Social Security prior to age 62, I set Social Security wealth prior to that age
as 0. I linearly interpolate Social Security wealth for ages between 62, 65, and 70. I use
the mortality and real interest rate assumptions from the PEP to convert these values into
their the annuity equivalents at age which are denoted by {bSSa }80a=51. Because Social Security
benefits do not increase after age 70, I set {bSSa }80a=71 = bSS70 .
DC match function
The employer’s DC match function, me(mw), is based on respondent reports of their own
and employer contributions expressed as a percentage of earnings in the 2010 survey wave.
Recall that me is the fraction of earnings that employers contribute to DC accounts and is a
function of the employees’ own contribution rate mw. To obtain the match function, I first
bin worker contribution rates into 0.01 sized intervals and then compute the median employer
contribution rate within each interval which is denoted by m˜e. I then regress binned worker
contribution rates on median employer contribution rates for mw ∈ [.01, .065]. Fitted values
from the regression (E[m˜e|mw]) represent the estimated match function. Approximating the
data for mw > .065, I assume that E[m˜e|mw > .065] = E[m˜e|mw = .065] which implies that
employer matching contributions stop once workers contribute 6.5 percent of earnings. The
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estimated match function is
mˆe(mw) =
.011 + .39mw if mw ≤ .065.0364 if mw > .065 (A.3)
Initial DC wealth and non-pension wealth
I assume that initial DC balances (WDC) and non-pension assets (A) are distributed
log-normally. For each initial age (i.e. between 51 and 59), I simulate assets using log-normal
parameters estimated from the distribution of A and WDC for pension eligible respondents
in the 2010 HRS. In these calculations, A is defined as household non-pension assets inclusive
of spousal DC wealth, whereas WDC is the respondent’s DC wealth. log-normal parameters
are estimated on the sample or respondents where A and WDC are non-negative. I then use
these parameter estimates to simulate WDC and A for workers initially aged 51-59.
Additional parameters
The discount factor (β) and real interest rate (r) are based on values consistent with
the PEP assumptions.18 The maximum DC contribution limit, C¯, is calibrated using 2010
IRS rules. Age specific mortality rates expressed as the probability of dying within one
year, {pa}80a=51, are based on the 2010 actuarial life table published by the Social Security
Administration (SSA). I average the gender-specific rates into a combined rate for each age
and then divide by p81 to impose a maximum age of 80 for all simulated individuals. Finally,
I use the NBER TAXSIM calculator to compute income and payroll tax liabilities when
solving the model.
Table A.4 provides a summary of all the calibrated parameters of the model and their
sources.
A.5.2 Solution algorithm
The model does not have an analytical solution, so I solve it numerically by backward
recursion. The state variables in the model are (a, e, g, A, b,WDC) of which g, A, and WDC
are continuous and exhibit both within- and between-age heterogeneity. I discretize the
continuous state variables over finite dimensional grids of size 6 for g, 20 for A, and 20 for
WDC . Grid points for A and WDC are narrowly spaced for low values and widely spaced for
high values. Iterating backward from the final age for a given value of θ = (σ, γ, φ, ρ, σv):
18The real interest rate is 2.9 percent which is based on the 2010 SSA OASDI trust fund report assumption.
I assume that the annual discount factor is 0.97 to be consistent with a real interest rate of approximately
3 percent.
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1. I compute the probability distribution over next period’s work disutility which arises
from randomness in the AR(1) component f . I employ the Rouwenhorst (1995)
approximation for the AR(1) term to obtain P (f ′ = fl′ |f = fl) for l, l′ = 1, . . . , 6.
I then use these probabilities to estimate
Ef ′
[
max
{
V Ra+1(a+ 1, b
′, A′,WDC
′
), V Wa+1(X
′)
}]
(A.4)
At age 80, V W = V R = 0 as no workers live beyond that age and there are no bequests.
2. For each value of the state variables (within the current age iteration), I compute V W
and V R and the associated decision rules as follows:
(a) To obtain V W , I compute the income and payroll tax rate faced by a worker for
each potential WDC
′
choice given the earnings level for the current age. I then
search over the WDC
′
and A
′
grid points to find the highest value of V W . I
impose the maximum contribution constraint (C¯) and preclude decumulation of
DC balances while working by setting the associated values of V W to negative
infinity. This grid search defines the decision rules for DC accumulation and
non-pension saving (or dissaving) while working.
(b) To obtain V R, I compute the income tax rate faced by a retiree for each potential
WDC
′
choice given the annuity income obtained by retiring at the current age. I
then search over the WDC
′
and A′ grid points to find the highest value of V R.
I preclude accumulation of DC balances in retirement by setting the associated
values of V R to negative infinity. This grid search defines the decision rules for
DC decumulation and non-pension saving (or dissaving) while retired.
(c) I compute the retirement decision for each value of the state variables by
comparing V W to V R. If V W ≤ V R , then the work decision is retirement.
Else if V W > V R, then the work decision is to stay employed.
3. The solution algorithm terminates when value functions and decision rules have been
obtained for each age.
I compute a separate set of value functions and decision rules by imposing pension freezes at
ages 56-64. A worker who experiences a pension freeze at age a has bDBa+k = b
DB
a for all k > 0.
I apply earnings reductions as estimated from LEHD data for workers who are affected by
freezes between the age of 56 and 64.19 To the extent that career lengths change due to the
19Earnings losses occur in the year of the freeze and in the next four years. The estimates are -3.8 percent,
-2.1 percent, -1.5 percent, -4.9 percent, and -1.6 percent. See the middle panel of Figure 1.6.
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freeze, I assume that they do not affect the value of Social Security wealth. This assumption
reflects the fact that most workers over 55 already have long work histories and do not
accrue substantial increases in Social Security benefits through continued work. Other than
the change to bDB and the earnings path, all other parameters remain the same.
A.5.3 Estimation
Having solved the model for a given value of θ by obtaining decision rules for each age,
I simulate data as follows
1. I simulate initial assets and work disutility draws for 5000 individuals who are initially
aged 51 to 59.20 I apply decision rules from the no-freeze scenario to obtain work
histories and asset accumulation paths to create a simulated control group. I use
linear interpolation to infer the optimal decision rules for simulated values of A,WDC ,
and g that lie between the grid points.
2. Next, I apply the freeze decision rules for the same population of individuals —
i.e. individuals with the same initial assets and work disutility draws —starting five
years after the initial age. Individuals in this exercise have the same work and asset
accumulation choices as the simulation control group for the first five years, but have
different work histories and asset accumulation choices once faced with a DB freeze. I
call this sample the simulated treated group.
3. I compute two sets of moments using the simulated control and treated groups. The
first set of moments is the average employment rate by age for the simulated control
group. I compute the control group levels starting four periods prior to the freeze
and lasting 6 periods after the freeze. The second set of moments is the difference in
average employment rates between the two groups (the simulated treatment effect). I
compute these differences for 12 periods starting from the period of the freeze.
Denote the vector of simulated moments by hˆ
S
(θ) . Denote the analogous vector of observed
moments from real-world (LEHD) data by hˆ
D
. The distance between the simulated and
real-world moments is
m(θ) = hˆ
S
(θ)− hˆD. (A.5)
20The share of individuals of each initial age is equal to the share of DB eligible working respondents in
2010 HRS.
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The MSM estimate of θ is given by
θˆ = argmin
θ∈Θ
m′(θ)Wm(θ) (A.6)
where W is a weighting matrix.
I estimate θˆ using a two step procedure. In the first step, I set W = ζI where I is
the identity matrix and ζ is a scaling vector. The scaling vector re-weights treatment effect
moments by a factor of 10 to give them approximately the same numerical importance as the
employment trend moments. I make this adjustment because the treatment effect moments
are economically very informative but are numerically an order of magnitude smaller than
the employment trend moments. Denote by θˆ1 the parameter vector obtained using the
first step weighting matrix which I estimate using the Nelder-Meade algorithm.21 In the
second step, I re-estimate the simulated moments 500 times holding θˆ1 fixed but re-drawing
random components of the simulation that introduce sampling variability (i.e. g and the
initial values of A and WDC). Using this parametric bootstrap procedure, I compute the
variance-covariance matrix of the simulated moments which is denoted by Sˆ(θˆ1). I then
estimate θˆ2 , the final parameter estimate, by setting W = Sˆ
−1
(θˆ1).
To obtain standard errors, I compute Dˆ = ∂h
S(θ)
∂θ′ |θˆ2 numerically by using 10 small
random deviations around θˆ2 and re-calculating h(θ) at each perturbed value. I then average
∂hS(θ)
∂θ′ across the perturbations to compute
Q = (1 +N−1S )
[
Dˆ
′
Sˆ
−1
(θˆ1)Dˆ
]−1
(A.7)
where NS = 1 is the number of simulations associated with the estimate of θˆ2. The square
root of the diagonal ofQ is the vector of standard errors for θˆ2 (Duffie and Singleton (1993)).
21I use a variety of starting values to avoid the possibility of the parameter search procedure converging
to a local minimum.
136
Table A.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
r 0.029 Real interest rate HRS PEP/SSA
β 0.97 Annual discount factor r ≈ .03
C¯ $54,500 Maximum combined contribution limit to DC plans (2010 level) IRS
{µAa , σAa }59a=51 Scale and shape parameters for non-pension wealth distribution for initial ages 51-59 HRS
{µWDCa , σWDCa }59a=51 Scale and shape parameters for DC wealth distribution for initial ages 51-59 HRS
E[m˜e|mw] Employer DC contribution rate expressed as a function of the worker’s contribution rate HRS
{bDBa }80a=51 Age-specific DB pension annuity HRS
{bSSa }80a=51 Age-specific Social Security annuity HRS
{pa}80a=51 Age-specific mortality rate adjusted so that p81 = 1 SSA
{ea}80a=51 Age-specific annual earnings HRS
τ(·) Federal income and payroll tax liabilities (2010 laws) NBER TAXSIM
Notes: See Appendix A.5.1 for details.
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A.6 Simulated pension freezes in the HRS
This Appendix describes how I construct the simulation underlying Figure 1.3. The
simulations are based on the sample of DB eligible HRS respondents from the 2010 survey
wave who are employed in the private sector and are not in hybrid or CB plans as of the
survey date.22 Using these data, I consider three age-specific components of compensation:
DB wealth, earnings, and DC wealth.
For survey respondents, the PEP provides estimates of DB wealth at each potential quit
date on the basis of equation (A.1). In addition, the PEP provides earnings projections at
each potential quit date for each respondent on the basis of equation (A.2). DC wealth is
reported by respondents as of the survey year (i.e. 2010). I use these measures along with
self-reported own and employer contribution rates (mw and me) to construct estimates of
past and projected future values of DC wealth using the law of motion described in equation
(1.3.4).23 Notably, DC wealth in 2010 is 0 for approximately half of the sample. I then
combine these estimates of DB wealth accruals, earnings, and DC wealth accruals to compute
total compensation at each potential quit age using equation (1.3.7).24 Finally, I average the
data across respondents and quit dates to obtain the “no-freeze” path of compensation.
To simulate a hypothetical DB pension freeze for workers aged aF , I make two changes.
First, I assume that the annuity value of nominal DB wealth is frozen as of aF . This is
equivalent to receiving no new accruals either due to tenure increases or due to earnings
growth.25 Second, I assume that respondents with no DC wealth as of aF — i.e. about
half the sample — begins contributing to a hypothetical new DC plan starting at age aF . I
assume that contribution rates for these workers are equal to the sample averages of mw and
me for respondents with non-zero DC wealth. Respondents who have non-zero DC wealth
are assumed to continue contributing at the same rate as they did prior to age aF . Having
defined post-freeze DB and DC wealth evolution, I combine the estimates of post-freeze DB
wealth accruals earnings, and DC wealth accruals to compute total compensation at each
potential quit age using equation (1.3.7). I then average these data across respondents and
22Frozen DB plans are not common in the HRS; only 6 respondents report having experienced one in the
2010 survey wave. I assume that all non-hybrid and non-CB plans in the 2010 sample are not frozen.
23I assume that respondents and their employers contribute at the same rate in all years. I rely on the
RAND HRS files which convert respondent reports of own and employer contributions to percentages of
earnings.
24All three components (i.e. DB wealth, earnings, and DC wealth) are converted to 2010 dollars. I do not
account for taxes in these simulations because online tax calculators cannot be used within the restricted
setting in which pension data are accessed.
25By preventing future growth in the nominal value of benefits, DB freezes have the effect of lowering
the present value of DB wealth in each year subsequent to the freeze, thereby generating negative future
accruals. This is because benefits stay fixed but the horizon over they can be collected falls.
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quit dates to obtain the “Freeze at aF” path of compensation. I conduct these calculations
for different values of aF to obtain different post-freeze paths of total compensation.
A.7 Supplementary tables and figures
Figure A.3: Impact of freezes on employment by gender (56-64 year-olds)
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Notes: This figure shows the time path of the treatment effect of the freeze on employment rates for men
and women separately. Workers are 56-64 years-old at the time of the freeze.
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Table A.5: Pre-period summary statistics split by age group (without propensity score re-weighting)
50-55 56-64 65-70
Variable Comp. mean Diff. p-value Comp. mean Diff. p-value Comp. mean Diff. p-value
Worker characteristics
Age 52.5 0.002 0.90 59.6 0.034 0.29 67.0 -0.011 0.68
Male 0.466 0.034 0.30 0.478 0.032 0.38 0.478 0.030 0.50
High school 0.226 0.005 0.77 0.231 0.000 0.99 0.288 0.006 0.75
Some college 0.329 -0.011 0.24 0.314 -0.010 0.26 0.292 -0.007 0.42
College or more 0.391 0.002 0.93 0.394 0.007 0.80 0.315 0.004 0.87
White 0.793 0.020 0.28 0.819 0.027 0.16 0.824 0.042 0.05
Black 0.093 -0.009 0.24 0.081 -0.013 0.05 0.074 -0.016 0.05
Hispanic 0.065 0.001 0.95 0.052 0.000 0.99 0.051 -0.006 0.46
Other race 0.049 -0.013 0.11 0.048 -0.014 0.09 0.051 -0.020 0.06
Earnings ($) 61,610 2051 0.61 62,240 1,243 0.73 48,130 -3915 0.10
Tenure at l − 5 7.6 -0.817 0.07 8.2 -0.898 0.04 8.2 -0.760 0.07
Retired 0.020 0.002 0.17 0.054 0.004 0.23 0.188 0.008 0.50
In labor force 0.966 -0.003 0.16 0.930 -0.005 0.23 0.783 -0.010 0.49
Switched l − 5 employer 0.034 0.025 0.01 0.030 0.024 0.02 0.027 0.006 0.07
Pension and firm characteristics
Log DB pension wealth/active participant 10.18 -0.037 0.91 10.27 -0.077 0.82 10.5 -0.028 0.87
Log DB pension accrual/active participant 7.73 -0.205 0.52 7.80 -0.264 0.41 7.98 -0.325 0.05
Pension plan claim age 62.7 -0.015 0.96 62.7 0.036 0.89 64.2 0.137 0.41
Log firm size 8.46 0.066 0.90 8.32 0.079 0.88 7.42 -0.273 0.55
Fraction workforce ≤ 45 0.584 0.007 0.63 0.570 0.005 0.74 0.553 -0.015 0.27
Fraction workforce [46,50] 0.146 -0.003 0.50 0.142 -0.001 0.68 0.136 0.000 0.99
Fraction workforce [51,55] 0.124 -0.002 0.60 0.128 -0.002 0.69 0.122 0.002 0.64
Fraction workforce [56,60] 0.086 -0.001 0.89 0.094 0.000 0.94 0.095 0.005 0.21
Fraction workforce [61,65] 0.041 0.000 0.98 0.045 0.000 0.96 0.061 0.005 0.20
Fraction workforce [66,70] 0.011 -0.001 0.62 0.012 -0.001 0.66 0.021 0.001 0.55
Fraction workforce ≥ 71 0.007 -0.001 0.46 0.008 -0.001 0.59 0.012 0.002 0.38
Comparison group workers 383000 373000 77000
Treated group workers 60000 66500 11000
Comparison group firms 7700 8600 4600
Treated group firms 1500 1700 900
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, statistics reported in the table average over the five year period preceeding any freeze activity. Pension wealth per active participant is computed as the
present value of the liability owed to active participants divided by the number of active participants. Tenure is understated because the LEHD does not capture the complete history of
an employer-employee relationship when states enter the dataset after a given employee-employer relationship is established. P-values for the difference between treatment and control
groups are obtained by regressing the statistic of interest on a indicator variable for treatment status and clustering standard errors at the firm-level.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Decomposition of recession-induced losses
This appendix explains how we decompose recession-induced wage losses into three
different components.
Start with the AKM/CHK decomposition (Equation (2.3.1)) in period t
log(wageit) = αi + ψj1{i works at j in t}+ x′itβ + rit.
Taking averages on both sides of Equation (2.3.1) in period t:
E [log(wageit)] = E [αi] + E [ψj] + E [x
′
itβ] . (B.1)
Define the average wage in period t if the same group of individuals were to experience a 1
point increase in the unemployment rate at entry as
E
[
log(wageRit)
]
= E
[
αRi
]
+ E
[
ψRj
]
+ E [x′itβ] . (B.2)
In Equation (B.2), αRi and ψ
R
j represent estimated person and establishment fixed effects
estimated for the same underlying individuals if they entered the labor market with a 1 point
higher unemployment rate. Notably, person fixed effects in the AKM/CHK framework are
subject to scarring and will be lower for otherwise identical individuals who, for exogenous
reasons, have lower lifetime earnings.
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Now, we can write E [log(wageit)]− E
[
log(wageRit)
]
as:
βWaget︸ ︷︷ ︸
% wage differential
= E [αi]− E
[
αRi
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
% due to non-employer factors
+ E [ψj]− E
[
ψRj
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
% due to employer-related factors
. (B.3)
Next, define
βNon-employert = E [αi]− E
[
αRi
]
, (B.4)
βEmployert = E [ψj]− E
[
ψRj
]
, (B.5)
as the non-employer-specific and employer-specific components of recession-induced wage
differentials. Estimating our main specification (Equation (2.4.1)) using CHK establishment
fixed effects (ψj) on the left-hand-side yields
{
βˆEmployer0 , . . . , βˆ
Employer
10
}
.
Having defined recession-induced employer-specific losses, we now partition these losses
into rents and compensating differentials using the decomposition in Sorkin (2018). Equation
(2.3.3) splits establishment fixed effects into rents, which are explained by value, and
compensation differentials which are orthogonal to value. Taking expectations on both sides,
we can write:
E [ψj] = piE [Vj]− E [aj] . (B.6)
Establishment fixed effects for otherwise identical individuals who enter the labor market
when unemployment rates are 1 point higher can be written as
E
[
ψRj
]
= piE
[
V Rj
]− E [aRj ] . (B.7)
Subtracting (B.7) from (B.6), the employer-specific pay reduction is
βEmployert = pi
(
E [Vj]− E
[
V Rj
])︸ ︷︷ ︸
% due to rents
− (E [aj]− E [aRj ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
% due to amenities
. (B.8)
Next, define
βRentt = pi
(
E [Vj]− E
[
V Rj
])
, (B.9)
βAmenityt = E [aj]− E
[
aRj
]
, (B.10)
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Combining Equations (B.3) and (B.8) we can write
βWaget = β
Non-employer
t + β
Employer
t
= βNon-employert +
(
βRentt − βAmenityt
)
(B.11)
Because βWaget ,β
Rent
t , and β
Amenity
t are estimated for t ∈ {0, . . . , 10}, we can recover
βNon-employert using Equation (B.11).
Finally, define the present value of wages for the first decade of labor market experience
as
PV = w¯0 + w¯1(1 + r)
−1 + · · ·+ w¯10(1 + r)−10, (B.12)
where w¯t represents the average daily wage earned in year t. The PDV of wages for workers
who face a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate at entry is
PV R = w¯0(1− βWage0 ) + w¯1(1− βWage1 )(1 + r)−1 + · · ·+ w¯10(1− βWage10 )(1 + r)−10 (B.13)
We use our estimates
{
βˆWage0 , . . . , βˆ
Wage
10
}
to quantify the loss in the present value of
wages attributable to a 1 point change in the unemployment rate. We then scale
the resulting estimate by a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate
which reflects a typical recession. Similar calculations with
{
βˆEmployer0 , . . . , βˆ
Employer
10
}
,{
βˆNon-employer0 , . . . , βˆ
Non-employer
10
}
,
{
βˆRent0 , . . . , βˆ
Rent
10
}
,
{
βˆAmenity0 , . . . , βˆ
Amenity
10
}
yield estimates
of the loss in the PV of wages attributable to employer-specific factors, non-employer specific
factors, rents, and amenities.
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B.2 Accounting for measurement error in establishment values
When estimating equation (2.3.3), we find that almost 96 percent of the variation in
establishment fixed effects is in the residual, which is substantially larger than the 72 percent
estimate obtained by Sorkin using U.S. data. The key reason for this difference is that our
establishment value estimates are derived from a 2 percent sample of workers — and therefore
more likely to be affected by measurement error — while Sorkin’s estimates are obtained
using the full population of workers in several U.S. states.
To evaluate the quantitative implications of measurement error in our estimates, we
randomly partition individuals in the SIAB into two groups and re-estimate the establishment
values using moves within each partition separately. For each establishment, this exercise
yields two different value estimates, each of which is based on an independent sample of
worker moves. Denote the error-free value of establishment j by V ∗j ; the split sample
estimates V 1j and V
2
j are given by
V 1j = V
∗
j + u
1
j (B.1)
V 2j = V
∗
j + u
2
j . (B.2)
Because independent samples of worker moves are used to estimate V 1j and V
2
j , we assume
that
E
[
u1ju
2
j
]
= 0. (B.3)
We then re-estimate equation (2.3.3) using an instrumental variables (IV) approach by
employing V 1j as an instrument for V
2
j and vice-versa. Assuming that each value estimate
exhibits classical measurement error (i.e. that E
[
V ∗j u
1
j
]
= E
[
V ∗j u
2
j
]
= 0), one would expect
OLS to yield estimates biased toward zero relative to IV.
Table B.1 presents estimates of pi based on the pooled set of workers, as well as estimates
based on sample of establishments for which we estimate two sets of value estimates based
on independent sets of worker moves. Using OLS to estimate pi on the pooled sample yields
a coefficient of 0.212. Estimating pi using OLS in the smaller sample of establishments for
which we obtain two independent estimates of value, yields coefficients of 0.239 and 0.220
which are similar in magnitude to the pooled sample estimate. In contrast, the IV-based
slope estimates are approximately two times larger than those obtained using OLS, a result
which is consistent with classical measurement error induced attenuation.1
1The two IV-based estimates reverse the order of the instrumental and the instrumented variable which
is arbitrary. Randomly partitioning the pooled sample reduces the number of workers available to estimate
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We also note that our interpretation of Figure 2.6 does not change in the presence of
measurement error. While the average relationship plotted in the dashed line would tilt
upwards when measurement error is corrected for, so would the implied career paths, by
roughly the same amount. This is the visual manifestation of the logic that recessions do
not differentially send workers to firms with more or less measurement error in their estimated
values.
Table B.1: Classical measurement error-induced attenuation in
pi
Pooled Sample Split Sample
OLS OLS(1) OLS(2) IV(1) IV(2)
pˆi 0.212 0.239 0.220 0.397 0.432
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.004
N 171,640 59,762 59,762 59,762 59,762
Notes: All models include gender fixed effects. OLS(1) and OLS(2) use the
value estimates obtained using each sample split. IV(1) and IV(2) reverse
the order of the instrumental and instrumented variable which is arbitrary.
values for any given establishment, which disproportionately eliminates smaller establishments since they
may no longer have sufficient flows to be in the strongly connected set. The slightly larger OLS-based
estimates in the split sample versus the pooled sample are a by-product of this selectivity.
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B.3 Additional analyses
B.3.1 Using actual training duration
This appendix shows results obtained by re-estimating Equation (2.4.1) using actual
rather than predicted year of entry. Actual year of entry is defined by the last day of
vocational training.
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Figure B.1: The effect of entry conditions (Uosc) on early career outcomes using actual year of entry
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Notes: Sample size for each specification is 125,363. 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training
occupation and training state in the individual’s year of entry. Controls included are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, predicted year of entry fixed effects,
training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects, median wage paid by training firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German
indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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Figure B.2: The effect of entry conditions (Uosc) on early career mobility using actual year of entry
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Notes: Sample size for each specification is 125,363. 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines. Uosc is the unemployment rate in a given individual’s training
occupation and training state in the individual’s year of entry. Controls included are potential experience fixed effects, year fixed effects, predicted year of entry fixed effects,
training occupation fixed effects, state of training fixed effects, median wage paid by training firm during last year of training, age at start of training fixed effects, a German
indicator variable, and a female indicator variable.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Constructing the training data set
Our training sample is composed of HRS-BR pairs generated by blocking the 1998 and
2004 waves of the HRS with the BR on 3-digit zip code, 10-digit phone number, telephone
area code, and city-state. We choose these specific years for two reasons. First, 1998 and
2004 were years in which the HRS drew fresh cohorts of survey respondents. Second, the
file structure of the BR changed in substantive ways in 2002. As such, using HRS cohorts
before and after 2002 to train the model allows us to account for unobserved variation in the
quality of data drawn from the BR.
Simple random sampling of pairs for human review would produce very few true matches
thereby limiting the predictive ability of our model. Instead, we compute Jaro-Winkler
(JW) scores for name and address similarity for each pair. We then divide the JW scores
for name and address into 4 bins each, with grid points spaced closer together at the right
tail of the score distribution. This binning exercise defines 16 strata from which we draw
equally sized samples to obtain a total sample size of NT ≈ 1000 pairs. Because the bins
are concentrated at the top of the JW name and address score distribution, this stratified
sampling methodology substantially increases the share of true matches in the training data
set relative to a simple random sample (see, e.g., Christen (2012)).
C.2 Model selection
Given that our training data set consists of approximately 2000 observations, estimating
a model with a high dimension of predictors is likely to yield unstable parameter estimates.
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To solve this dimensionality problem and, more importantly, to avoid over-fitting our model,
we use ML tools to aid in prediction. While a complex model with many variables and
interactions has the potential of reducing in-sample (training) errors substantially, this
improvement is misleading because it considers the wrong model-fit criterion. To ensure
that the model generalizes well, we consider out-of-sample (test) error which we estimate
using 10-fold cross validation.
In our setting, the complexity of the prediction model is indexed by the dimension of
the covariate vector. Reducing model complexity by shrinking the number of covariates
increases the bias component of the test error, but has the potential to reduce the variance
component substantially. In order to obtain a model with the optimal degree of complexity,
we employ the Elastic Net (EN) shrinkage estimator. The EN estimator is the solution to
the minimization problem posed in (C.1); l indexes observations in the training set, while p
indexes regressors in the model:
min
β∈Rp
2NT∑
l=1
(
yl − Λ
(
β0 +
q∑
p=1
x˜lpβp
))2
st:
q∑
p=1
β2p ≤ t1,
q∑
p=1
|βp| ≤ t2 (C.1)
In (C.1), the typical least squares minimization criteria is supplemented with two constraints
each of which constitutes a tuning parameter for the estimator. Together, these tuning
parameters control the level of model complexity: t1, as in Ridge Regression, sets a maximum
threshold on the sum of squared values of the coefficients. The Ridge penalty term has the
effect of controlling the variance component of test error by preventing any one predictor
from exhibiting too strong of an effect on the outcome. This penalty is particularly important
when some predictors are correlated. t2, as in the LASSO, sets a maximum threshold on
the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients. When this second constraint binds, some
of the coefficients are set exactly to zero thereby shrinking the dimensionality of the model.
The optimal prediction model is chosen by finding the pair of tuning parameters that jointly
minimize out-of-sample error.
The EN estimator can also be conveniently summarized in Lagrangian form as shown
in equation (C.2). The two tuning parameters discussed above are replaced by a Lagrange
multiplier, λ ∈ R+, and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1] that controls the degree of mixing between
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the Ridge constraint and the LASSO constraint:
min
β∈Rp
2NT∑
l=1
(
yl − Λ
(
β0 +
q∑
p=1
x˜lpβp
))2
+ λ
q∑
p=1
(
α|βp|+ (1− α)β2p
)
(C.2)
We obtain our establishment and employer prediction models by implementing the EN
estimator using the lassoglm package in MATLAB. This particular implementation of the
EN estimator takes a given value of α and finds the value of λ that delivers the lowest
out-of-sample deviance. To obtain the best prediction model, we perform a grid search by
iterating α from 0.05 to 0.95 in 0.05-unit increments. For each value of α, we obtain the
model associated with the lowest test deviance estimate. The optimal model is the one with
the lowest test deviance across all the values of α.
C.3 Sample selection induced by cutoffs
As noted in section 3.4.2.1 the data-driven cutoffs that we estimate and impose on the set
of pairs prior to drawing multiple implicates sometimes results in 0 BR candidate matches for
a given HRS job. For about 33 percent of employer matches and 8 percent of establishment
matches where such a situation occurs, we have little confidence about having selected the
right employer or establishment using our matching models.1 This appendix examines the
extent to which HRS respondents for whom we find at least one BR match differ from HRS
respondents for whom we cannot find any suitable matches.
Table C.1 shows demographics, education, wages, annual hours of work, union
membership, tenure, total labor market experience, and whether respondents work for
public sector employers. The first column of the table shows characteristics for the full
sample. The left panel shows characteristics for respondents matched to at least one employer
(above cutoff) and respondents for whom no adequate BR candidate employer is available
(below cutoff). The right panel shows the same information for establishment matches.
Concentrating first on the left panel reveals some key differences: Nonwhite and foreign-born
respondents are more likely to be unmatched. Respondents that are unmatched have about
two years less in tenure with their current employer and have slightly lower lifetime labor
market experience. Finally, unmatched workers are substantially less likely to be employed
in the public sector. These differences point at employer attachment as an important source
1While employer matches are easier to confirm than establishment matches, the ROC-based optimal
cutoffs trade off sensitivity and specificity. Furthermore, the employer and establishment match models are
estimated independently. Thus, the share of HRS jobs with inadequate BR employer candidates (33 percent)
is larger than the share of HRS jobs with inadequate BR establishment candidates (8 percent).
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of signal strength in the data on employer names and addresses (obtained primarily for
pension characteristics in the HRS). Furthermore, because public employers are more likely
to maintain unified pension plans, it is easier to obtain sharper matching of public sector
employees using our method.2
Patterns of selection in the right hand panel are similar to those highlighted above:
Respondents who are nonwhite, foreign-born, have lower tenure, less labor market experience,
and are more likely to be employed outside the public sector are less likely to be matched to
any establishment. In addition, union membership is predictive of higher quality matches.
On the whole, these statistics show that information elicited from survey responses may be
garbled in ways that are correlated with individual characteristics. While our cutoff-based
procedure filters away these sources of noise and hones in on higher quality matches for the
majority of the sample, it does not refine information that is already garbled. Addressing
this concern ultimately requires reliance on sharper identifiers such as EINs.
2Private employers often offer multiple pension plans with a variety of names. While reporting
information about their pension plans, respondents may provide pension plan names that differ in small
but meaningful ways from the employers name as it would appear in the BR. This source of variability could
reduce the accuracy of our matching algorithm.
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Table C.1: Characteristics of matchable and non-matchable respondents
Employer match Establishment match
Variable Full sample Above cutoff Below cutoff Above cutoff Below cutoff
N 5700 3700 1900 5200 450
Male 0.446 0.432 0.472 0.439 0.531
Age 56.8 56.7 57.0 56.7 58.2
Native born 0.837 0.865 0.782 0.843 0.758
White 0.643 0.684 0.565 0.647 0.596
Black 0.236 0.210 0.287 0.235 0.249
Other race 0.121 0.107 0.148 0.118 0.155
Schooling (years) 13.3 13.5 13.0 13.4 12.5
Wage ($/hr) 29.5 28.9 30.6 29.0 34.8
Hours 1902 1901 1905 1902 1906
Union 0.143 0.139 0.151 0.147 0.096
Tenure (years) 10.2 10.7 9.2 10.3 7.5
Experience (years) 32.5 32.9 31.9 32.6 30.2
Public employer 0.247 0.280 0.184 0.258 0.108
Notes: This table is based on the set of working HRS respondents in the 2010 wave who provided names and addresses
of their employers. Some HRS respondents report hourly wages directly. Others report compensation at daily, weekly,
monthly, or annual levels. When compensation is reported at a different level than hourly, we convert it using the
respondent’s report of how many hours per week and weeks per year worked. Public sector employment is coded by the
HRS based on the report of the employer name elicited from the respondent.
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C.4 Measurement error and nonresponse bias
Define Ri = 1 if the HRS respondent reports a value for firm size and Ri = 0 if they do
not. Denote the decile of the log hourly wage of respondent i by di. The expectation of true
log firm size conditional on the decile of log wages is
E
[
s∗ij|di
]
(C.1)
The log of self-reported firm size conditional on the decile of log wages is
E [sij|di, Ri = 1] (C.2)
The log of true firm size conditional on the decile of log wages among those who do respond
is
E
[
s∗ij|di, Ri = 1
]
(C.3)
Measurement error is given by subtracting (C.3) from (C.2):
E [vi|di, Ri = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Measurement error
= E [sij|di, Ri = 1]− E
[
s∗ij|di, Ri = 1
]
(C.4)
Decompose term (C.1) by writing
E
[
s∗ij|di
]
= pdE
[
s∗ij|di, Ri = 1
]
+ (1− pd)E [s∗ij|di, Ri = 0] (C.5)
where pd = P [Ri = 1|di] is the conditional response probability. Subtracting
E
[
s∗ij|di, Ri = 1
]
from both sides of equation (C.5) yields the following expression for bias
due to nonresponse
E
[
s∗ij|di
]− E [s∗ij|di, Ri = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nonresponse bias
= (1− pd){E [s∗ij|di, Ri = 0]− E [s∗ij|di, Ri = 1]} (C.6)
Positive values of the left side of equation (C.6) imply that non-responders work at larger
employers than do responders since 1− pd ∈ (0, 1). The converse is true for negative values
of the left side.
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